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ABSTRACT
Decision making is a process that is characterized by several activities. For a typical seml-
structured to unstructured multi-criteria task, decision-makers must go through problem
exploration, the so-called intelligence phase, to understand what the task is about. Subsequent,
critical activities are design of alternatives, choice generation and building consensus around the
generated choices. The best idea will be implemented usually by a group of several stakeholders.
Unless care has been taken to build consensus during the decision process, the implementation is
unlikely to succeed. That is, the decision is unlikely to become a purposeful action. At the same
time, the multiple objective nature of the considered tasks also adds to the group decision-making
process.
This research explores both creativity or idea generation and supporting consensus building on
the basis of the above justification. An investigation or the currcnt status or multi-criteria group
decision mak ing is done through Iiterature surveys 0 I' the fields 0 I'M ul ti-criteria Dccision Mak ing
and Group Decision Support Systcms. Particular emphasis or thc theoretical and practical sides or
this research is placed on supporting creativity and supporting consensus building. In the rormer.
the issue or task structuring is considered as a way to better enhance the creativity process, within
a laboratory experiment on a problem related to information systems and systems analysis and
dcsign. In the support of consensus building, a theoretical framework is examined within a real
lire study using the multiple criteria group decision-making environment. Team Expert Choice.
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The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of today's business organization no longer makes
momentous decisions on his or her own. The nature of organizational decision making has
changed. There are two, inter-related reasons for this. The first is the increasing complexity of
organizations and the environment in which they must operate; the second relates to the
increasing levels of specialization by individuals. The multi-dimensional nature or complexity of
organizational problems requires these specialists to periodically interact to solve business
problems effectively. Groups are inherently gifted with the ability to out-perform individuals.
Many a study has been devoted to ascertain this (Nunamaker et aI., 1999; Pervan, 1998).
Organizational and environmental complexity not only requires group interaction, it requires
those groups (and individuals that make them up) to be creative in the problem solving process.
This can be seen in today's business organizations increasingly employing creativity experts to
give them an edge over their competitors.
Effective problem solving groups also require the ability to rcadily reach agreement on the
solutions or ideas they generate. At the same timc, thc ability to successfully implement an idea
or solution dcpcnds dircctly Oil the group's abi Ii ty to bui Id and reach cOllscnsus around the
required solution. 111 some scenarios, this consensus is the ultimate goal of the decision making
process, becausc of the cxistcnce of numerous stakeholclers. For example, joint ventures, formcd
for strategic business reasons, require consensual decision making Oil the part of thc parties
involved in order to function efTectively.
1.1. Overview of the structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is structured in the following manner. The first chapter is an introductory
chapter articulating the goals of the research, its importance and justification and broadly its
foundations on the theory of decision making. The second chapter explores research issues
surrounding MCDM. The third chapter is a literature survey of GSS research and its current
status. The fourth chapter explores the specific theoretical foundations of the practical work
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undertaken in this thesis. Chapter Five looks at the design, formulation and discussion of the
experimental work of this thesis. Finally, Chapter Six concludes the research and looks at future
research issues.
1.2. The background to the research problem
Before the tasks and scope of this research are outlined, it is necessary to consider the issues
regarding group interaction within the broader field of decision making.
Decision making is a well-researched field with robust theoretical foundations upon which any
study of group decision making systems or multiple criteria decision making must draw. In this
section the foundations of decision making and the possible classifications of decisions and
decision makers are briefly explored.
On the Foundations of Decision Making
"Decision making is n process of choosing among alternatives courses of action ror the purpose
or attaining a goal or goals" (Turban and !\ronson, 199X:7). Research and surveys of managerial
tasks have consistently reported that the large bulk of managerial activitics consist or dccision
making. "The manager is first and forcmost a decision maker" and "all managerial activities
revolve around decision making" (Turban and Aronson. 1998: Laudon and Laudon. 1996). It has
been noted that managers have considered decision making a purc art. something acquired
through experience learning by trial and error. This is because of individual styles being used to
approach and successfully solve the same typc of managerial problems (Turban and Aronson.
1998). These styles are based mainly on creativity, intuition, judgment and cxperience, in contrast
to being founded on systematic quantitative methods that are grounded on a scicnti fic approach
(Turban and Aronson, 1998).
However, in recent times, socicty has witnessed organizations evolving in a way that regularly
and periodically requires groups of individuals and not just individuals to be collectively called
upon to address semi-structured tasks for the benefit of the organization (DeSanctisand Gallupe,
2
Chapter I I"troduction
1987; Pumsook and Jenney, 1997). Organizational problems have either become increasingly
more complex and or organizations have to be more accountable for the decisions they make.
There is an extended pool of stakeholders in the decisions facing organizations. This pool has
grown to include what previously would have been considered outsiders to the process and the
outcome.
Turban and Meredith (1994) identify the environmental changes (see Table 1.1 below) that have
increased the general level of complexity of the environment in \vhich managers must operate.
For example, the state of competition has so increased that neither physical border nor legislation
can protect organizations; this has had the most impact on recently democratising societies.
Turban and Meredith (1994) conclude that because of these changes decision making has become
more complicated than in the past.
Tuble 1.1 FRctors Affecting Decision Making. (Adapted from TurbRIl Rnd Meredith (1994»
Factor Trend Results
Technology Increasing ~ More alternatives lo
In rormat ion/cam rulers Increasing ~ choose rrom
Structural Complexity Increasing ~ Larger Cost or Making
Competition Increasing ~ Errors
International Markets Inc reas ing ~ More uncertai nt)'
Political stability Increasing ~ regarding the futurc
Consumcrism Increasing ~
Government intervention Increasing ~
The above table shows that the increase in the number or alternatives facing decision makers as a
result of the changes in the major factors affecting decision making contributes to the increase in
complexity of the latter. There are four reasons advanced for this. (I) There are unabated, rapid
3
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improvements being made in technology and communication systems. (2) The cost of committing
an error can be very large, precisely because of the" complexity and magnitude of operations,
and the chain reaction that an error can cause in many parts of the organization" (Turban and
Aronson, 1998:9). (3) The information necessary to make decisions can be difficult to access. (4)
Decisions have to be made quickly (Turban and Aronson, 1998).
As a result of these changes and trends, the trial and error approach to managerial decision
making has become unreliable. Managers have to be more sophisticated and use new tools and
techniques that have been and continue to be developed (Turban and Aronson, 1998). Computer
applications have moved from transaction processing and activity monitoring to information
systems that support problem analysis and solution applications.
Levels of Decision Making in Organizations
It is important to make the distinction between problem solving and decision making: "the three
activities - fixing agendas, setting goals and designing actions - are usually called prohlem
s(}l"ing"~ while "evaluating and choosing is usually called decision fJlaking" (Simon et al..
19X7: 11).
!\nthony (1965) usefully grouped decision making in organizations into three levels:
• The Strategic level - which concerns itsel f classically with determining long-term
objectives. resources. and policies in an organization.
• The Management Control level - which is related to the monitoring of how efficiently
and effectively resources are utilized and how well operational units are performing.
• The Operational Control level - which concerns itself with deciding how to carry out
tasks specified by upper and middle management and establishing criteria for completion
and resource allocation.
More recently. Laudon and Laudon (1996) have suggested that another level between
management control and operational control can be included,
4
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• The Knowledge-level - which typically deals with evaluating new ideas for products
and services; ways to communicate new knowledge and ways to distribute
information throughout the organization.
Laudon and Laudon's (1996) definition is appealing in light of the prevalence of knowledge
workers in today's organization.
Possible Classifications of Decisions
For each level of decision making in an organization there are various types of decisions that
must be 'made' at various points in time. Simon's (1960) classification of these decisions types
as being either programmed or non-programmed has been largely embraced in the literature.
Often, this same distinction is referred to as structured and unstructured decisions (Turban and
Aronson, 1998; Forman, 1997, Turban and Turban, 1996 and others). Unstructured decisions
have been described as novel, important, non-rolltine decisions in which the decision maker must
provide judgment, evaluation, and insights into the problem-definition: there is no agreed-upon
procedure for making such decisions (Gorry and Scott-Morton, 1971 ~ Stevens and Finlay, 1996).
Structured decisions on the other hand are decisions that are repetitive, routine and have a
definite procedure for handling them (Gorry and Scott-Morton, 1971 ~ Laudon and Laudon 1(96).
In hetween lie decisions that arc semi-structured, that is, decisions where only a portion of the
decision has clear answcrs that can heen generated hy a known or accepted procedure (I,audon
and Laudon, 19(6).
Stages in Decision Making
While there are di fferent types of decisions for eaeh of the organizational decision making levels,
it is important to note that decision making per se is not a single unified activity or event (Laudon
& Laudon, 1996; Simon 1960; 1977, Turban and Aronson, 1998~ Forman, 1997). Decision
making is a process characterized by several activities, which typically take place at different
times. A process can be defined as 'a series of actions, changes, or functions that bring about an
cnd or resulf (forman, 1997:20). A process has connotations of the passage of time by definition
(The American Heritage Dictionary and Rogct's Electronic Thesaurus, 1987). The decision
making process entails four stages (Simon, 1960):
5
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• Intelligence - where the decision maker has to perceive and understand the problem.
• Design - once the problem has been perceived by the decision maker, possible solutions
must be designed.
• Choice - once several alternative solutions have been designed, a choice solution must
be identified or selected.
• Implementation - where the chosen solution is carried out.
Simon's model has been described as being mainly suitable for structured decisions. For
unstructured decisions the model of Mintzberg et al. (1976) is considered more suitable. The
latter contains three main decision making phases: identification, development and selection.
There are a number of additional stages within these. Mintzberg et al. (1976) found, on the basis
of a study of 25 strategic decision making processes that the greatest amount of activity
concentrated in the development phase of the decision process. This phase involves searching,
designing and screening. Other features that are significant about the work of Mintzberg et al.
(1976) are the exploration of' the role of' time in the decision process, and the investigation of'
interruptions within a dynamic decision environment, in which power and organi/,ational politics
play an important role.
The distinction between the decision making phases is important for the purposes or this
dissertation because the focus in Chapter Four wi 11 be on enhanci ng the intdl igence phase of
decision making by lIsing structuring tcchniqucs and group decision making support tools and
technology.
Types of decision makers
The complexity of the decision making process is compounded by the dissimilar cognitive styles
of the decision makers. For example, there are systcluatic and intuitive decision makers
(Jcnnings and Wattam, 1994). Systematic dccision makers are people who approach a problem by
structuring it in terms of some formal method. Intuitive decision makers on the other hand,
approach a problem using a multiplicity of methods in an unstructured fashion. These differences




From Individual Decision Making to Group Decision Making
Research in Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) has grown in the last 15 years as a result
of progress in the understanding of group processes and dynamics, and the improved capabilities
of information technologies that support them. These issues are dealt with at length in chapter
three of this dissertation. At this stage it suffices to point out that a central issue in this type of
research is investigating creativity support. Although much research has been conducted widely
elsewhere in this area (Dennis et aI, 1996, Dennis, 1999), to the best knowledge of the author
there have been no studies of this kind performed in South Africa.
Among the many facets of group decision support research, the focus on the role of task
structuring for brainstorming groups is a relatively new issue. It takes electronic brainstorming
software environments research and practice to what DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987) defined as
more machine-induced group communication patterns that can include expert advice. While
much research has been conducted in the GDSS lield, it has been restricted to modelling
tcchniques or the kind round in traditional DSS. In the area of' idea generation, many rcsearchers
have demonstrated the benclits or electronic support versus no support. Little attention has been
paid to cnhancing thcsc environlllcnts however. For this rcason, task structuring was cOllsidcrcd
seriously in formulating the scope of this research. In a Illulti-criteria group cnvironlllent onc
typically observes a divergent proccss, first, which is associated with the generation or ideas; and
subsequcntly a convergent process, which is directed at reaching consensus on a particular issue.
Support ing consensus bui Id ing logically follows the idea generation process. This is the
justi fication for the inclusion or both topics in this study.
This research concentrates on both the divergent and convergent processes. It can be asserted that
both processes play an important role in the quality or decision making within small groups; and
this was another .i usti fication for the selection of the goals of this research.
While commercial group decision support environments have been on the market ror about nine
years, the first multi-criteria group decision support environment, Team Expert Choice was
7
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introduced in 1997. The novelty of this type of GDSS is a further justification for the scope of
work reported in this research.
1.3. Goals of the Research
The main goal of this research is to investigate the role of task structuring on creativity and ways
of supporting consensus in a multi-criteria group decision support environment. Both issues are
important aspects of the theory and application of multi-criteria group support systems. The sub-
goals of the research are:
(I) To investigate the foundations and current research issues In Multi Criteria Decision
Making (MCDM);
(2) To investigate the main issues in Group Decision Support Systems (GOSS);
(3) To investigate the role of task-structuring in group electronic brainstorming sessions;
(4) To research the issue of supporting consensus building in a multi-criteria group decision
environment.
1.4. Scope and limitations of the research
The research on creativity in (,roup Support Systcms is a very hroad (see Connoly et aL 1994:
liallupe ct aL 1991 :Dclmis and Valacich, 1991: Dermis, 19(6). This research concentrates only
on the role of task structuring in a brainstorming session, because relatively littlc rescarch has
been donc on thc issuc. Thcre arc other gencral group support cnvi ronmcnts like GroupSystcll1s
V which have been used in previous research (Nunamaker et al. 1989, Grohowski, et al 1(90),
but this research uses a multiple criteria group support systcms bccausc it is a rclativcly new
tcchnology in the ficld of ass.
The theory of' MCDM includcs several approaches as discussed in chaptcr two or this
disscrtation. However, the most widely used, commercially available multi-criteria group support
cnvironment is for the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AI-JP). In addition, previous ':York on
supporting consensus building in an MDCM group setting also uses the AHP, although not in a
computerized group support environment. Hence, the selection of Team Expert Choice allowed
for the generation of results which could be compared with important previous work on
8
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consensus building in a group MCDM problem (Bryson, 1997; Bryson, 1996; Ngwenyama et aI,
1996). These researchers used proprietary, in-house developed software which is neither
commercially available nor in the public domain.
1.5. Research methodology
A useful triad for the justification of research (Robey, 1996) includes research aims, theoretical
foundations and research methods. Research aims determine both the theoretical foundations and







Fi~n rl' 1.1 A t dad for the .Jnsti firatioll of H.esea I'd. (adapted from J{ohey (19()6»
It has been suggested that the theoretical foundation of research is what distinguishes it from the
realm of theoretical unfounded management consultancy (Jackson. 1995). The starting point in
determining the appropriate research approaches are the aims of the research as outlined in a
preceding section. The two important aspects of group processes that are considered here provide
a deeper insight into the process of group decision making.
One of the sub-goals of this research is thus to conduct a detailed analysis of the literature sources
in the areas Decision Making and or Multi-Criteria Group Support Systcms. The surveys examine
(I) the current state of GDSS altcr 30 years of existencc~ (2) the foundations and current research
issues in MCDM in general and more specitically in the Analytic Ilierarchy Process. The
theoretical foundations of this research are formulated on the basis or the literature analysis. The
issue of task structuring in idea generation is addressed through a laboratory experiment as that is
the most appropriate environment for controlling some of the parameters of the research. The
9
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theoretical dimension of that part of the research relates to the partial replication of the work by
Dennis et al. (1996) and Dennis et al. (1999). Their work is new within the field off GDSS. This
research embarks on verifying the conditions laid out in their studies using the Team Expert
Choice. environment, which is not investigated in previously published research on task
structuring to the best knowledge of the author.
On the other hand, one of the outcomes from the literature survey is the indication of a need to
expand the research methods used beyond the traditional laboratory experiment where
appropriate. For this reason the process of supporting consensus building in a Multi-criteria
Group Decision environment is investigated through a qualitative field study as it provides more
insights into the issue if compared to laboratory experiments. The above considerations outline
the research methodology adopted in this dissertation in line with the general guidelines
expressed by Robey (1996) in Figure 1.1.
1.6. Significance of the research
The University of Natal Pictermaritzburg· recently aequircd a Group Decision Support System
environment in the form of Team Expert Choice. The university is thus positioned as one of two
tert iary inst it ut ions ill South 1\ frica to possess a group decision support systcm enabl ing it to
conduct contcmporary CiSS research, This has prcscnted thc researchcr with an opportunity to
explorc experimcntal GSS work \\'ithin a reputable software cnvironment. In addition. using
Team Expcrt Choice is also significant because a majority of published GSS research is
conducted within the confincs of laboratory experimentation using Ventana Corp's GroupSytellls
(Nunamaker, et al. 1999). The contribution of the currcnt research is that it applies GOSS theory
using a di fferent, yet reputable software platform for both laboratory and field studies.
Research into task structuring is one of first steps in the direction of enhancing the performancc
derived from group support environments through simple interventionist strategies. To the best or
this author's knowledge, the work of Dcnnis et aI., (1996) and Dcnnis et aI., (1999), is the only
other research on the matter. There is therefore both scope and need for further research in this
particular area of Group Support Systems and Electronic Brainstorming in particular. The benefit
10
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of exploring task structuring for the purposes of enhancing the productivity, effectiveness and
efficiency of electronic brainstorming groups is a relevant and timely contribution to the field.
An added justification of this research is that it uses a Systems Analysis and Design task for the
context of the research. To the best of this author's knowledge there are no recorded cases of
similar research using Systems Analysis and Design as its context.
The practical dimension relates to the knowledge that, no such research on electronic
brainstorming has been conducted within South Africa. Secondly, in exploring group multiple
criteria decision making within a live environment with real stakeholders, a significant effort is
made to improve the decision making by student leaders engaged in an important social activity.
Thirdly, the qualitative field study with real stakeholders is justified in light of the reported dearth
of other methods of research (other than laboratory experimentation) in the field of GSS (Pervan,
1998; Nunamaker, 1999).
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CHAPTER 2. ON MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING (MCDM):
GENERAL RESEARCH ISSUES
2.1. Introduction
Schoemaker and Russo (1991) observe that in practice when managers or decision makers have
to tnake a decision, there is occasional reflection and "lots of shooting from the hip." Yet,
decision theory and many decision approaches have been around for a long time (Schoemaker
and Russo, 1991). Decision Psychology has documented the shortcomings that people, left to
their own devices, typically display when making a decision: for example, over-confidence,
myopic framing and looking mainly for confirming evidence (Schoemaker and Russo, 1991). The
availability of many decision approaches means, where decision makers opt to follow a
systematic approach to decision making, not only must they eventually make a decision or select
the best alternative, they must also decide on which decision approach to use in the decision
making process. Thcy have to "dccide how to decide", for thcrc are costs and benefits associated
with thc various approaches (Schoemaker and Russo, 1991: 4).
1n general, there is a hierarchy of decision making approachcs as discussed by Schocmaker and
Russo (1991). (Sec Figurc 2-1 below). The hierarchy assumes that at the lowcst level a dccision
maker has thc option or utilizing intuitivc judgmcnts, which arc gcncrally "unsystcmatic,
unrd iablc and su frcr rrom consistcncy problcms." Schoemaker and Russo (1991) report or
cxperimental evidcncc whcrc the samc group or decision makcrs wcre given the same problem at
d i rrcrent ti mcs, they ended up selecting di ffercnt choices "j n somc instances decisions changed
rrom week to week." Othcr shortcomings or intuitivc judgcmcnt arc the random unrcliability or
dccision making, 1'01' example the most reccnt information may be over-wcightcd (callcd rcccncy
bias), this may givc way to (primacy bias) that carly imprcssion formation frames subsequcnt
qucstioning or frcezcs judgments into stereotypcs. finally, dccision makers can have arraming
bias (their refercncc points), which influences thc manncr in which they draw boundaries around
problems and the implicit yardsticks thcy usc to evaluatc the consequences of thcir options
(Schoemaker and Russo, 1991).
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(Screening and Ranking Rules)
Intuitive Judgments
Figure 2-1 n Pyrnmld of Dedsloll Approaches (adapted frol11 SdlOcl11akcr ulld Russo. 1991)
J~nnings and Wattam (1994) suggest that intuitive judgment is defici~nt enough to require
"decision aids." Decision aids are based on common and simplistic strategies and f~ll1 into three
categories: (I) CORllitive Decisioll l{lIles: these includ~ satislicing, the use or analogs and
adages, nutshell briefings, and incremental change. This implies the decision maker sticks as
closely as possible to the last decision b~aring on the issue and agreement. Satisficing, a cognitive
decision rule, can b~ traced back to Simon's (1977) concept or bounded rationality. The concept
states that people do not optimise, they satisfice. That is they do not choose the best alternative
there is, but rather seek a "satisfactory" alternative. This is likely because "a cognitive decision
rule that selects the first alternative that satisfies all aspiration levels is much easier to implement
although often with less desirable results" (Dyer and Forman, 1992: 101). The second category
(2) Aftiliative Decision Rules arc based on 'avoiding punishment'. 4 following the party line' and
'preserving group harmony.' The third category is concerned with (3) Self Serving and Emotive
Rules. That is. serving self or personal interests, 'relying on gut feel' (which is inflyenced by
onc's present mood); 'retaliating'; 'the feeling that we can do it;' feelings of elation' (Jennings and
Wattam, 1994). The above decision aids may work in certain, routine choices, but may be
problematic when dealing with important complex decisions (Dyer and Forman, 1992).
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On the second level of the hierarchy are heuristics. The third and slightly more sophisticated
level is bootstrapping, which is the modelling of expert knowledge. It can account for random
noise and some amount of complexity. Finally, there are value analysis approaches, like the
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process, which is the focus
of this research.
In general, it is reasonable that the importance, complexity and context of the decision should be
the guiding factors when choosing a decision making approach. Examining decision contexts
means looking at whether there are common objectives, non-common- objectives and/or conflict
(Dyer and Forman, 1992). The selection of a decision approach is not a simple matter. Certain
decision making approaches may be suitable for certain kinds of decision contexts and
complexity. This will become evident in this dissertation as expected utility theory and the
Analytic Hierarchy Process are more closely examined. Whether or not a comprehensive, multi-
purpose approach is ideal or even feasible is still subject to debate.
The field of Operations Research/Management Science (OR/MS) provided a basis for dealing
with formalized decision efficiency and effectiveness. Decisions must he efficient, - a
preoccupation of (M IS and OR/MS)~ they must he effective - a preoccupation of DSS and
MCDM: however they must also he explicable - a preoccupation of Ilurnan Management
Systems (11 MS) (Zeleny, 19X2). "These threc requiremcnts corrcspond to thc interdependcnce of
cxpertisc. know-what, and know-why" (Zeleny, 1982: 474). Briefly eflicicncy is performing a
gi ven task as wcll as possi hie wi th respect to a given pcrformance cri tcrion. usually econom ic.
Effectiveness involves identifying what should be done and the dcsired effect or purpose upon
which the selection of tasks is based (Zeleny. 1982). This is classically presented as "doing things
right" and "doing the right things" in MIS introductory texts.
"Explicability is related to the fact that proposed goals and purposes, even if effective, must be
capable of explanation. Whose purpose is to prevai I and why?" (Zclcny, 1982: 475). Expl icabi Ii ty
is especially relevant today, precisely because more and more decisions involve the interests of' a
group of individuals. The ability to convincc others about the desirability of a given purpose is a
necessary condition for a successful decision implementation (Zeleny, 1982). In this dissertation,
a field study is performed in an environment where explicability is very important. These
requirements are related to the traditional field of Operations Research/Management Science that
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provided a basis for dealing with formalized decision efficiency and effectiveness. These
requirements are related to the traditional classification of management problems into the
categories of operational, tactical and strategic.
2.2. An Overview of Multiple Criteria Decision Making
This chapter will present an exploration of issues surrounding MCDM as a "decision analysis"
tool. It will explore some of the nomenclature used in the discipline; briefly outline the premises
of two well known MCDM approaches with the view of examining where MCDM stands today,
especially with regard to supporting decision making within group contexts. The final section of
this chapter will then examine the Analytic Hierarchy Process, a MCDM method, with respect to
its application in more detail. At the end of the chapter, further potential areas of research will be
reflected upon.
In this dissertation, it is noted that in introducing the foundations of multi-objective or multi-
criteria decision making, their concepts arc largely based on the perspectivcs of the first multi-
criteria methods articulated in multiattrihute utility thcory (May, 1(54) and multi()~iective
programming also known as thc "Illulticriterion simplex mcthod." Thc lattcr was first explored in
I<)()] by Peter nod (Zelcny, 19X2~ (,oicocchea et al. 19X2).
2.2.1. On Single Criterion Optimisation
h.)(· many years aner the birth or Opcrations Research (OR), it was generally considered
acceptable that the only way to formulatc a problem correctly consisted of defining a single
criterion. This criterion would represent the efTectiveness or the system under study (Ro)' and
Vanderpooten, 1995). The strategy of suboptimisation in OR as described by one of the founding
f~\thers of Operational Research, Harvey Wagner is to select one sub-objective, for example profit
maximization, and push it to its limits. This is done although doing so might have some negative
consequence elsewhere. Should the negative effects of such suboptimisation start showing up,
then the next pressing sub-objective is selected and that pushed to its own limits. This notion is
evident in the writing of Wagner (1969: 132) "optimise on the first function, then go on to each
othcr function, one by onc, employing the previous optimal basis as an intuitive solution." This
notion of suboptimisation is also evident throughout the articulations of economic theory, welfare
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theory, game theory and decision analysis theory (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996; Zeleny 1982). In
these fields, one usually considers things from a rational point of view which involves
maximizing the expected utility of a decision that is usually represented by a single criterion.
This is 'usually expressed as a search for the optimum i.e. maximum or minimum of a function of
variables that are constrained by equations or inequalities. For example one could seek to
maximize the objective function z(x) i.e.
max z(x)
subject to
gi(X)::; 0, i = 1,2,3 1J1
Xj ~ 0, j = I, 2, 3 n
The objective function z(x) and gi(X) are defined on an n-dimensional Euclidean vector space of
decision variables,
x = (XI, X2, X3 ... xn) E Rn
with values in R, the set of real numbers.
In this problcm thc feasiblc rcgion is delined by
x = {x:x E I{". g,(x) ~ 0 xi ~ () for all i andj }
Note that the functions z(x) and bl(X) can he linear or nOll linear functions or the decision
variahles. XI' This optimisatioll problem seeks to lind x*, an element or the feasible regioll X.
such that X*E X will result in a maximulll value f()l' z(x) (Goicoechea et al.. 1982).
Optimising a single function is arguably a task that most people can perform. The problem is
typically well defined and unambiguous. Moreover. an impressive battery of analytical tools have
been developed allowing for quick and mostly error-free calculations to be pcrformed (lcleny.
1982). "The quantitative models of econometrics, operations research and managcment science
assist in untangling complicated cause-cffect structures and interdependencies" (Zeleny. 1982:
485). For example, maximizing sales as a single function is relatively simple if sales were the
only variable or objective that mattered. Irall else rai Is, onc can drop the price to zero~ and if that
did not optimise results either, one could pay for the items to be taken (Schoemaker and Russo,
199]). However, in this example, simultaneously maximizing the profit function could be another
legitimate criterion. Roy (1977) observes that the reality of executive decision making is that, real
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decisions are based on a progressive comparison of the preference systems of multiple actors, in a
generally fuzzy environment, evolving through interactions within the sphere of different
political, value, and power frameworks. Attempting to reduce such a variety of factors into a
single criterion of choice would constitute a gross misrepresentation of reality. Historically,
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) has indicated a concern with this class of problems
that involves multiple attributes, objectives, or goals; objectives that are often competing for the
same, finite resources. By emphasizing the multiplicity of criteria it presents an attempt to avoid
using a common measure of value when the choice involves heterogeneous items (Iz and
Gardiner, 1993; Stewart 1992).
The multiplicity of criteria in every arena of business, public policy and even personal decision
making is today almost self-evident. In this research, however focus will be on business or
organizational decision making.
2.2.2. The Formulation Of The Multi-Objective Problem
!\ multi-ol~iectiveproblem is characterized by a p-dimcnsional vector or objective functions
alld a reasible region X as dclined abovc. Contrary to thc single-objcctivc case, ill licu or sceking
a single optimal solution, a set or non-dominated solutions is sought ((,oicocchca et a!. 19X2).
This set or nOIl-dominated solutions is a subset or thc Icasible regioll, X. Thc main characteristic
or the non-dominated set or solutions is "fe)r cach solution outside thc set but still within thc
feasible region, there is a non-dominated solution 1'01' which all objective runctions arc unchanoccl. ~
or improved and at least one which is strictly improved" (Goicocchea et a!', 1982: 19). Thus the
concept of' "optimisation" within a multi-objective programming problem cannot be said to exist
since one cannot in general optimise (l priori a vector or objective functions (Goicoechca ct al..
19X2). Keen (1977) similarly notes that optimisation in the traditional mathcmatical scnse is
impossible if mUltiple criteria are involved.
Goicoechea et al. (1982) propose that the set of non-dominated solutions be formulated as
follows:
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max-dominate Z(X) == [ZI(X), Z2(X), ... , Zp(x)]
subject to
XEX
The term "max-dominate" is used to convey the intent to search and identify the set of non-
dominated solutions that is, the set of solutions that dominate the other solutions in X
(Goicoechea et aI., 1982).
Assuming more of each objective function is desirable then given a set of feasible solutions X,
the set of non-dominated solutions, denoted by S is defined as follows:
S =={ x: x E X there exists no other Xl E X such that
Zq (x') > 41 (x) for some q E (I, 2, ... , p)
and Z k(X') 2: '4 (x) for all k ~ q}
l1ased on the definition of S as one moves from one non-dominated solution to another non-
dominated solution and one objective function improves thcn one or more of the other objective
functions must decrease (Goicoechea ct al.. 19X2). I:inally. therc is a set of non-dominatcd
ohjcctives. Z. givcn a I)-dimensional vector of ohjective functions. z(x). a set of Icasihle solutions
llll<.1 a set or non- dominatcd solutiol1s S. Z is n:prcscl1tcd as follows
Z =:7.(x): 7.(x) E RI'. and XE S:-
so tlwt for every :\ E S. therc corresponds an elemcnt [/'-I(X). Z2(X) ..... :l1'(x)1 in the set or 11011-
dominated objectives. Z (Goicocchea et al.. 1982; Zelcny 1(82). The orderil1g or the set or 110n-
dam inatecl objecti ves can be accolllpl ishecl by usi ng add itional cri teria. "The add itional cri teria
can be determined by considering the preferences or the decision maker as they relate to the
various object ive functions. thei r tradeofTs. and the probabi Iity 0 f achievement associated \Vi th
the value of an objective function" (Goicoechea et al.. 1982:23).
The concept or non-dominated solution was similarly considered as the Parcto optimum. or
theory of "Pareto optimality" applied to operations research and productive efficiency.
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Simon's (1960) concept of satisficing indicates that certain cognitive limits lead decision makers
to think in terms of bounded rationality. This concept has often been thought of as a suitable
extension and modification of the concept of optimisation. However, Zeleny (1982) argues that
the notion of satisficing is only superficially compelling.
2.2.3. Inherent Conflict in a Multiple Criteria Problem
Often in complex decision situations such as policy planning issues characterized by multiple
criteria, decision makers are frequently more concerned with resolving conflict, reducing risk and
managing cognitive strain than with optimising solutions (Zeleny, 1982, Saaty, 1990). Conflict is
an inherent property of any multi-criteria problem; this is largely due to limited resources and or
varying individual vested interests (Goicoechea et aI., 1982). Von Neumann and Mogernstern
(1953: 10) articulate it as follows
11 ... this mUltiple objective situation is certainly no maximum problem, but a peculiar and
disconcerting mixture of several conflicting problems. This kind of problcm is nowhcre dealt with
in classical mathematics. It arises in full clarity even in the most "elemcntary" situations, e.g. when
all variables can assumc only a finite number of variablcs"
lJnder these circumstances, "the MCDM model becomes a methodology supporting the problem-
sol vi ng process of the decision maker" (/.deny, 1982: ()l).
(\mllict can only bc rcsolvcd through innovation or adaptation. I.C. dcveloping altcrnativcs
previously unknown. or changing the current value structure of the decision makcr so that the
decision maker becomes satislied with one of the available alternatives (Goicoechea et al. 1(82).
The very source of prc-c1ecision contlict is the non-availability or suitable alternatives and
especially the infeasibility of the ideal alternative (Zcleny. 1982). Thus the decision maker starts
searching for ncw alternatives, prcferably those closely approximating the ideal. In this search for
an alternative the ideal alternative becomes a reference point. If the ideal alternative became
feasible the decision would stop and the conflict would be resolved. Initially, the search is
systematic with more and more information being gathered and perhaps even more decision
makcrs being brought into the process. However, as the decision maker realizes that additional
information is unlikely to reverse or signitieantly intluence the existing order of preferences, the
process becomes more biased and subjective (Zeleny, 1982). Conflicting criteria are derived from
thc various, basic needs and values of human beings.
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For instance, a potential employee when considering a new job will consider not just salary, but
future expected rates of increase, fringe benefits, working conditions, vicinity to the home,
responsibility and the levels of challenge entailed in the job. The choice can be complex and even
'agonizing' (Zeleny, 1982). Being faced with multiple and conflicting objectives implies that a
trade-off necessarily takes place for the choice to be made. In other words, in a partial to
complete ordering of the set of non-dominated solutions, improving achievement with respect to
one objective can only be accomplished at the expense of another. Pareto optimality (efficiency)
is exactly that point at which one cannot improve one measure without decreasing another.
2.2.4. The Role of the Decision Maker
The set of non-dominated solutions was defined as a subset of the initial set of feasible solutions.
In the tradition of multiple-objective decision making, this was done without considering the
preferences of the decision maker. The related set of non-dominated objectives generally
represents a collection of incomparable solutions, since the objective functions may be
incomparable in the lirst place. Such incomplete orderings imply the need for introducing value
judgments into the solution process, the 'value structure' of the decision maker. In this regard, the
decision maker can he asked to articulate his or her prcferences to ordcr thc altcrnativc solutions
in thc non-dominated set «(ioicocchca et a!. 19X2). Thcre arc two methods that have been used in
accounting for the valuc structure or the decision maker:-
I. Methods which rely on the prior articulation of preferences and
2. Methods which rely 011 progressive articulation of preferences.
Methods of prior articulation of preferences rcquire, as inputs. value judgmcnts from the decision
maker independently for each point of view (in order to construct a partial preference model lor
each point of view) and some inter-criteria preference information. methods of progressive
articulation of prefercnces on the other hand permit the systematic exploration of the dccision
space without requiring the prior specification of any preferences (Bana e Costa et al.. 1995). In
addition, much of decision theory is pre-occupied with whether decision methods should
recommend the best way to make optimal decisions regardless of what the disposition of the
decision nlaker is; or whether to attempt to understand the manner in which humans make
decisions, seeing as they have been doing so for as long as they have existed. In the next section,
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decision theories are defined, as this becomes important in evaluating the current MCDM schools
of thought later in the chapter.
2.2.5.· A Discussion on Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Decision
Theories
A descriptive theory is one which purports to describe the world as it is, explaining how people
make decisions and predicting the decisions that they may make (Howard, 1992, Keeney, 1992).
Its quality or performance is measured by the extent to which it accurately characterizes and
predicts the behaviour of actual systems or the behaviour of peoples (Keeney, 1992; Howard,
1992). A normative theory on the other hand, establishes norms for how things should be.
Consequently, "normative models have no place in the physical sciences because they deal with
fact rather than human behaviour" (Howard, 1992:32). Still, proponents of normative theory
believe that in a decision making environment, where human will is very much the issue, not only
is it possible, but often it is desirable, to propose the norms for decision making, norms so cogent
that once accepted any departure from them would be considered a mistake (I IowaI'd, 1992: 29).
The term "decision analysis" is defined as applied decision theory (lloward, 1(92). "Decision
analysis is the engineering use or the norms or decision theory in the practical world" (1Ioward,
1992:52).
Iloward (1992) uses the word normative In the sense of "rules that should govern decision
making" (HowarcL 1992:51). Keeney. (1992) defines Ilormative approaches to decisiollmaking as
focusing on the rational procedures for decision making and how decisions should be made in
order to be logically consistent with these rational procedures. Other authors have used the word
normative to mean "ideal descriptions or individual decision making that should not necessarily
he followed in actual practice" (Howard. 1992:51).
Prescriptive decision making is according to Howard (1992) merely reference to the decision
process that is to he recommended to the decision maker even ir the normative rules are violated
in the process. These prescriptive rules are merely approximations or the norms that are necessary
when applying the norms in practice. "They are not mistakes in the sense or violations or the
norms of decision making, ... but are rather interpretations required to apply the norms sensibly in
the world" (Howard, 1992:52). In many eases these are founded on higher decision rules such as
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"one should not spend more resources on a decision process than the results of the process are
worth to one" (Howard, 1992:52). For Howard (1992), the only time it would be worth risking
violating the norms would be when the cost of ensuring that they were satisfied was more than
the cost of the potential violation. "In a prescriptive approach the analyst begins with a
description and draws up prescriptions based on normative hypotheses validated by the reality
thus described" (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996). Accordingly there is no reason therefore for
violating the norms in any decision, or any reason to think decision analysis or decision
engineering is any different from any other engineering discipline (Howard, 1992).
Keeney (1992) proposes a useful framework, depicted on Table 2.1 below. In the table there are
three rows representing the three theories normative, descriptive and prescriptive. The first three
columns are part of a matrix representing all decision problems; classes of decision problems and
specific decision problems. The next two columns represent the criterion for evaluating axioms
and the judges who apply the criteria.
(The depicted X on Tahle 2. I shows the focus of attention of the theory)
Tnhle 2.1 Fentures thnt distinJ:llish normative, desl'riptive, nnd prescriptive decision mnkinJ:
Prohlclll FOl'lIs






IAdapted f rOI11 Keeney (1992: 58)J
N(lJ'll1at iv'c ;\ ( 'orrcctness Theoretical
Sagcs
I kscriptivc \ Empirical ,.:, pcri men tal
Validity Rcsearchers
------- ------
11rescri pt ivc \ t Iscflllncss Applied
Analysis
~
As can be seen from Tahle 2.1 with normative theory the focus is on al/ decision prohlems, The
criterion for evaluating a set of axioms is whether they arc logically correct. meaning that they
are rational and lead to logically consistent decisions. The appraisal on logical correctness
requires a conclusion reached by "wise sages" meaning those individuals concerned with the
theoretical foundations of decision making (Keeney 1992:58). With descriptive theory on the
other hand, the choice of axioms is not one of preference or professional belief. Rather the issue
is whether the axioms describe the manner in which people actually make decisions. According
to Keeney (1992), since the question needs to be empirically tested by researchers, the focus
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typically is on classes of decision problems that are conveniently aggregated, e.g. investment
decisions.
Finally, prescriptively the point of interest is in addressing specific decisions. Here a decision
analyst' would focus on one decision problem at a time and is not particularly concerned with
whether the axioms utilized to support the analysis for that given problem are appropriate for
other classes of problems or all other problems. The main criterion is whether the axioms are a
selection of axioms for a specific decision problem (Keeney, 1992). In addition, Keeney (1992)
identifies an overall set of assumptions that axiomatic systems must fit into for the purposes of
prescriptive decision analysis. There are five aspects that theoretical assumptions (axioms) need
to address (Keeney, 1992:60; Saaty 1990, Keen and Raiffa, 1993).
• structuring the problem,
• quantifying the objectives,
• describing the possible impacts,
• integrating information to provide guidance for decision making and
• communicating the insights of the analysis
The first asped, struduring the decision problem forms the foundation or any spcci fication
analysis (Keeney, 1992~ Saaty 1990~ Kccn and Rain~l, 1(93). It means identifying the alternatives
and qualitatively specifying the objectives in a manner useful for quantitative analysis (Kceney.
1992: Keell alld Rain~l. 19lJl). For rn:scriplive analysis a combination of theoretical and
operational assumptions is ncccssary. The choicc or appropriatc theoretical axioms depcnds.
among other things. on thc implcmentation or thcse axioms ill givcn situations (Kecncy. 1992:
Kccn and Rai n~l, 19(3).
Tahle 2.2 A Categorization of Assumptions Required for Prescriptive Decision Analysis, .
Focus of Assumptions
Idcntifying Quantifying. Describing Integrating Commun icati ng
Prohlcm Objcctives Impacts Information Insights




[Adapted trom Keeney (1992)]
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From the above it is clear that normative, descriptive and prescriptive theories to decision making
address different questions. It is important to bear in mind that different theories are often
developed with different objectives in mind, and that many tricky issues are involved (WinkleI',
1990)..
2.2.6. On the Use of Decision Methods for Individual and Group Decision Making
In its earlier times, MCDM focused on supporting individual decision makers; it has since seen a
growing interest in adapting multiple criteria decision methodology to the needs of multiple
decision makers and collaborative technologies (lz and Gardiner, 1993). The existence of several
participants in the decision making process further compounds the issue of multiple criteria
decision making. Intuitively, one imagines that it is hard enough balancing several conflicting
criteria emanating from the same individual. Yet doing the same action for criteria and values
derived from a group of decision makers is considerably more complex.
Thcn.~ is some dchatc on whether the dccision methods traditionally applied to individual dccision
making could hc equally applicd to group dccision making. Thc question is relevant to
proponcnts of nonn;'ltivc, dcscriptive or prcscriptivc thcorics alikc. By his own admission,
IIowaI'd (1992:53), "would hc n:ticcnt to offcr any warranty on thc quality of thc dccision making
... in a group dccision process" using exrected utility's normativc tools. IInward's observations
are aligncd to thc idcas articulatcd by Arrow (1957) that no group dccision proccss, except
dictatorship, would satisfy thc simrle requircmcnts that would necd to bc placed on any sensible
dccision process. Ccrtain members of the grour may utilizc (all the problcms of) gaming.
misreprcscntations of agcnda and manipulation. Somc may bc motivated to bc deceptive about
their representations of the basis elements (i.e. or the alternativcs, information prefercnces
(I IowaI'd. 1992:53). Thcrcfore, Howard asserts, hc cannot vouch for the succcss of normative
theory for succcssful implcmentation in a group environmcnt in the rrivate sector. Within
governmcnt sector environs, he is even more scertical.
On the contrary, according to Keeney (1992), it is a common misconception that expected utility
axioms are not suitable for the decision problems involving more than one decision maker. He
attests that this is simply not true. He observes that the axioms themselves never mention the
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need for a decision maker or the role of the decision maker. The axioms simply state that one can
obtain preference judgments necessary to construct the probabilities and utilities for the decision
problem. So, if there were a group and the group was willing to somehow specify the necessary
preference judgments to utilize in the analysis, then the analysis might be useful (Keeney, 1992).
In fact, with expected utility theory" there is no need to have an identifiable decision maker or
decision makers" (Keeney, 1992:69). The analyst could identify a knowledgeable interested party
to construct the appropriate utility functions or even complete the analysis with various utility
functions provided by the analyst himself or herself based on his or her understanding of the
problem. If the resulting analysis provides insights that reach the decision makers and influences
decisions, this could be very important and certainly qualifies as decision analysis. Indeed, for
some problems one cannot forecast who all the decision makers will be in the future (Banville, et
aI., 1998; Keeney, 1992).
Group decision making contexts are just one example illustrating the limitations of objectivity for
decision making thcories and approaches. In many real-world problems, the "decision maker" as
a person, truly able to makc a decision, does not always exist. Usually several people (actors or
stakeholders) take part ill the decision process and it is important not to confuse who ratities the
decision with the so-called decision maker in the decision process. The decisioll maker is in f;lct
thc pcrson (or set or pcrsons) for whom or in thc namc or whom thc dccision aid is provided
(Hanvillc, et aI., I<)<)X; Roy and Vandcrpooten, I<)<)(l).
Thcrc arc other fundamcntal limitations or objcctivity; and these arc \Veil rcsearched in thc liekl
or MCDM. Roy and Vandcrpootcn (1996) show threc othcr major aspccts that havc to bc takcn
into account when considering the limitations of strict objectivity in the use of decision aids,
mcthods or approachcs. These limitations confront any decision aid or mcthod be it prescriptive,
descriptive, or normative. The first limitation relates to thc fuzziness of the borderline (or
frontier) between what is and what is not feasible. Moreover, this borderline is frequently
modi lied in the Iight of what is found through the decision anal ysis study itsel f. The second
limitation refers to the preferences of the decision maker. That is, cven whcn the decision maker
is not a mythical person, his or her prefercnces seldom seem well shaped. In and among areas of
firm convictions lie hazy zones of uncertainty, half-held beliefs or indeed conflicts and
contradictions (Roy and Vanderpooten, )996). Roy and Vanderpooten ( 1996) add that it must be
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conceded therefore, that the decision analysis study itself contributes to eliminating questioning,
solving conflicts, transforming contradictions and to destabilizing certain convictions. If, within
this context, a decision is made to resort to a multi-criteria approach, the elaboration of the set of
decision criteria cannot be founded on purely objective considerations (Ray and Vanderpooten,
1996; Saaty, 1990, Saaty and Vargas, 1994). The third limitation of objectivity relates to data
imprecision and uncertainty in that, "data such as the numerical values of evaluations or
performances, the characteristics and the analytic forms of the probabilistic distributions, the
weights of criteria, ... are often imprecise, uncertain, or ill determined" (Roy and Vanderpooten,
1996). Finally, in general, it is believed to be impossible to say that a decision is a good or bad
one by referring only to a mathematical model. There are organizational, pedagogical and cultural
(socio-political) aspects of the entire decision process. These also contribute to the making of a
given decision, its quality and success (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996, Banville, et al. 1998,
Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997).
The above underline the extent to which f~lctors or an objective nature for example, the
characteristics or alternatives interact in decision aids with f~lctors or an cntirely subjectivc naturc
arising from both the actors' systcm or valucs and the way in which iII-detcrmincd conscqucnccs
arc evaluatcd (Roy and Vandcrpootcn, I<)<)G). It is impossiblc to dcny thc importancc of thc
subjcctive I~lctors and to put thcm asidc ill an attcmpt to usc a "totally ohjcctivc" approach (I{o)'
and Vandcrpootcn. 19<)(}; Saaty. I<)()(); Zclcny. I')X2. Saaty and Vargas. 1994. Saaty. I')<) Ia).
2.2.7. The Issue of Measurement and Measurement Scales
Thc introduction of' the decision makcr's (subjcctive) prcfercnces into thc analysis nccessitatcs a
concomitant mcasurcmcnt tool. Thc issuc of mcasurcmcnt for multiplc critcria dccision making
tools. tcchniqucs and mcthods is onc that stirs strong dcbatc. Each mcthod or tcchniquc uscs
somc form of mcasurcmcnt scalc as a fundamcntal assumption. This ordinarily would not posc
any questions wcrc it not for the fact that, thc usc of thc diffcrcnt scales frequcntly yields
differcnt results (Pervan and Klass. 1<)<)3; Saaty, 1991 c). i\ dccision theory must ultimately
justify the way it elicits prefercnces and judgmcnts, converts them to numbers, manipulatcs thcm
and produces an overall answer that bclongs to onc ofthcsc scalcs (Saaty, 199Ic). In this scction
the basic characteristics of mathematical measurement in general are visitcd. The performancc or
each method or technique is then examined.
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Pure mathematical measurement has the following characteristics: unequivocal order, equal
intervals and an unambiguous zero (Mladenova and Millwood, 1998). These features allow for
the performance of mathematical operations with the elements characterized on the scale. The
assumptions about ordering and the equality of intervals allow for the addition and subtraction
operations with such scales, while the unambiguous zero allows for division and multiplication in
terms of the scale (Zeleny, 1982; Pervan and Klass, 1993; Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1991, Vargas,
1994; Mladenova and Millwood, 1998).
There are three major measurement scales: the nominal, ordinal and cardinal scales, which are
discussed next.
The NOlninal Scale is the simplest kind of scale. In a nominal scale there is naming but no
ordering. Properties are broken down into equivalent classes, but the classes are not ranked with
respect to one another. The only rule for the formation of such scales is that the classes be
mutually exclusive (Pervan and Klass, 1<)<)3). Nominal Scales are invariant under the identi ty
transformation (Saaty, 19(1).
Ordinal Scales. on the other hand, are topological scales, which merely order the elements or
properties of elements with respect to one ~\Ilothcr. Things arc rankcd in somc order without the
prclencc of maintaining cqual intcrvals bclwcen thc e1cmcnts. Thcsc scales do not pcrmit any
arithmctic operations (Mladcnova and Millwood, 199R). Ordinal scalcs arc purely rclational:
objects are rank-ordcred and no mcaningful nUlllcrical propertics can be assigncd to thclll. It can
only be said: object 1\ is preferred to object 13, that /\ is equal to 13, or that l3 is preferred to /\.
Ilowcvcr, it cannot be said by how much. Thc intensity or degree of prefcrence is not apparcnt
from ordinal scales. Ordinal scales can be cxprcssed through nUlllcrical or verbal rankings such as
11. 2. ] ...etc. or good, averagc bad, ctc·1 The 1300lean variable II or 0J assigned to a prelcrcnce is
a special case of ordinal scalcs. For ordinal numbers, the intervals or the differences between
them are meaningless for example 17 minus 5 and 4 minus 2J, so that any algebraic manipulations
of these numbers are also meaningless (Zelcny, 1982: 131; Pervan and Klass, 1993; Saaty, 1980;
Saaty and Vargas, 1991). Ordinal scales arc invariant under strictly monotone transformations
(Saaty, 1991).
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Cardinal Scales on the other hand assign meaningful numerical values (numbers, intervals,
ratios etc.) to the objects in question. So that addition, subtraction and multiplication of these by a
constartt is meaningful [7-5 = 4-2]. Cardinal scales can be further divided into interval and ratio
scales (Pervan and Klass, 1993; Saaty, 1980; Zeleny, 1982).
• Interval Scales are characterized by the allowance of an arbitrary zero point. COF and °C are
typical examples). Interval scales are constructed to rank features in a manner, which relies
upon the assumption of the equality of intervals between classes, thus permitting simple
addition and subtraction operations. However, because a zero is not recognized or is arbitrary,
multiplication and division are not permitted (Pervan and Klass, 1993; Saaty, 1980; Zeleny,
1982). Interval scales have the form ax+b, where a>0, b:;tO (Saaty, 199Ic). Interval scales are
invariant under positive linear transformations (Saaty, 1991).
• Ratio Scales. on the contrary. arc characterized by a non-arbitrary zero point or an
unamhiguous zero as well as unequivocal ordering and equal intervals. Ilere the
Illultiplication by interval-scaled variables is allowed (Pervan and Klass, 1<)93~ Saaty. 19X()~
/'c1eny. 19X2). Ratio seales are a special case of interval scaks. with the form ax + O. a O.
While one can add or suhtract inlcrval scales numbers one canllot l11ulliply or divide tl1el11.
With ratio scales. all four arithmetic operations can he performed Oil them. Ratio scales are
invariant under positive similarit), transformations (Saaty. 199 I).
Related to measurement scales is the definition of anchors (Zcleny. 19R2). Anchors are points or
reference. Points of referencc must be defined for thc reason that in praclice it is not suflicient to
ask. "Do you prefer more to less?" Onc needs to know with respect to what. That is. what is the
framework of inquiry. misery or money? The framework or point of reference makes a di fference
to the responsc given. Latcr in this chaptcr when comparing the two methods. the AIIP and the
MAUT. it will be seen that this area is one where M!\UT and AI rp proponents do not agree
(Harker and Vargas, 1990, Winkler. 1990). Nevertheless, in practice. it has been report~d that
decision makers especially those in group environments instinctively resort to simple additive
scoring when confronted with multiple criteria choices, although this evidence is anecdotal
(Zeleny, ]982; Stewart, 1992).
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2.2.8. On The Terminology of MCDM
There is still some controversy regarding standard terminology in the field of MCDM. This is
indicati~e of its still evolving state: there is an "absence of a consistent and unified terminology,
even as to what is meant by criteria" (Bana e Costa, et al. 1995: 263). In this section some of the





Attributes: are descriptors of objective reality (Stewart, 1992). They may be actual objective
traits or may be subjectively assigned traits. They are perceived characteristics of objects.
They carinot be separated from the decision maker's values and model of reality.
Objectives: once the attributes have been specified, the decision maker must decide which
attributes to maximize or minimize. Is the potential employee going to maximize job
challenge and minimize fringe benefits? In answering these questions, the decision maker
speci ties an objective. Objectives thus represent directions of preference for the decision
maker; that is, his needs and desircs. Thcre arc only two directions of preference: more or
less, implying maximize or minimize (Zeleny, 1982). Objcctives are not attributes but are
derived rrom one or more attributes. There is an implied hierarchy in the relationship between
o~iectives and alternatives.
(;oals: are rully illentiliahle \vith thc dccision maker's needs and dcsires. They are (/Iwiori
determ ined spccific valucs or Ievcls dell ncd in terms or attri butes and or objeetivcs (Zclcny.
I(82). They can be precisc desircd Ievcls of attainment or morc fuzzily delincatcd. For
example maximizing prolit is an objectivc but achieving a return or IYYu on investmcnt is a
goal. Goals are "that which will satisfy or reduce the striving" (Goicoechea et al.. 19H2: 25).
Criteria: are measures, rules and standards that guide decision making. Attributes, objectives
and goals can be referred to as criteria. Criteria are all attributes. objeetives and goals that
have been judged as relevant to a particular decision situation by a specific decision maker
(Zeleny, 1982). Bouyssou (1995) proposes a general definition or a criterion, "a tool allowing
for the comparison of alternatives according to a particular point or view". (Sec also Stewart,
1992). This definition incorporates the common language sense of the use of the term
criterion as in measures, rules and standards (that guide decision making). The Oxford
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Dictionary (1984: 172) defines criterion as a "principle or standard that a thing is judged". The
definition also caters for the technical notion of a criterion as a model of preferences between
elements of a set of X real or fictitious actions (Stewart, 1992).
Some of these definitions are subject to debate (refer to Henig and Buchanan (1996) for
additional comments).
2.2.9. On the Types arid Characteristics of Decision Criteria
In the literature, decisions have been classified with respect to different criteria. One
classification reflects the inherent existence of uncertainty in a decision. Where there is certainty
about the decision situation, the decisions have been defined as decisions under certainty. While
decisions under risk are when. the probabilities of occurrence of an event are unknown. There are
decisions under uncertainty, where even the probabilities of occurrence of a particular event are
unknown. This classification is aligned to the decision classification continuum of well-
structured, semi-structured and unstructured decisions (Radford, 1981).
Substantial research (Saaty. 19HO~ Keeney and Rai n~l. 1(76) has been done on the identi lication
or criteria: exploring the desirable pn~perties whieh should be satisfied by a scl or decision
criteria. For instance, Skwart (1992) proposes that decision criteria should he independent and
should avoid the douhle counting or issues. /'eleny (1982:21) descrihes "a userul ta\ollomy or
dilTerent patterns or modes or deciding itself." lie ohserves that "criteria can either he \\"l~11
dclined and quantitatively measurahle or they may he mostly qualitative, poorly measurable and
ladell with uncertainty" Zeleny (1982:2\). III the rormer instance the altematives or choice arc
well ucscri bed. thei r conscq ucnces ars measurable anu thci r impacts understood. In the latter case
the alternatives arc only imprecisely characterized by the criteria. their outcomes are uncertain
and the cause-efTect relationships are ul\.clear. A decision maker can be quite clear, in some cases.
or what his or her preferences arc and':be able to articulate them as a single dominant criterion.
Alternatively the decision maker's- preference may have many sides and be describable only
through the multiple criteria or choicc>The decision maker's task of deciding can in this \\'ay be
classified into four basic groups or modes (Zeleny, 1982):
I. Clearly defined, certain alternatives, which are evaluated in terms of single criteria, named
Computation (analysis).
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2. Poorly defined, uncertain alternatives, which are evaluated in terms of single criteria named
Judgment (MAUT is of this type).
3. Clearly defined, certain alternatives, which are evaluated In terms of multiple criteria,
n~med Compromise.
4. Poorly defined, uncertain alternatives, which are evaluated in terms of multiple criteria,
named Inspiration or Intuition.
This taxonomy is useful in that it provides a distinction between problems of computation,
judgment, compromise and inspiration, with the concomitant implication that possibly different
strategies ought to be used in dealing with the different types of decision problems. In more
recent times, Lai and Hwang (1994) define another taxonomy of decision tasks (that have
multiple and usually conflicting criteria). Their classi fication suggests that there are two decision
task categories, namely:
(I) Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) and
(2) Multiple Objectivc Decision Making (MODM).
• MAJ)M is delined as being associated with problems whose number or alternatives has
already bcen predelined i.e. certail1 (I,ai and Ilwang, 1994). Ilere the decision maker is
required to select, prioritise and rank a linite Ilumher or courses or action ill the 1(lce or
Illultiple (conllicting) attributes. This classilication should then include the compromise
Illode delined hy Zeleny (19X2).
• MODM is delined as being associated with problcms whose alternatives have not been pre-
determined i.e. uncertain (Lai and Ilwang, 1994). Ilere, the decision maker is primarily
concerned with dcsigni ng a "most" prom ising alternati ve wi th respect to Iim i ted resources.
This would include Zeleny's inspiration mode.
This research concerns itscl r prcdolll inantl)' with the area 0 r Multi plc Attri butc Decision Maki ng
(MADM) also referred to as Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), possibly to indicate
an attcmpt to show its linkages to classical decision analysis (DA) (See Lootsma, 1996).
The abovc two classifications show uncertainty or imprecision as an intrinsic factor in real
decision tasks. Imprecision will always exist (Lai and Hwang, 1994). Traditionally, the modelling
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of imprecision in decision analysis has been done through probability theory and or fuzzy set
theory. Even though probability theory presents a stochastic or a random nature of decision
analysis it does not measure the imprecision that results from human behaviour. Probability
theory 'is rather a way of modelling incomplete knowledge about the (external) environment
surrounding human beings (Lai and Hwang, 1994). Even so, probability theory has formed a
significant part of MCDM theory and research. It is a tool that is used for example in Expected
Utility Theory and the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT).
The criticism of the use of probability theory is largely founded precisely on the basis that
probability theory does not capture the subjective nature of human decision making (Lai and
Hwang, (994), the very uncertainty that appears to be prevalent in most decision tasks that
warrant the use of a formal method of analysis in the first place. On the contrary, fuzzy set theory
captures the subjectivity of human behaviour. It is better equipped to handle the imprecision that
arises from mental phenomena, phenomena which are neither random nor stochastic (Lai and
Ilwang, I<)94~ Keen and Rain~l, 1(93). However, fuzzy set theory will not be examined in this
thesis as it is considered to heyond the scope or this research.
That a rational approach to decision making should take human subjectivity into account rather
thall relying only Oil objective probability Ille.lsures is cchocd hy mallY rcsc'lrchers (I,ai and
Ilwang. 19()4: Saaty. 19XO. Saaty alld Vargas. 1994: I:orman. 19(»: I,elcny. I()X2: Keell and
Rai n~l. 199]). The next section \\'ill explore sevcral approaches that do take subjectivity into
account.
2.3. An Overview of Outranking Methods and Utility Theory
This section examines three different schools of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)
that have emerged, with respect to their philosophical orientation and some or the axiomatic
assumptions upon which they are based. That there are still several 'schools' or MCDA methods
is a revelation or the state or MCDA theory and development (Lootsma. 1(96),
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2.3.1. Outranking Methods (ORM)
The Outranking Methods approach states that for two alternatives Ai and Aj, Ai outranks Aj
(Ai S Aj) if given all that there is to know about the two alternatives Ai and Aj, there are enough
arguments to decide that Ai is at least as good as Aj. The goal of ORM is to find all alternatives
that dominate other alternatives while they cannot be dominated by any other alternative from the
decision maker's viewpoint. ORM derives ordinal or absolute scales and assumes nothing about
rank preservation: it is built on the principle of dominating alternatives (Vargas, 1994).
In ELECTRE I, an ORM tool, the major issue is the threshold of concordance used to define the
outranking relation. The' threshold values are selected by the decision maker. The concordance
threshold (c") defines the minimum amount by which an alternative must dominate another, and
the disconcordance threshold (dl\) is the maximum amount by which an alternative can be
dominated by another, when it does not dominate it on all criteria. An alternative will score the
full value of the criterion if it dominates another altern~tive. The assumption being made is that
all the criteria are equally weighted. There does not appear to be guidelines on how to set these
thresholds, and their values helong to the same scale as that or the criteria weights (Vargas,
1(94).
The major reported di fliculties cxperienced with ELECTRE I and 11 were due to the f~lct that the
performances of thc alternativcs on thc diffcrent critcria wcrc oftcn imprecise and cven ill-
detcrmined. Morcovcr, this inaccuratc knowledgc was not explicitly takcn into consideration
(Roy and Vanderpootcn, 19(6). ELECTRE I11 prescntcd two new featurcs: (I) thc possibility of
working with indifference and preferencc thresholds i.e. with the conccpt of "pseudo criteria" (2)
thc introduction of a fuzzy outranking rclation instead of a prefcrencc modcl containing only two
crisp outranking relations (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996). ELECTRE IV has been developed
with a real-world problem, which provides the ranking of alternatives for cases in which it is
especially difficult to indicate the relative importance of each criterion. Significantly, this does
not amount to assigning an equal importance to each criterion (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996).
The ORM is perceived by its proponents as being the French or European school of MCDA. The
outranking school however, purports to be neither a normative, descriptive or prescriptive theory.
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Its proponents claim it should be viewed as a constructivist approach (Ray and Vanderpooten,
)996). This however has been criticized in that: "as soon as we acknowledge that our aim is no
longer or is only secondarily to describe or discover but rather to construct or create we
necessarily distance ourselves significantly from the question for norms or prescribing... We do
not believe that some axiomatic results will lead us to believe ... we possess the means of gaining
access to truth" (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1996:27).
2.3.2. The Foundations of Expected Utility Theory and Some Violations of its
Properties
Utility Theory is said to be possibly the most widely accepted normative theory for decision
making under risk (Keller, 1992). The theory has several required properties. The term property
refers to either an axiom or a characteristic resulting from a combination of axioms. Keller
suggests that since the properties are seen as appropriate components of a normative theory, they
could be called the principles or desiderata to emphasize their normative status. Although, there
are many strains of utility theory, like more generalized utility theories, Subjective Expected
Utility ( EU), the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MA UT) and Expected Utility Theory (I~UT),
cxpccted utility thcory is discussed hecause somc of its fundamental assumptions inform the
foundations of MA lJT.
Fhe /·,'.\pectec! Utilit)' Thc()f)! (/<.-'(/1). SOI1/C olits properties ([m/their ,'io/a/io/ls
As a normative thcory, thc norms it proposcs arc the most important thing about cxpectcd utility
thcory. The norms it proposes arc frequently the standards by which the thcory is judgcd. Ir the
norms or properties it proposes arc sound then the method is sound. It is however debatable on
what basis the soundness of these norms is to be judged. Are the)' to bc judged from an
implcmcntation point of view or are they to be judged from a theoretical soundness point of vicw,
the case of "wise sages". If for example the implementation is so cumbersome so as to hinder
actual use by real world decision makers, for whom is the mcthod sound?
In this section, some of the normatively appealing properties upon which expected utility theory
is founded and some of their violations in practice are introduced.
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The axiomitization of Expected Utility Theory by Von Neuman and Morgenstern (1947) shows
that if a set of some apparently normatively appealing axioms holds, alternative actions can be
ranked by their expected utilities (Keller, 1992). The Expected Utility Theory shows that the
expected utility of an alternative action is equal to the weighted average of the utilities of the
possible outcomes where the weights are the objective probabilities of each outcome (Savage,
1954). Subjective utilities can be computed by allowing the decision maker to derive his own
subjective probabilities of events, which are then used to compute the subjective expected utility
of each alternative (Savage, 1954).
There are some fundamental axioms of EUT, such as the substitution, ambiguity indifference,
separability, the reduction of compound lotteries, the fixed reference level and transitivity
properties (Keller, 1992, Howard, 1992, Keeney, 1992, Keen and Raiffa, 1993). These cannot,
within the scope of this research, be discussed in detail. Only transitivity is discussed for the
purposes of illustrating the differences of EUT with the Analytic Hierarchy Process.
The Property (?l Transit ivity
The relation of prefercnee is assulllcd to he transitivc: II' A is marc prcferablc than B, and B is
morc prcfcrable than C thcn it follows that A is also morc prefcrablc than CIA IJ and IJ>C thcn
A>CI· A must havc a highcr utility than C. This is thc utility maximization assumrtion. Thc two.
utility-maximization and transitivity requircmcnts arc inseparable (Kcllcr. 1992). Intuitively. the
transitivity of preferences for simrle. single- criteria choices appears acceptablc. For multiple
criteria however, the transitivity of preferences seems not always to be true. as will be discussed
below.
Viola/ions q( the Transitivity of Preferences
There have been numerous studies of the violations of the property of transitivity. This includes
the preference reversal phenomenon (Grether and Plott, 1979~ Lichtenstein and Slovic. 1971).
However, these studies have assumed equivalence between judged and choice indifferences,
which is now being questioned (Bostic, Herrnstein and Luce, 1991; Tversky, Sattath and Slovic,
1988). In a study conducted by MacCrimmon (1965) it was found that business executives
sometimes violated transitivity. However when these were verbally pointed out, many of the
35
Chapter 2: 0" Multiple Criteria Decision Making General Research Is.wc.~
business executives chose to re-adjust their orderings to become transitive. The property of
transitivity has, with the advent of the Analytic Hierarchy Process, become even more
contentious. As will be seen later in this chapter the AHP does not absolutely demand the
transitiv.ity of preferences.
Utility-maximization theory requires that at least preference relations are transitive; otherwise, it
would not work. Even though utility-maximization and transitivity requirements are inseparable
normatively, in real world situations the intransitivities of preferences occur sufficiently often to
be a curse upon modern decision theory (Saaty, 1992). Notwithstanding the fact that transitive
relations are far more mathematically tractable than intransitive ones, one must recognize that
they exist and provide a theory, which accounts for them. (Zeleny, 1982; Saaty, 1992). Fishburn
(1983) does not assume indifference relations are necessarily transitive. That is, B>A and A>D
are not assumed to imply B>D in all cases. It was also found that intransitive choices can be
expected to occur whenever more than one dimension exists in the attributes along which people
order their choices (May, 1954). I'or uni-dimensional choices, he concludes that there can be no
intransitivity of choices.
At thc same timc, suhjects often wish to pcrsist 111 the violations or other expectcd utility
propcrtics. especially suhsti tut ion. sure-thing and ambigui ty ind iITerence ("-eller, 19(2). There is
substantial evidcnce regarding the descriptive violations or the axioms upon which expected
utility theory is based. The first reported paradox was initiated by Allais in 1953 (Keller. ItJ92)
and it sho\Vs that subjects systematically make choices that violate pri nci pies of expected uti Iity
dcmonstrating that that expected utility is not a rully descriptive modcl or choice undcr risk.
These violations have encouraged debate and developments or strains of utility theory that
account for these violations. Some authors have respondcd to thc charges or dcscriptivc
violations in an attempt to clarify the issuc. In the main, there havc been three broad catcgories of
rcsponscs to the descri pti ve violations of expected uti Iity. Firstly, somc authors have argued that
cxpected utility theory's purposc is normativc. Thus, there is a need to re-clarify the conditions
under which EUT is an appropriate model for prescriptive use and when it is not, as is the case
whcn distri butional equity is involved (Howard, 1992; Keeney, 1992; Keen and Rai n'a, 1993).
Secondly, there is a need to develop prescriptive techniques, for example, visual problem
representations to aid decision makers to conform to expected utility theory (Howard, 1992;
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Keller, 1992). Thirdly, new models have been proposed or developed, including the generalized
utility models, that may be descriptively valid and that might be used prescriptively in special
settings (Miyakoto, 1992, Keller 1992, Winkler, 1990).
The Multiattribute Utility Theory (MA UT)
Parts of MAUT are built on Expected Utility (EU) and Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeld and Edwards, 1986). MAUT is founded on a value
function based on an additive score representing goal achievement according to each criterion, so
that the total score or value of the alternative described by an attribute vector x would be as
follows
p
vex) = LVi(Xj) (1)
At a basic level x has only the property of preference ordering so that if Xli is preferred to xb then
V(XIl»V(X
h
). Traditional MAUT assumes that the utility function (u) is additive, which requires
the indepcndellcc (or substitutahility) of attributes. If attributes arc Ilot fully independcnt then one
might find that function (u) is not decomposable into its component parts and must be considered
holistically as an irreduciblc cntity (Zclcny, 19X2: 413). Significantly, in order to ensure that this
assumption holds it is necessary for the criteria to hc preferentially independent. This mcans a
decision maker should be able to explicitly statc whcther a given trade-oil between two attributcs
reprcscnting two criteria is acceptable or not. c('/eris pari/ms. There are only two binary relations
for compari ng two aItcrnatives: strict prc!crence, P and ind i fTerence, I. 130th must be transi tive.
This excludes all cascs of incomparabi Iity, which can comc from con fl icti ng cri teria.
The Multiattribute Uti Iity Theory (MA UT) evaluates uti Iity functions intended to accurately
express thc decision maker's outcome preferences in terms of Illultiple attributes. If an
appropriate utility is assigned to each possible outcome and the expected utility of each
alternative is calculated, then the best course of action for any decision maker is the alternative
with the highest expected utility (Keen and Raiff~l, 1993). According to Fishburn (1970)
indifference is defined as the absence of strict preference. Under such hypotheses, the alternatives
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of any set can be ranked without ambiguity from the best to the \vorst (Roy and Vanderpooten,
1996).
This concept of trade-off is central to MAUT; and so is the additive value function: an increase of
one unit of Vj(Xj) will always be exactly compensated by a loss of one unit Vj (Xj). This occurs
regardless of the value of Xi (Vargas, 1994). Vj(Xj) represents an interval scale of preference,
where unit increments in Vj(Xj) have the same marginal value to the decision maker. The scores
are not, however arbitrary ordinal preference measures. In this way rank preservation or
preference transitivity is critical to the premises of MAUT (Vargas, 1994).
MAUT is described as tending to reduce the complex problem of assessing multiattribute utility
function into one of assessing a series of uni-dimensional utility functions. These individually
estimated component functions are then glued together again in the form of "value tradeoffs" .
Thc tradeoffs are determined subjectively through the judgment of the decision maker, as in:
"How much improvcmcnt am I willing to givc-up in tcrms of objective A in return for specific
improvement from objective B?" The main objective or MAUT is to establish a super-objective,
to maximize the overall utility (Zeleny, 19X2). As a result one of the most important tasks f()r
MAlJT is to establish the independence or attributes. In addition, the scaling f~lctors used do not
measure the relative importance or each attribute. These only reflect the relative importance of
each attribute as it changes frolll its worst to its hcst available valuc (Zclcny, 19X2).
A rclated criticism of utility theory is cxpressed by Zeleny (1982): that most utility theory
assullles that all alternatives arc comparable in the sense that given any two alternatives onc or
the other is either strictly preferred or the two are seen to be preferentially equivalent (choice
indifferent). Yet. there is a presumption that one cannot express the intensity of onc's preferences.
If one is presumed not to be able to express the intensity of one's preference (as assumed in
ordinal utility models) then the notion of indifference (which is a precise expression of preference
intensity) becomes difficult or even impossible to estimate. If the decision maker does not strictly
prefer onc alternative to another, the absence of strict preference should not imply indifference.
Certain pairs of alternatives are non-comparable because the decision maker either (I) does not
know how to; or (2) does not want to or (3) is not able to compare them (Roy, 1977). To
confound such non-comparability with indifference is to considerably over-simplify the decision
38
Chapter 2: On Multiple Criteria Decision Making General Research luues
making process (Roy, 1977). In reality, it is well noted that there is a need to monitor the
strengths of preferences as expressed by decision makers between the different gains and losses
in one or more attributes. This requires the value function to do more than just preserve order
(Vargas, 1994).
2.4. The Fundamentals of the Analytic Hierarchy Process and Major Research
Areas in it
2.4.1. Introduction
In the preceding section, the general foundations of MCDM and of the expected utility theory
were examined. Expected Utility's offspring MAUT (Multi-Attribute Utility Theory) was also
briefly considered. In this section, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is examined, starting
with its foundations and extending to its areas and contexts of application.
Thomas L. Saaty developed the Analytic 11 ierarchy Process, a multi-criteria decision support
approach, in the 1970's. The Analytic Ilierarchy Process is a descriptive theory that includes
procedures leading to outcomes, as they would he ranked hy a normative theory (Saaty, 1991). In
order to adequately examine and illustrate how the Analytic Ilierarchy Process works, this
scction \Vi 11 conceptually introduce alld deli nc the All P. Thcll it wi 11 hrielly explore its
l1lathemat ical aspects to iIlustratc adeq untel)' how it works.
2.4.2. A Conceptual Description of the Analytic Hierarchy Process
The AI-IP is a process-technique that focuses on the choice phase of decision making. " It helps
decision makers structure complex decisions, develop measures of utility and synthesize
measures of both tangibles and intangibles with respect to competing objectives. (Dyer and
Forman, 1992). The Analytic Hierarchy Process is based on three principles:
• decomposition, of the overall problem into an hierarchy
• comparative judgments and
• synthesis of priorities.
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In Saaty's words
"The Analytic Hierarchy Process is a method of breaking down a complex situation into its
component parts, arranging these parts or variables into a hierarchic order, assigning numerical
values to subjective judgments on the relative importance of each variable, and synthesizing the
judgments to determine overall priorities ofthe variables" (Saaty, 1990:3).
With the Analytic Hierarchy Process, the problem is structured as a hierarchy and assessments
are made in the form of paired comparisons. The AHP combines two other well-known
approaches: (1) causal processes and (2) purposive action processes (Saaty and Vargas, 1991). In
causal processes, an action is described as an event with specific outcomes with the sequence
being cause -+ event (outcome), where the cause may be internal or external to the system. In
purposive action processes, the sequence is action -+ event (outcome) -+ consequence (for the
actors involved). In the latter case, the actions are no longer identical to the events. The actions of
the actor in the system control the outcome of events and are selected through the conscious
choice of the actor, who chooses the alternatives he believes are beneficial to him. Moreover, the
outcome does not depend on the outcome of previous events through a causal process or on the
attribute of the individual. The actor makes his choice of actions through his perception of the
consequences that the outcomes will have for him or her. According to Saaty and Vargas (199 I)
the AliI> synthesizes the two approaches by identifying the outcomes that are benelicial to the
actors, while simultaneously providing a way of assessing the causes or f~lctors which may have
more to do with certain types or outcOIllCS.
The mathcmatical foundations of the ;\IIP are relativcly conceptually simple to understand. The
purpose or the approach is to use weights. called priorities to allocatc a rcsource among activities
or to implement the most important activity according to the rank or the activities. The task is to
find the relative strength (i.e. priority or weight) of each activity with respect to each objective.
The result obtained is then synthesized for each activity in order to derive a single overall priority
for all activities.
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GOAL
Buy aCar
Cntena 1 Cnlena 2 Cnlena 3
Price Pertormance Sare~
Figure 2.2 A Model for Car Selection
In Figure 2.2, for instance a decision maker wants to purchase a motor vehicle (the overall goal).
She has reduced her alternatives to three models, i.e. a BMW, a Volvo and a Mercedes. There are
three criteria (or objectives) that the decision maker has identified as relevant to the decision:
price, performance and safety for all alternatives. In some instances, the objectives themselves
may need to be prioritised with respect to another set of (higher level) objectives. The priorities
of the (higher level) objectives are then used as weighting factors for the priorities derived for the
activities. The process of comparing the higher level objectives with still higher ones may be
continued up to a single overall objective (goal). This arrangement of the activities, objectives, to
criteria to alternatives - makes up the hierarchical structure.
The decision making process is ahout establishing mappings between alternatives and attributes
and between attri butcs and cri teria. Berore seleeti ng an al ternati ve, the final act, the structure
should he rully assessed; although there is no objective measure to show that the construction or
the structure is complete (1lenig and 13uchanan, I99(»). It is the efrort or construction that counts,
~lIld or necessity this is an iterative process. The reward is a better understanding or the decision
maker's preferences and a possible extension of the set of alternatives.
Once the hierarchy has been defined, the AI-IP provides a method for scaling the weights of the
elements in each level of the hierarchy with respect to the elements on the next higher level. The
essential requirement for analysis by hierarchies is to be able to decompose a problem into levels,
each level consisting of similar elements and having an impact on the levels above and below it
(Saaty, 1984). Within each level a pairwise comparison of the elements is performed. Pairwisc
comparisons indicate the strength with which one element dominates another with respect to the
criterion they are being compared (Saaty and Vargas, 1991). So that, in the example illustrated
above a pairwise comparison in the first instance would reflect the relative strength of
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performance to price with respect to buying a motor vehicle, or performance to safety and so on.
Out of n factors there would be n(n-l )/2 judgments required to generate the pairwise comparison
matrix entries because the reciprocals and the diagonal elements can be entered automatically.
There are two kinds of comparisons the AHP can use: absolute and relative comparisons (Saaty,
1990; Saaty, 1994a, Saaty and Vargas, 1991). From a cognitive psychology point of view with
absolute comparisons, an alternative is compared with standards on various attributes that are
stored through experience in memory. For relative comparisons, the alternatives are compared in
pairs according to a common attribute (for example the BMW vs. the Volvo with respect to
safety). Both types of comparison result in ratio scales of measurement in the AHP (Saaty, 1991c,
Peniwati, 1996, Vargas, 1994, Saaty, 1996a). Relative measurement is usually needed in all
problems, tangible and intangible (Saaty and Vargas, 1991). Absolute measurement is the
normative mode, while relative measurement is the descriptive mode (Saaty and Vargas, 1991).
Absolute measurement is applied to rank alternatives in terms of the criteria; lIsing the ratings or
intensities of the criteria, such as excellent, very good, good, average, poor, and very poor. In the
above example, the three criteria: safety, performance and price could he given intensities of
excellent, very good, good and so on to very poor upon which cach alternative car would be
rated. 1\ ner sett ing the priorities on the criteria (or sub-criteria), pai rwise comparisons are also
pcrformcd on thc ratings of these. The ratings may be diflerent for each criterion. I\n alternative
is thcn evaluated or scored by identifying for each criterion, the relevant rating which describes
that alternative best (Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1990; Saaty and Vargas, 1991; Saaty and Kearns ( 199 I).
The final act is, the wcighted (global) priorities of the ratings are added to produce a ratio scale
score for that altcrnativc. In general, thc absolute measurement mcthod is suitable for choice
decisions that involve criteria that are set independently of the alternatives and when dealing with
a large number of alternatives.
Ilowcvcr, with absolute measurement there can be no rank reversal of the alternatives, when onc
alternative is added or another removed (Saaty, 1994b; Saaty and Vargas, 1991). This is
particularly relevant where the importance of the criteria does not depend on the number of
alternatives or on their priorities, even though it Illay be independent from the alternatives
according to some function, meaning or context. This is in contrast to relative measurement
(Saaty and Vargas, 1991). With relative measurement, the addition of a new alternative or
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removal of an old one can result in the reversal of ranks of the original alternatives. This is clear
to see because the priorities of the old alternatives change when an addition or removal of an
alternative occurs. This property of the AHP has caused much consternation among proponents
of utility theories and other MCDA practitioners and academics. One way of avoiding the
possibility of rank reversal within the AHP is the use of the ideal mode of synthesis (Saaty,
1994c) in lieu of the original distributive mode.
In order to quantify the judgments, and or where the weights are unknown, the Analytic
Hierarchy Process uses a fundamental scale with values that range from I to 9 as shown in Table
2.3 below. The reasons for choosing such a scale are summarized below (Saaty, 1994a; Saaty,
1990).
Tnble 2.3 The Annlytic Hierarchy Process Scale and its verbal interpretation
Intensity of Definition Explanation
Importance
I Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally to
the objective
J Weak Importance (of one over the Experience and judgment slightly
other) favour one activity over another.
----
S Strong Importancc Expericncc and judgmcnt strongly
f;\vour onc activity ovcr anothcr.
7 Dcmonstrated Importance I\n activity is strongly favoured
and its dominance is dcmonstratcd
in practice.
C) I\bsolute Importance The evidcnce bvouring one
activity over another is of the
highcst possible order of
afTirmation
2,"',6,8 Intermediate valucs between the t\vo Used when compromise is neeeled
adjacent judgments
Reciprucals of the ahove Ifactivity i has one of the abovc
numhers numbers assigned to it when
compared to activity), then) has the
reciprocal value when compared to
with i.
Rationals Ratios arising from the scale II' consistency were to be scale
forced by obtaining n numcrical
values to span
(I) The qualitative distinctions are meaningful in practice and have an clement or precision when
the items being compared are of the same order of magnitude or close together with respect
to the property used to make the comparison.
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(2) The ability to make qualitative distinctions is well represented by the five attributes: equal,
moderate, strong, very strong and extreme and interpolations between them when desired.
(3) The limit of seven (plus or minus two) items in simultaneous comparisons suggests that if
seven (plus or minus two) elements are compared and if they are all slightly different from
one another, a nine point scale would be needed to distinguish among these differences.
(4) There are both local and global priorities. Local priorities are defined with respect to the root
of a cluster in a hierarchy, whereas global priorities represent the priority with respect to the
overall goal.
2.4.3. A Brief Axiomatic Description of the Principles of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process
The AHP is mainly based on four axioms (Saaty, I994a) namely,
(I) reciprocal;
(2) homogenous
(3) hierarchic or feedback independence; and
(4) expectations ahout the val id ity of the model and about derived rank order.
I) The neciprocity of Comparisons
The reciprocal comparisons are based on the simple abstract principle that, "magnitude
com parison between two objects, on a common property is estahl ished by lISI ng the smaller
object as a unit or measurement and estimating the larger one as a multiple or that unit" (Saaty,
1994(1: 44), In addition. "it is essential that the smaller object be the first one used to estimate the
magnitudc of the larger object in order to detcrmine the reciprocal value for the smaller onc, If
the largcr object is to serve as the unit, it must be decomposed by using the smaller object as the
unit" (Saaty, 1994:44), The reciprocal relation bctween the two objccts, x and y, has the form:
y= Ilx frolll which the symmetric relation xy= I is known as inversion, Invcrsion assumes that the
magnitudes or x and y can be established with respect to a third magnitude, which has an
arbitrary unit valuc.
Graphically, when x is allowed to vary continuously over real numbers, this specifies a hyperbola
in the xy-plane. More generally "it specities a ratio in a potential field between two points A and
B so that A has a potential of IIx from Band 8 a potential of I/y from A" (Saaty, 1994a: 44).
Finally, reciprocal comparisons are of two kinds continuous and discrete, but both types of
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comparisons give rise to numbers that belong to a ratio scale. Comparisons require a particular
kind of information, although when actual numbers are available they can be used to estimate
relative measurement. Where there are no scales, judgment must be used to make the estimate.
Cognitive psychologists contend that judgment relies on the brain to respond accurately to a
stimulus of varying intensity. However, judgment must precede the existence of scales (Saaty,
1994a).
2) The Homogeneity of elements
The axiom of homogeneity implies that for accuracy, judgment must be confined to a narrow
range of discrimination among intensities. For wider ranges one needs to cluster homogenous
elements together and include a common element to act as a pivot from one cluster to the next
(Vargas, 1994).
3) Hierarchic or feedback dependence
According to this axiom, to deal with multiple attributes there are two concepts of independence
that the Analytic I1 ierarchy Process needs: outer dependence and inner independence. A set or
alternatives, A is said to be ollter dependent (independent) on a criterion C iI' there does not exist
a Wc E Wo where Wc is an clement in the set or alternatives and W is the set or criteria on a level
above the alternativcs in the hicrarchy. ;\ set or alternativcs A is said to be inncr indcpendent wilh
resp('ct to t/re criterio/1 (' i r. and only ir the clements in A arc outer dependcnt on thcmselves
according to the criterion (Vargas. 19(4). Further. in a hierarchy:
a) ;\ level is outer dependent on the Icvel above it.
b) !\ level is inner independent \\'jth respect to all the elements in the level above it
c) A level is oLlter dependent on the level below it (Vargas. 1994).
Morc details on dependencies in the AHP can be found in Saaty (1996), where he deals with the
Analytic Network Process, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
4) Expectations about the validity of the nlodel and about derived rank order
When making a decision the hierarchy is assumed to be complete (Vargas, 1994, Henig and
Buchanan, 1996).
The implications of the above axioms can be illustrated in the following manner. Suppose one is
given n elements to compare [AI .. .A,,], and assume that the weights of the elements are known
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respectively as [WI ... W n]. Further, suppose that a matrix of pairwise comparison ratios is formed







If for example the elements were A I to An were gold bars whose respective weights WI to W n were
being compared to form the matrix A, then the reciprocal nature of the matrix A is easily
illustrated in that the element Wij = 1!wij. That is if one gold bar is estimated to be 10 times larger
than another then the other which serves as the unit of comparison must be 1/10 times as heavy as
the first. AIso, any gold bar compared to itsel f should produce a weight ratio or I ~ hence the
diagonal elements are all unity in a reciprocal matrix.
The above matrix A has been multiplied on the right by the vector weights w, the result or this
Illultiplication is 11\1'. To recovcr thc scalc rroll1 thc matrix or ratios, the cquation A 1I'=11\\' or
(A-I1I)\I'=O must bc solved. This givcs rise to a systcm or homogenous linear equations that has a
non-trivial solution, irand only irthc determinant (A -Ill) vanishcs, i.c. that 11 is an eigenvaluc or
A (Saaty. 1994a, 1(90).
Since every row is a constant multiple of any other row, the matrix A has unit rank and therefore
all its eigenvalucs, except onc, are zero. The sum of the eigenvalues is equal to thc trace or thc
matrix (i.e. the sum of its diagonal elements). In this case the trace orA equals n. Thererorc 11 is
the eigenvaluc or A, it is thc largest principle eigenvalue and associated with it is a non-trivial
positivc solution H'. To make H' unique its entries are normalized by dividing by their sum. Thus,
givcn a comparison matrix the scale can be recovered. In this casc, the solution is any column of
matrix A normalized (Saaty and Yargas, 1991). Significantly, matrix A has the reciprocal
property of aij = l/aji and a;i =I (Saaty, 1994a, 1990; Saaty and Vargas, 1991). Another property
of matrix A is that ideally it is consistent. Its entries satisfy the condition aijajk=aik.
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A positive n by n matrix is said to be consistent if:
aijajk=aik and i, j, k = (I ,...n}
The relations aji = I/aij and ajj = I must be preserved in the matrices In order to maintain
consistency. The reason as illustrated above being, if for example element Xt(W/) is estimated to
be k times heavier than element X2(W2), then common sense requires that element X2(W2) be
estimated to be l/k times the weight of the first (Saaty, I994a).
The AHP provides the decision maker with a way of examining the consistency of the entries in a
pairwise comparison matrix and the hierarchy as a whole, through a consistency ratio measure
(Golden and Wang, 1989). The consistency index (C.I.) is defined as
C.1. = (Amax - n)/(n-l)
where Amax is the largest eigenvalue of the n x n pairwise comparison matrix. If the decision
maker is perfectly consistent in specifying the entries then, then Amax = nand C.1. = O. Where
the decision maker is inconsistent then Arnax - n. Saaty (1990) has proposed the consistency
ratio (C.R. to llle,lSUre the degree or inconsistency) where
C.R. = C.I./R.I
Thc R.1. (random index) valuc is computcd rrom 500 11 X 11 rositivc reciprocal palrwlse
comparison matrices whose entries werc randomly generated using thc I to 9 scale (Saaty. 19(0).
If the consistcncy ratio were significantly small. then the estimates would he accepted.
Otherwise. an attcmpt would he madc to improve the consistency by getting additional
information. Finally. a value of C.R. under 0.10 it taken to mean that the decision maker has been
su fliciently consistent (Saaty. 1990).
An inquiry into what contributes to the consistency or a judgment, yields the answer that the
following elements contribute to consistency (Saaty, 1994a: Saaty, 1994b):
(I) The homogeneity of the elements in a group that is "not comparing a grain of sand with a
mountain".
(2) The number of elements in a group - to improve consistency, it is accepted that an individual
cannot compare more than seven objects (plus or minus two) simultaneously without
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becoming more inconsistent. This is based on psychological experiments, which can be
justified mathematically (Saaty, 1990).
(3) "The knowledge of the analyst about the problem under study" which will contribute to the
ability to understand and facilitate more or less consistency.
2.4.4. On Some Applications of the Analytic Hierarchy Process
The Analytic Hierarchy Process has been used in a multiplicity of settings globally. It is the most
widely used decision analysis methodology in the United States of America (Golden and Wang
1989; Zahedi, 1986) and also around the world (Xiang and Ming: 1991 and Vachnadze and
Markozashvili, 1987; Vargas, 1994), Moreover, the majority of Analytic Hierarchy Process
applications have been in group settings. This is because it structures any complex, multi-person,
multi-criterion and multi-period problem hierarchically. The need for sharing ideas, consensus
building, and justification purposes in group decision making is catered for. This is the primary
reason why the members of the group decision environment studied in this research the Students'
Representative Council (SRC) were motivated to use the approach.
There are more than 2000 title papers on the theory and application of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process contained ill .iust Saaty (1994h). Somc examples are in cOllllict resolution (the 'miraclc'
South 1\ frican negotiatcd settlemcnt is all outcome of a process that included I\nalytic Ilierarchy
Process specialists); gencrating alternatives; setting priorities; f~lculty memher selection; site
location, predicting outcomes; planning and forecasts. I\ttempting to illustrate all the areas of
application of the I\I-If> is not feasible within the confines of this research. Although the I\HP has
a relatively short history (WinkleI'. 1990) compared to the tradition of Utility Theories. it appears
to have gained significant worldwide acceptance. This is in spite of some of the animated
theoretical arguments and debates that have been characteristic of the interaction between the
proponents of the Analytic Hierarchy Process and those of Utility Theories.
2.4.5. On Issues and Characteristics that differentiate the Analytic Hierarchy
Process from Utility Theories
The existence and foundations of the different streams of thought in the field of MCDA were
discllssed in Section 2.2.5. The ORM and Expected Utility Theory have already been explored. In
this section the features that distinguish the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the Multiattribute
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Utility Theory (MAUT) and to a lesser extent the Outranking Methods (aRM) are explored.
Evidently, proponents of these streams of thought are engaged in debates that often attempt to
prove the superiority of one method over the other. For the purposes of this discussion, the major
axiomatic differences of both are summarized in the Table below.
Table 2.4 A Summary of the axiomatic differences between MAUT and the AHP
MAUT AHP
Normative Descriptive
Absolute Measurement Relative Measurement
Interval Scales Ratio Scales
Preference Elicitation: Preference Elicitation:
Lottery Comparisons Pairwise Comparisons
Intransitivity of Preferences and no Rank Reversal Transitive Preferences and rank reversal possible
Rationality assumption Accounts for Judgmental Biases
Group Support? Group Support?
Ifandles uncertainty Handles uncertainty through interval judgments
2.4.5.1. The Measurement Scale of the Analytic Hierarchy Process Compared to
Expected Utility Theory
130th the AIIP and utility theories are preoccupied with the scales they use: the Analytic
Ilierarchy Process uses ratio scales for both criteria and alternatives. while the MAlil uses
interval scales for the alternatives only. Conceptually. it has been shown that MAlJl IS a
Ilormative arproach and the AIIP a descriptive and prescriptive approach (Saaty. 1997). While
Iloward (1992) argues for preserving the scientific way in which decisions must be made. Saaty.
in defence of the prescriptive approach observes that
"People have been making decisions for a very long time. Contrary to what most or liS
who are interested in decision making may like to believe, most people do not takc
serioLlsly the existence of theories which purport to set their thinking and feeling right.
They claim to know their own valuc system and what they want. The may wonder how
anyone else can know well enough to tell them how best to organize their thinking ill
order to make better choices. Yet, research has shown that complex decisions are beyond
the capacity of the human brain to synthesize intuitively and efficiently. Since decision-
making is a natural characteristic of people, how do we describe what they do so that an
ordinary mortal can understand what we are saying? We do not wish to legislate the
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method with which people should make decisions but only to describe it. .. ln the process
we may learn things that can help people make better decisions"(Saaty, 1990d: 259).
Zeleny (1982:478) echoes similar sentiments when he notes:
"We know next to nothing about how and why people make decisions; yet we feel entitled
to advise them how and why they should make them. If atoms and molecules failed to
adhere to the laws supposedly describing their behaviour, we would not call such
behaviour irrational or suboptimal. Yet when people fail to follow the axioms of
rationality invented by other people, their behaviour is considered suboptimal and
irrational"
Relative measurement
MAUT proponents have rejected relative measurement and the hierarchic composition of the
AHP. Dyer (1990) argues that the rankings produced by the AHP are arbitrary. He contends,
arbitrary rankings occur when the principle of hierarchic composition is assumed. "This principle
requires that the weights on the higher levels of the hierarchy be determined independently of the
weights on the lower levels" (Dyer, 1990:249). In other words, the weights on the criteria do not
depend on the alternatives under consideration. Finally he suggests that the key to correcting this
!law is the synthesis of' the Analytic Ilierarchy Process with the concepts of MI\UT. Ilowever,
these sentiments arc disputed on the basis of the f~lct that they rely on the foundations or Ml\lJT
(see Saaty. 1990a).
Preference Elicitation Methods
The Analytic Ilierarchy Process has been criticized 1'01' the "ambiguity of the questions that the
decision maker must answer" (Dyer. 1990). In addition, the defence claim of the Analytic
1-1 ierarchy Proccss that am biguity is inherent in all prclcrcnce el ic itat ion methods includ ing those
or classical utility theory (Harker and Vargas, 1987) has been described as misleading (Dyer,
1990). Dyer argues that the elicitation questions associated with the AHP have more in common
with the questions used to determine a strength of preference runction. which requires a
subjective estimate of strength of preference on a cardinal scale (Dyer, 1990).
The AH P is regarded as being casy to use for the purposes of preference elicitation. On the
contrary, Olson et al. (1996) in a comparative study of MCDM approaches found that MAUT
was comparatively more difficult to understand. SMART which is a Multi-Attribute Value
50
Chapter 2: On Multiple Criteria Decision Making General Research Issues
Theory (MA VT) tool is a simplified version of MAUT in that it does not seek the decision
makers attitude towards risk was also found to be easier to use. Belton (1993) reports that there is
a general tendency for a wider acceptance within the utility theory school of MAVT, precisely
because it is simpler than MAUT in not requiring the decision maker's attitude to risk.
Dealing with Uncertainty
The AHP has been criticized for being found wanting in handling uncertainty. Proponents of the
AHP have refuted this. The AHP allows for the incorporation of uncertainty in the decision
making process through interval judgements (Saaty, 1990), and recently through emerging fuzzy
logic extensions of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. See also (Saaty and Vargas, 1987; Forman
1993; Haines, 1998).
The 'great deal' of time required to process the pairwise comparisons 111 a typical Analytic
Hierarchy Process analysis is another criticism that has been levelled at the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (Forman, 1997). For a moderately sized problem, the AHP may be too time-consuming.
Ilowevcr, the" All P is not designed for use on the vast m,~jority of the thousands of decisions wc
make cach day hut rather for the 'crucial' decisions that individuals and organizations IllllSt make"
(Forman, 1997:35).
Scales of Measurement, Inconsistency and the Transitivity of Preferences
The one to nine seale orthe AliI> has also been criticized, together with the usc of the eigenvector
approach to average inconsistent jllogments (Dyer, 19(0). Arguably, relative comparison, as
Saaty points out is the tool of the human brain as dcmonstratcd by cognitive psychologists. Luce
and Rai fTa, (1957:25) observed:
"No matter how intransitivities exist. we must recognize that they exist. and we can take
only little comfort in the thought that they are an anathema to most of what constitutes
theory in the behavioural sciences today ... Or we may limit ourselves to 'normative' or
'idealized' behaviour in the hope that such studies will have metatheoretic impact on more
real istic studies... Transiti ve relations are far more mathematically tractable than
intransitive ones"
Relative comparison is used all the time and it will not disappear through lack of a fitting
axiomatic framework (Saaty, 1991 a). As demonstrated earlier intransitivity is likely to emerge in
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pairwise comparisons, and the AHP does not demand transitivity or perfect consistency (Amax = n)
but provides a measure of inconsistency in each set of judgments (Forman, 1993). Many authors
have argued in defence of the intransitivity of preferences in that "if intransitivity frequently
occurs as an integral part of the human decision making strategy then it cannot be wished away.
It must be incorporated into our models as well. There is nothing inconsistent about the
intransitivity of preferences" (Zeleny, 1982: 85; Forman 1997). The inconsistency of judgments
is shown at the end of the process (Forman, 1997, Saaty, 1990). Forman (1997) suggests it is
important that a low inconsistency not (sic) become the goal of the decision making pro-e.ess. A
low inconsistency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a good decision. He observes that
it is more important to be accurate than consistent. "In fact it is possible to be perfectly consistent
but consistently wrong". Other authors have argued that it is natural for decision makers to want
to be consistent, it is a prerequisite to logical thinking, and that transitivity violations would
undermine the confidence the decision makers may initially have in the tool (Lootsma, 1993).
However, Dyer (1990a) argues these areas are relatively minor operational issues and do not
rcprcscnt flaws in the basic methodology of the Analytic Hierarchy Process.
2.4.5.2. Rank Reversal in the Analytic Hierarchy Process - The Preservation of
Rank Paradox.
The objection to the Analytic Ilierarchy Process allowing rank reversal is regarded as a l1lore
substantive objection by proponents of" classical utility theories. Dyer (1990a) contcnds that rank
reversal is actually a symptom or a mllch more prorollnd prohlem with the Analytic Ilierarchy
Process, that is, the rankings provided by thc Analytic Hierarchy Process are arbitrary. The rank
reversal phenomcnon is explored first. Simply stated rank reversal implics that the ranking of
alternatives as determined by the AHP may be altered by the addition or subtraction of another
alternativc for consideration (Dyer, 1990a).
The major objection from the proponents of utility theory against relative measurement comes
from the acccptancc of Utility Theory's axiom on the transitivity of preferences. This axiom
states that if an additional activity is introduced in the comparisons of the original set [A /...A,,], or
if onc of them is deleted, there should be no change in the rank order of the original set (Howard,
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1992). In the Analytic Hierarchy Process, this is true when the matrix A is consistent but not
when A is inconsistent.
The point is illustrated using an example quoted in the literature, (Corbin and Marley, 1974;
Saaty, 1996a) that of a woman in a small town wishing to buy a hat. The lady enters the only hat
store in town and is shown two hats A and B, that she likes equally well, and thus may be
considered equally likely to buy. However, it is then supposed that the salesperson discovers a
third hat, C, which is identical to A. The lady may well choose hat B for sure (rather than risk the
possibility of encountering someone wearing a hat identical to hers). This result contradicts
regularity, a condition of choice theory that has to do with rank preservation (Saaty, and Vargas,
1994).
These violations of the utility theory property of independence from irrelevant alternatives occur
sufficiently regularly in the real world to pose an integrity problem for a decision aid that does
not account for them. For example in politics the tactic of vote splitting is often used, where for
example, there are two candidates one rightist and the other leftist with a result of 601% for the
leftist candidate and 40'Yo 1'01' thc rightist candidate. II' a third, less popular rightist candidate, is
introduced. this would split thc right votc hetwcen thc two options availahle to the right and the
leftist candidate could cmcrgc as the \\·inncr.
I\lthough. "axiom 4. dcvcloped by Saaty (1986). or the theory of the I\IIP explicitly excluded
copics and near copies from consideration" (l'larl,er and Vargas. 1987). Dyer contends that the
rcasoning behind the exclusion of copies and near copies is \vithout foundation and cannot be
supportcd on either intuitive or technical grounds. Rather when ranking a set of alternatives by
some procedure, it is expected that when a copy of one of them is added to the set. the procedure
should rank this copy the same as its matching alternative (which the AHP does do). In addition.
it is expected that the procedure assign both alternatives the same rank as that of the original
matching alternative (which the AHP does not do). The only exception should occur where the
criteria include a concern about the uniqueness of an alternative and or if "the copy provides
additional information that changes the perception of the decision maker regarding the
alternatives" (Dyer, 1990a: 253).
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To conclude, an observation relevant to one of the sub-goals of this research is made and that is
about a decision making environment with "lifeworld actors" (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997) with a
vested interest in a decision. It is almost inconceivable that the addition or removal of a said
alternative does not in itself present additional information that mayor may not change the
decision makers perception of the decision problem including both alternatives and criteria.
"The mere presence or absence of an alternative in relative measurement introduces additional information
regarding the dominance of that alternative with respect to the other alternatives, irrespective of their
number. This information is like adding or deleting a variable in a linear programming problem. The new
optimum must be re-calculated from the start. In addition the new optimum would not usually coincide
with the previous optimum on some of the variables" (Harker and Vargas, 1990)
The simple presence or absence of an additional or previously available alternative be it a copy,
near-copy or different alternative alters the decision context. It is also possible that the decision
maker may wish to re-define the criteria in light of the changes in the available options or criteria,
however. This thinking is consistent with the concept that as decision aids (or nlcilitators) interact
with decision makers and the decision making process itscl f they afrect the outcome of the
process in some way. More pertinently, in practice, in a structured organizational decision
process, alternatives do not suddenly appear to he added onto the process or removed willy-nilly.
The initial decision to include or exclude alternatives, in the lirst place, is a considered one. Most
business organizations would not waste time or money worrying about phantom alternatives or
dispensahle 411 ternat ives. In sum, when an alternati vc is added or removed a rc-ranki ng appears
nccessary. This is not to say that a revcrsal of rankings is nccessary. but that it is possible.
Thcre arc cases. neverthelcss wherc one would want to prescrvc rank, such as in admissions
selection in an academic institution (Saaty, 1991). As already mcntioned the AI-JP uses absolutc
measuremcnt. Jn this case, this does not cnd the debate as absolute measurement is also based on
hierarchic composition, implying if the original construction of intensities were also changed. by
adding (or removing) a new rating category, such as 'Iabove average" onto ["high", "medium" and
"Iow"j. Then using the AHP to generate scores to the now four possible ratings on this criterion.
"the rankings may change even if none or them are the rating "above average" and no other
ratings are changed (Dyer, 1990a: 274). The ideal mode of synthesis in the AHP is another way
of preserving rank. Although Dyer (1990) contends that the real issue is not the phenomenon of
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rank reversal per se, but a "much more profound problem" with the AHP: "the rankings provided
are arbitrary". Dyer suggests that a solution would be one that incorporates the property of
difference independence from utility theory, although Saaty refutes this in his reply.
On the other hand, some authors have argued that the AHP and the MAUT are more alike than
dissimilar. For example, see Forman (1993) and Keller (1992). More specifically, when
comparing the Analytic Hierarchy Process' absolute or ratings mode - (which has been described
as the normative mode (Saaty and Vargas, 1991; Harker and Vargas, 1990)) - with MAUT, the
only significant difference is the way the value function is derived for the alternatives. As the
Analytic Hierarchy Process uses pairwise comparisons the MAUT uses lotteries.
Other differences involve the way in which the analysis is structured when there are numerous
attributes and how weights are derived for the attributes. These differences are becoming less and
less apparent as MAUT practitioners have begun to use the Analytic Hierarchy Process approach
for these aspects of the problem. Thus if the absolute or ratings approach of the AHP is compared
to MAUT, the only dilTerence is the questioning used to derive the shapc or the valuc function
(Forman, 199]).
2.4.5.3. On Some Issues Related to the Hierarchical Structuring of Problems
With the Alii>, prohlems are structurcd eithcr in thc form of a hierarchy, or as a network (in the
case of existing interdependencies between the elements of one level. or feedback from lower
levels in the hierarchy). The hierarchy has long been seen as a suitable representation for
handling complexity (Simon, 1962), and is widely Llsed in general systems theory, cybernetics
and hard systems thinking. According to Saaty (1994b), the basic principle to follow in creating
this structure is always to sec if one can answer the lallowing question: Can I compare the
elements on a lower level using some or all of the elements on the next higher level as criteria?
Hierarchies are only special cases of more general network models that can capture the
interdependencies between elements within a level, or feedback 1'1'0111 a lower level to a higher
onc.
As a multi-criteria decision making theory, the AHP is suitable for evaluating subjective issues
revealing cultural and political differences within the context of a given problem (see Saaty and
Alexander, 1990).
55
Chapter 2: On Multiple Criteria Deci.tion M£lkin~ General Research I.u/les
AHP models include both qualitative and quantitative data and in this way it reflects the
subjectivity of the decision maker as an important element of complex problems, where not all
decision factors can be measured precisely in quantitative terms. However, the incorporation of
subjecdve data in a decision problem is a controlled subjectivity; controlled through the
Consistency Ratio (Saaty, 1990). The latter provides an effective feedback mechanism for the
quality of decisions based on the pairwise comparisons of decision makers.
It can be easily observed that the higher levels in a hierarchy usually reflect policy factors that
would be considered mainly by top-level management. On the other hand, lower levels of an
AHP n10del comprise features reflecting more specific knowledge about the problem. In a
decentralized decision making environment such operational level knowledge is typical for
decisions that are taken by individual organizational units (Petkov, 1994).
2.4.5.4. Group Decision Making Contexts and the AHP
The suitability of each MCDA approach to group decision making in general and within specific
group decision contexts is another distinguishing f~lctor hetween the AIIP and MAUl. Ilowever,
it is distinguishing in so f~lr as the AI-IP makes provision for group decision making and has heen
arplied on many occasions to group decision environmcnts. In contrast it is the abscnce of" group
decision support within utility theory that is evident. Group decision support, and ill particular
mapping Illultiple criteria decision analysis to organizational group decision cnvironments is a
major sub-goal of" this research. Iknce, this aspect is assigncd a section or its own. In this section,
a continuulll of dccision contcxts is prescnted and the Analytic Ilicrarchy Process's ability to
handle these is examined. There is almost nothing in the literature 011 the application of other
MCDA approachcs to group decision support cnvironmcnts (Lootsma, 1996).
Why is the Analytic Hierarchy Process suited to Group Decision Making? Numerous rcsearchers
(Nunamaker et. ai, 1991) have pointed out the need to focus on supporting thc decision process as
opposed to the isolated task. Of the four decision making phases defined by (Simon, 1960). DSS
and GDSS research has to date placed emphasis on the intelligence and design phases with
relatively little attention paid to the choice phase (Dyer and Forman, 1992).
In group decision making situations, there is little assurance that all available and pertinent
information has been considered or even that the choice made by consensus is the one that is
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most likely to achieve the stated objective. Limited human capacity to process information,
inherent in complex decisions, impacts on the human ability to make the kinds of tradeoffs
implied by choices involving several conflicting dimensions. (Jennings and Wattam, 1994). From
this, it is evident that groups and indeed group support systems need multiple criteria methods to
deal with various decision contexts.
Dyer and Forman (1992) outline a continuum of group decision making contexts that range from
common objectives, non-common objectives to conflict in which the AHP can be applied.
(1) Common Objectives -- which is where all parties, have virtually the same objectives. They
suggest that there are four ways in which the AHP can be applied under a common-objective,
group decision making context:
• Consensus
The process of consensus can be used to persuade people that their interests have been taken into
account. I· rom the point of view of the Analytic Hierarchy Process consensus implies improving
the conlidence of the priority values by using severaljuuges to bring the results in line with the
majority preference (Saaty, I<)<)oa). In this case the AIIP provides one or two ways: eithcr the
group can discuss and debate the issue and seck consensus through discussion, for each
judgment. or each individual member can provide their own personal evaluation.
• Voting or ('ol1l/Jromising
Ir nn the other hand conscnsus cannot be reached on a speci fie .i udgmenl. then the group Illay
choose to votc or CO 111 pro 111 ise on all intermed iate .i udgrncnt. They note that tll is \\'()rks
particularly well with the AHP because or the inherent redundancy in pairwise comparisons.
which ensures that priorities change little with any small change to anyone judgment. The point
is to make sure that group members are aware of this feature (Dyer and Forman, 1992: 103). This
makes groups more amenable to compromising instead of being "bogged down on a particular
.i udgmcnt."
• Forming (he Geometric lv/can
Where there is disagreement and consensus cannot be reached, or the group is unwilling to vote
or compromise on a judgment, the judgments can be combined for each question by taking the
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geometric mean of members' assigned individual judgments (Saaty, 1990a; Dyer and Forman,
1992; Tone,1996).
• C0'!1bining the Results from the Individual Models.
If group members cannot meet or have significantly diverse objectives, then each group member
can provide judgments separately. These individual judgments can then be processed by the use
of separate models, which are then averaged. Expert Choice performs this function with ease.
Else the model could incorporate the actors or participants in the hierarchy, below the goal node,
and weights assigned to the actors. This however is slightly more complex and consideration
must be given on how to assign weights to the players. If soundness of judgment were a
consideration for example, how would this soundness be measured? These are additional issues
the group will have to discuss and possibly create another hierarchy for this purpose. The
resultant actors' priorities can then be entered on the original hierarchy.
(2) Non-common objectives -- that is, where the parties have non-shared and sometimes hidden
objectives. For non-common objectives it is not possible to reach consensus on all aspects or the
decision and similar approaches to the above are recommended by the authors. They recommend
focusing on objectives or interests as opposed to alternatives or positions. They suggest that
interests are more important because they define what the prohlcm really is. "A wise solution
should reconcile inlcrests and not positions" (Dyer and Forman. 1992: IOS).
(3) Conflict -- decision contexts in which the parties scck concessions from their opponcnts. In a
conflict, particularly onc of long duration, reason rarely prevails (Dyer and Forman. 19(2).
Positions becomc entrcnched and "peoplc scek not only to satisfy their own needs, but also to
punish their opponents for having opposcd them or at least to pay the price for their opposition"
(Saaty and Alcxander, 1989: - on retributive conflict resolution). In this case, there is the need. by
both parties, to assess what the benefits and costs to themselves and their opponents may be for
any concessions made or received on either side. These concessions may be qualitative or
quantitative. Howcver, questions on how the concession lists are to be generated i.e. how one
trade-off sets ofT concessions that arc acceptable to both sides, or in order to reach a
"comprehensive" settlement. Or indeed on what is meant by a comprehensive settlement, and
what the role of the mediator is in achieving a comprehensive settlement? All these are questions
that remain to be answered (Dyer and Forman, 1992).
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2.4.5.5. On the AHP and Group Judgments: Consensus Building
The aggregation of individual judgments or ratings into a group score has been subject to debate
with reference to MCDA decision approaches and group decision making. As early as 1967,
Kenneth Arrow suggested, in his impossibility theorem that, in general it is impossible to derive a
rational group choice from ordinal comparisons made by individual members, implying
aggregating individual preferences into a group preference is impossible. Arrow's theorem is a
work on the compatibility of a social utility function with individual utilities. Arrow concludes
that it is impossible that the ordering of alternatives by a group will always be consistent with the
ordering of each of the participating individuals (Saaty, 1994e; Peniwati, 1996; Howard, 1992).
Arrow's impossibility theorem has excited a lot of debate particularly among the proponents of
the Analytic Hierarchy Process who have challenged his work, while others regard it as "seminal"
(Howard, 1992).
Peniwati (1996) shows that ordinal group aggregation is problematic, complex and "procedure
dependent". She demonstrates that the aggregation of ordinal prererences is subject to the
paradox or voting. the Condorcet erfect which occurs when the aggregation or transitive,
individual ordinal prefercnccs produces an intransitive group choice. Peniwati, further illustrates
that the conditions laid out by Arrow can howcvcr be satisficd whcn one uses prcferences that arc
cardinal as opposcd to ordinal. More specifically. at appropriatc consistency levels. the AIIP
negates the impossibility thcorcm (Peni\\'ati. 199()). Whcn individual vector prioritics are known.
thc geometric mcan is a way of combining them to represent a group priority in a manner
consistent with the propositions of AITO\\'S' Theorem (Peniwati, 1996~ Saaty. 1994c).
Similarly. Saaty (1994c: 39) suggests the "way to analyse how individuals develop expectations
about the compatibility of their rankings with that of the group to which they provide input is by
assuming that each individual carries out a complete ranking of the alternatives and compares it
with the originally proposed group ranking". Ranking can be performed on a cardinal scale so
that "meaningful numbers are assigned to the alternatives rather than ordinals". The creation of a
cardinal scale is achieved by creating a ratio scale, which according to Saaty leads to the question
of inconsistency and deciding when a ranking is valid and when it is unjustified by the
judgments. By allowing for specified levels of inconsistency individuals can adjust their
judgments and incompatibility up to the tolerance level, so that it is possible that all individual
59
Chap/a 2. On .\f/l/fip/e Cri/erra Decision MakinK Genaa/ Rest'arch I.twes
preferences would agree with a group decision more often than Arrow's theory suggests (Saaty,
1994c).
Individual judgments can also be elicited from each individual and these judgments can be
combined using the geometric mean. "The use of the geometric mean is the only way in which to
combine judgments made in pairwise comparisons while preserving the reciprocal property"
(Saaty, 1990a, 1994c; Peniwati, 1996, Forman and Peniwati, 1996), The latter statement has not
met with difficulties of acceptance that are articulated in the literature.
2.4.5.6. Further Additional Research on the Original AHP
The criticisms of the AHP by utility theorists have not gone unnoticed. Some proponents of the
AHP have taken heed and developed extensions of the AHP that resolve the problem of rank
reversal, for example the ideal mode of synthesis in Saaty (1997). Other developments that have
emerged extending the AHP include issues of scale, the handling of uncertainty and interference
hetween elements. These are hrieny discllssed below, although a detailed discussion of these is
beyond the scope or this research. One development has heen the introduction of a modi lied scale
sueh as the so called "balanced scale" (Salo and Ilamalainen, 1997), or the scale proposed for the
multiplicative rorm or the AlIi> (Lootsma and Schuijt, 19(5). Saln and Ilamalainen (1997) claim
the balanced scale decreases the inconsistency or the comparison matrices and the variation ill
weights CO III pared to the trad itional AHP one to ni ne poi nt scale proposed by Saaty. No report on
the basic difTerence between the final ordering or alternatives using the two scales exists.
Poyhoncn and I-Iamalainen (1997) report that thc halanced scale produced weights for the first
and second most important attributcs that are closer to those derived by other MCDA approaches.
while for the same weights the traditional scalc produccd valucs that were greater by as much as a
100% •
Multiplicative AHP (MAHP) evolved from the ideas of Lootsma (1993). Its foundations are laid
out in an axiomatic framework developed by Barzilai and Lootsma (1995) and enhanced in
Barzilai (1996). MAHP uses the same problem structuring as the original AHP. It employs a ratio
scale for the preference rating of one alternative over another using pairwise comparisons to elicit
the preferences. It also employs a hierarchical structure and the same questioning procedure as
the classical AHP. The differences between itself and the classical AHP are in computational
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methods. The most important feature about it is, it avoids rank reversal by applying the Utility
Theory axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, when that is considered undesirable.
Other recent developments pertain to the possibility of handling the uncertainty inherent in
decision makers' judgments through interval judgments. With interval judgments, the decision
maker defines an interval in which his or her judgment lies, in lieu of generating a point
judgment. Other approaches have been suggested in the last ten years, including simulation and
linear programming. More information on this can be found in Saaty (1994), Salo and
Hamalainen (1997), Stam and Silva (1997) and Haines (1998).
2.5. On Future Areas of Research within MCDA-MCDM
In the earlier sections of this chapter, the three schools of MCDA were identified. These were
explored with respect to their axiomatic foundations and frameworks, and their ability to handle
multiple criteria, multiple persons, and multiple alternatives problems that exist for organizational
decision makers. What emerged were some difTerences between the approaches about some
fundamcntal theoretical issucs. And yet besides thc signs of formation of thc Multi-attribute
Utility Theory (MAUT), thc Analytic Ilierarchy Process, and the Outranking (Frcnch) schools,
"wc still do not have a sharcd view on how human prcfcrencc and human valuc judgmcnt should
he modelled" (Lootsmi.l. Il)9():37).
011 thc other hand. l3an'1 c Costa et a!. (1995:271) suggest that thesc streams of thought should
110t be seen as conflicting. but rather as complimentary approaches and sources of new and rich
ideas. "Under this constructive perspective, the image or the "hydra with several heads" can thus
be replaced by that of a "rocket with several engines" contributing together to the success of its
mission: this is what is needed for MCDA to emerge somewhere in the future, as a coherent body
of tools."
The process of moving towards a common understanding of MCDM will require the resolution of
some of the differences identified earlier in this chapter. One of these is to sort out the basic aim
of an MCDM method or technique. Stewart (1992) suggests that "the aim of a multiple criteria
decision making technique is to provide help and guidance to the decision maker in discovering
his or her most desired solution to the problem (in the sense of, that course of action which best
61
Chapter 2: On Multiple Criteria DeciJion ,\'fakinK General Reuarch I.U/lCJ
achieves the decision maker's long term goals)." French (1984) concludes that a good decision
aid should help the decision maker explore not just the problem but also himself. Howard (1992)
describes decision analysis as a "quality conversation about a decision designed to lead to clarity
of action." Finally, Keeney (1992) says "we should spend more of our decision making time
concentrating on what is important ...articulating and understanding our values and using these to
select meaningful decisions to ponder, to create better alternatives ... and to evaluate more
carefully the desirability of the alternatives."
Related to this is that another fundamental objective for the future should be to explore the links
between the desires for a theoretical foundation and operational validation (Bana e Costa et aI.,
1995). Thus the differentiation and defence of approaches on the basis that they fall within the
theoretical foundations of normative or descriptive and are therefore not comparable could move
towards the same end-objective, that is supporting real decision makers solve multiple criteria
problems using theoretically sound and yet operationally tractable methods. Ironically, it is
ohserved here that this in itself is a mUltiple criteria problem: balancing the two objectives
theoretical rigor and operational tractability within MCDA.
Rclated to this is the notion or subjectivity and ohjectivity of the decision maker, the process,
and the analysis. Normative thcorists havc argued 1'01' a purely rational approach. and proponcnts
or descriptive theory have recognizcd subjcctivity and intuition and the chasm would nced to bc
resolved. Zeleny (1982:487) suggests "Both analysis and intuition arc uscful applicd to thc right
problcm." On thc other hand, Henig and Buchanan (1996) proposc a solution, which nceds
further practical research. They suggest that whi le acknowledgi ng the existence of the inherent
subjectivity or a multiple criteria problem and the need for preference elicitation, they endeavour,
in their paper, to "clearly separate the objective from the subjective in the decision making
process". Their proposal says solving an MCDM problem amounts to an objective investigation
or the impact of alternatives on attributes; and a subjective evaluation of the decision maker's
preference system. They argue that the former ought to be scientific in nature. The mapping of
alternatives to attributes is the objective part of the process and is independent of the decision
maker's preference. While, the mapping of criteria to attributes is the subjective part the process.
They argue that some of the subjective mapping in some cases can be replaced with objective
analysis by introducing aggregated attributes (Henig and Buchanan, 1996). In response to
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comments by Lootsma (1996), Phillips (1996), Stewart (1996), Daellenbach (1996), they argue
that too often in MCDM "the major source of bad decision making is that too much is too easily
justified by causal subjectivity: intuition, culture, tradition, experience, belief etc." Their aim is to
leave more room for objectivity (Henig and Buchanan, 1996).
Further research is needed on the Structuring and Framing of the decision process (Peniwati,
1996a). This author believes that for practical purposes, while the objective of any MCDA
approach should be to provide the user of such a method with the ability to select the right or best
alternative in a multiple criteria problem environment/task, in so doing, an assumption is made
that the sub-objective is to clarify the problem, i.e. problem structure en-route to the solution,
thus bringing better a understanding of the problem. The understanding of the problem includes
having the capacity to distinguish between phantom and real issues in a decision situation. This
appears to be a reasonable pre-requisite to successful problem solving within organizations.
Therefore building formalized structuring techniques within all MCDA approaches is an area that
warrants further research. Although the AHP provides structuring, it does so in a non-formalized
manner. 1s there a need to perhaps formal ize that?
Another important issue, which is currently little discussed, is the selection or the appropriate
fJroh/ef1/atic for the decision aid within the decision context (Bana e Costa ct aI., 1995). This
issue arrccts the I~lcilitator when framing a decision situation. Aiding the decision maker to solve
choice problems has heen the dominant decision aid. There are other /Jroh/elllolics in decision
aid ing. such as rank ing and assignment problem situations. The author bel ieves more
doculllentation and indeed research is needed for iclcnti fying the problem arenas for which an
approach such as the AHP is appropriate. This assumes that a method extending its applicability
across a large domain of task or problem types although ideal is way off. Zeleny (1982) writes
about the field being far away from a method that is to the decision maker as an automobile is to
a driver.
Another area for further work is Group Decision Maldng. The decision maker as a collective of
individuals is a feature of business environments, which is unlikely to go away given the ever-
increasing complexity of business environment. Yet, very little rigorolls research has been done
in the field of MCDA to aid the multiple criteria -- multiple decision maker situation. In cases
where the decision maker is not a single individual or a homogenous group, but rather an
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individual or group that has to make decisions for a larger group, the rationale behind the
decision reached is complicated by other group-specific factors. For example, the other members
with a vested interested in the decision but not involved in the decision making process require a
justific~tion that must be clearly documented (Bana e Costa et aI., 1995), In addition groups
present issues of culture (Lootsma, 1996; Daily et aI., 1996), power and influence (Lockett, et ai,
1998) which all play a part in the "subjective" content of the decision.
The above conclusions partially served as motivation for the issues chosen to be investigated in
more detail in this dissertation, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four.
64
Chapter.l. A Uterature 5iun'ey o/CS:\'
CHAPTER 3. A LITERATURE SURVEY ON GROUP DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
3.1. .A Brief Introduction to Group Decision Support System
A Group Decision Support System (GOSS) has been described as a computer-based system for
supporting groups in a face-to-face, geographically and or temporally distributed meeting
environments (Gray, 1984). A commonly quoted definition describes a GOSS as "a set of
software, hardware and language components and procedures that support a group of people
engaged in a decision related meeting" (Huber, 1984).
The complexity and difficulty of unravelling the issues surrounding GOSS research is articulated
by Kerr (1982):
"Social interaction in decision making groups i.\' characterized by such
variety. complexity. and apparent disorder that it seems to defy neat
analysis. The key d{lliculty seems to he choosin~ an approach a.'pect (?lthe
group's hehaviourfor ohserwlIion" (Kerr /982:(2)
This chapter is structured to first explore some or the major issues of GDSS, This is followed by
an examination or the features or a GOSS that have been included in its technology. The chapter
will conclude by inquiring into the outstanding issues in the field of GDSS and the possible areas
of future research.
In this dissertation, group decision support systems (GOSS) and group support systems (GSS)
will be used interchangeably. Stevens and Finlay (1996) in a survey of GSS research report that
GSS is a wider and more modern term. Some authors also refer to GDSS as collaborative
technologies (Nunamaker, 1995). Others have used Electronic Meeting Systems (EMS)
(Nunamaker et aI., 1989; Nunamaker et aI., 1999)
GSS are an offshoot of Decision Support Systems (DSS). DSS are computer based information
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systems that are designed with the purpose of improving the processes and outcomes of human
decision making. In order to demonstrate the background of GSS the foundations of DSS are
explored.
The imperatives that drive Decision Support Systems i.e. the foundations of decision making,
including types of decisions and decision makers were discussed in Chapter One. In the following
section, the characteristics and capabilities of the systems used to support decision making are
overviewed.
3.2. A Brief Look at the Important Characteristics and Capabilities of a Decision
Support System (DSS)
"A Decision Support System (DSS) is an interactive, flexible, and adaptable computer-based
information system (CBIS) specially developed for supporting the solution of a non-structured
management problem for improved decision making" (Turban and Aronson, 1998; 77). It uses
data, provides easy user interlllce and can incorporate the decision maker's own insights. In
addition a DSS may use models, is built by an interactive process (usually by cnd-users), supports
all phases of decision making, and may include a knowledge component. The characteristics and
capabilities of a DSS arc provided by its major components. In summary, the following arc the
characteristics and capabilities of a DSS (Turban and I\ronson, I<)9X~ Gray, 1984~ Keen and
MOI,ton, 1980; Keen, 1986~ Turban and Meredith, 1994).
a) DSS provide support for decision makers mainly in semi-structured and unstructured
situations by bringing together human judgement and computerized information. Typically
such problems cannot be solved conveniently by other systems or by standard quantitative
methods or t601s.
b) Support is provided for vanous managerial levels, rangll1g from top executives to line
managers.
c) Support is provided to individuals as well as groups. Less structured problems often require
the involvement of several individuals from different departments and organizational levels.
d) DSS provide support to several interdependent and/or sequential decisions.
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e) DSS support all phases of the decision making process: intelligence, design, choice and
implementation.
t) DSS support a variety of decision making styles.
g) DSS are adaptive over time. The decision maker must be reactive, able to confront changing
conditions quickly, and adapt the DSS to meet these changes. DSS are flexible, so users can
add, delete, combine, change, or rearrange basic elements.
h) Users must feel at home with DSS. User-friendliness, strong graphic capabilities, and an
English-like interactive human-machine interface can increase the effectiveness ofOSS.
i) DSS attempts to improve the effectiveness of decision making (accuracy, timeliness, and
quality), rather than its efficiency (cost) of decision making.
j) The decision maker has complete control over all steps of the decision making process in
solving a problem. A DSS specifically aims to support and not to replace the decision maker.
k) End-users should be able to construct and modify simple systems by themselves. Larger
systems can be built with assistance from information systems (IS) specialists.
I) ;\ DSS usually utilizes models ror analysing decision making situations. The modelling
capabi Ii ty enahles decision makers to experiment with di rrcrent strategies under di fferent
con figurations.
111) The DSS should provide access to a variety of data sources, formats, and types, ranging from
geographic information systcms to object oricntcd ones.
The Conlponents of a DSS
As already mentioned thc characteristics and capabilities of a DSS are provided by its major
components (Turban and Aronson, \998). Figure 3.\ shows the major components of a DSS,
which are defined below.
• Data management sub-.~ystems. This sub-system includes a database, which contains relevant
data for the situation and is managed by software known as a database management system
(OBMS)
• Model management sub-systems. This is a software package that includes financial, statistical,
management science, or other quantitative models that provide the system's analytical
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capabilities and appropriate software management. Modelling languages for building custom
models are also included.
• User-interface sub-systems. The user communicates with and commands the DSS through
this ,sub-system.
Sometimes a fourth component is included. It can be a mail system component (Sauter, 1997) or










I, igul'c 3.1 A Schcmatic Vicw of a DSS - (adapted from Turban and Aronson, 1998)
Research in DSS continues to be multi-faceted. In a paper. tracking the development of DSS
research, Eom (1998) finds, in the five years between 1991 and 1995 DSS research areas and
reference disciplines can be categorized into four different groups: steady, strengthening,
emerging and dying. In the steady category inter alia is multi-criteria decision making. Two DSS
research sub-fields foundations and individual differences fall into the dying category. Group
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DSS is found in the strengthening category. This finding is significant for this research although
not surprising given the developments in business organizations and the role that groups or teams
continue to play.
3.3. The Transition to GSS
As discussed in Chapter One modern organizations have a larger pool of stakeholders that
requires groups to solve problems and recommend solutions. Pumsook and Jenney, (1997:7)
suggest that because of this reliance by organizations on groups to solve problems and
recommend solutions: decision making groups have become 'less like special project commando
teams' and more a part of the support that exists for a variety of end-user functions in an
organization. There is a growing need for pooled interdependent decision support precisely
because of the role played by groups in organizations. Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS)
thus refer to specialized DSS to support teams involved in decision making (Gray, 1994).
GDSS are integrated computer-hased support systems, which l~lcilitate the solution of semi-
structured or unstructured prohlems, hy a group who has joint responsihility for making the
decision (DeSanclis and Gallupe, 1(85). The "ultimate" goal or (JDSS is to improve decision
quality ancl reduce meeting time in an atmosphere conducive to group member satisl~lclion
(VogeL et aI., 1(87).
In the early stages it was clear that GSS theory and practice were mainly preoccupied with the
capability to alleviate the communication breakdowns that characteristically occur in group
processes in a same-time/same-place environment (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987). Ilowever,
Group Decision Support Systems have evolved with the aim of managing the processing of the
increased pools or information in meetings. The introduction of group interaction introduces
difficulties that are unique to a group environment. Group dynamics exist purely by virtue of
there being more than one individual attempting to solve a problem: individuals have different
cognitive styles, as shown in Chapter One. It is for that reason, GDSS technology faces some
distinct issues of concern to DSS. In summary, the main difference between DSS and GDSS is
that traditionally DSS have focused on the outcome of the decision making task (DeSanctis,
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1980), whereas GDSS focus on the process of group decision making (DeSanctis, 1980).
The added trend of the increasing complexity of the environment in which managers must
function has meant more and more important decisions or solutions are sought by a collective of
decision makers. Organizational surveys have consistently reported that managers spend a
significant portion of their time in meetings, making choices among alternatives i.e. decisions
(Gray et aI., 1981). Many of these surveys also report dissatisfaction with the (unsupported)
meeting process. Managers cite wasted time, the feeling of achieving nothing, going around in
circles as sentiments that many who have participated in regular company meetings share or are
aware of. In spite of the apparent dissatisfaction with meeting processes organizations have not
relented and abolished meetings completely. It is doubtful whether they can actually do so. The
need to get buy-in from all stakeholders~ the need to consult the people who may ultimately be
responsible for implementing decisions taken in the organization and the need to pool the
expertise which resides with separate individuals in order to solve problems are just some
examples that dcmonstrate the nccd for group meetings.
During the latc 19XOs rcscarchcrs embarked on examll1l11g methods dcsigned to alleviatc the
archetypal communication breakdowns that are characteristic or group interaction. Mcmbcrs
talking at thc samc timc or waiting 1'01' onc's turn while othcrs speak (talking serially), known as
fJroc!lfction h/ocking are some or thc cxamplcs of thc typical communication hreakdowns. Thesc
wi 11 be discussed in more detai I under the section "process losses."
3.4. An Overview of the GDSS Environment
The recognition that more individuals working on the same problem are better off than any single
individual working on his or her own is a well-received idea within the field of GDSS and
behavioural sciences research. It is recognized that for the numerous categories of task (types) for
which groups gather, they are far more effective than individuals working by themselves. This
applies for example to idea generation.
Notwithstanding this synergy effect, there is the almost self-evident paradox that arises from
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group interaction. The paradox has been illustrated many times through the recorded experiences
of many groups. Groups are frequently observed to be inefficient (and sometimes ineffective) at
completing their assigned tasks (Turban and Aronson, 1998). In more recent times this has been
compounded by the fact that the persons suitable to compose the group are not necessarily
physically at the same place at the same time. The case of branch mangers of a big bank is a good
example of this. While the bank may need to convene these decision makers regularly to
formulate and implement coherent company plans, getting them together at the same place at the
same time is often costly and sometimes risky for the business.
Frequently individuals that should compose a group are as illustrated in Figure 3.2 at the same-
place at the same-time, at different-places at the same time; at different times at the same place; at
different places at different times which all amounts to being at any place at any time.
same time




samc time cl iflCrcll t timc
c1iflcrcnt place diflcrcnt placc
Figu re 3.2 The time-place qUftdnlllt
Group support systems features and design strategies should be premised on optimising the
effectiveness and efficiency of a group engaged in decision making through appropriate
technological interventions. "The objective of decision support systems for groups is to discover
and present groups with new possibilities and approaches for making decisions" (DeSanctis and
Gallupe, 1987:592)" They do this by acting on the information exchange.
DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987) proposed three approach-levels of systems support features. These
approaches have informed a lot of the GOSS research and literature, for instance McLeod and
Liker (1992). Within each of the feature levels of group support, other researchers have pursued
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"sub-features" which will be examined concurrently. By way of illustration: the degree of
anonymity offered by a GOSS is kno\vn as a Level I GSS feature. A brief summary of these is
introduced hereunder.
Level 1 GDSS "provide technical features aimed at removing common communication
barriers"(DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987:593). These features include such things as large screen
displays, vote solicitation and compilation, the anonymous input of ideas and or preferences and
electronic message exchange between members. Level I features' improve the decision process
by facilitating the information exchange among group members" (DeSanctis and Gallupe,
1987:593). The degree of anonymity offered by a GSS is a feature that has been studied
extensively. The capacity to contribute ideas anonymously has been shown to reduce group
process losses such as evaluation apprehension, while this capacity may also enhance process
gains such the equality of participation (Mcleod and Liker, 1992).
Level 2 GnSS provide decision modelling and group decision techniques aimed at reducing the
uncertainty and noise that occur in the group's decision process. This Illay occur through thc
provision of automated planning tools and other aids that arc commonly found in thc traditional
individual DSS. Ilowever, it would be designed for group members to work with and vicw
simultancously using a large common screcn. Level 2 GDSS Illay provide utility and probability
assessmcnt modcls, risk asscssmcnt. statistical modcls and multi-critcria dccision models
([)eSanctis and Gallupc, 1987).
Level 3 GOSS fcatures exhibit "machinc-induccd group communication pattcrns and can includc
cxpert advice in the selecting and arranging of rulcs to be applied during a meeting. At this level,
signiticantly, each member represents a node in the communication network and deliberate
patterns are imposed on the group by the technology" (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987:594).
Examples of Level-3 systems are CyberQuest (CQ), a Group Support System that features
computerized problem-solving techniques along with hyper-media, and multi-stimuli processes.
Participants access various data bases of information and analytical tools to generate, evaluate,
and implement organizational decisions. They also support same-time/same-place, different-
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time/different-place, and same-time/different-place meetings. (GSS-ListServe - newsgroup,
1999).
The higher the level of GOSS, the more sophisticated the technology needs to be and the more
dramatic the intervention into the group's natural decision process.
Existing research GOSS deals mainly with Level 1 and Level 2 GOSS. It identifies five
interacting components that form part of a GSS environment. These are the Group, Individual
(the profile of the individual members of the group); Task (the task with which the group intends
to tackle); Process (the process dynamics of the interacting individuals) and the Technology
(Huber, 1982). However, there is a nebulous line between group issues and process issues. The
author has found that frequently researchers discuss the two components simultaneously. Huber
(1982) is one such example. This is symptomatic of the complexity and variety of the group
process, referred to by Kerr (1982). While group issues have tended to dominate research, more
reccntly stud ies arc starti ng to emcrge that focus on task issucs. This research focuses on the
issues that have thus f~lr reccivcd little rcsearcher attcntion.
3.4.1. The Individual and Individual Characteristics
This aspect or a GDSS cnvironlllcnt deals with the characteristics of the individual(s)
participati ng in the group proccss. Thcse include atti tude, abi Iity. background. emotional state.
cui ture. accountabi Iity. cogni tive decision mak ing stylc and rcasons for group mem bershi p. Here
\Vc explore some or these and brieOy examine ho\V GSS researchers have sought to understand
and manage the complexities brought about by the characteristics or the individual in order to
enhance the group process or experience.
Accountability is the degree to 'vvhich each individual is personally accountable for the decision
reached and the extent to which the members present have the authority to make a final decision
(Friend, 1990). Accountability is related to stakeholding in the process.
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Culture can have a strong influence upon behaviour so that the degree of technology is more
appropriate for some cultures than for others. Gray and Olfman (1989) emphasize the importance
of considering the culture and spoken language of potential users when designing a GSS. Here
the authors consider issues of an international GSS design, which would include translation
capacity. Considerations of culture in a group process are of particular interest in an environment
such as the United Nations, multi-nationals, which comprise local and international management.
The Decision making style of the individual participating in the group process is perhaps a more
complex issue than the ones above. Here GOSS research has not operated in isolation in
attempting to unravel individual cognitive styles in order to optimise the group process. It is
known that the outcome of the decision process is substantially influenced by the individual's
personalized strategies and abilities for problem solving. Frequently these personalized styles
differ between individuals. In particular these specialized styles of decision making may be
effective in some contexts and not so effective in others (Keen and Scott Morton, 1978).
Similarly with problem structuring and fnllning, the differences in cognitive ahilities among
individuals have heen round (in image theory research) to be important variahles in determining
the use or imagery in problem-solving activities, particularly in problem structuring (Loy, 19(1).
('onseq uentl y, pro li ling the ind ividual(s) that make up the group has pre-occupied (,SS
researchers for some time (Dennis et aL 19R7~ Loy, 19(1). Many studies have referred to the
study of psychology for direction in this matter.
3.4.2. The Task and Task Characteristics
The task is the very reason for which the group is gathered. As introduced at the beginning of this
chapter, decision makers potentially face problems (tasks) that fall somewhere between the
continuous spectrum or programmed (structured) to non-programmed (unstructured) tasks. Using
Simon's (1977) decision making model these tasks fall into the phases of: Intelligence, Design
Choice and Implementation. Due to the tasks faced by groups being so varied, each decision
making phase requires the participants to carry out different actions. These actions subsequently
affect many aspects of the group process, for example the quality of the solution, or satisfaction
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with the solution.
Research on the task component explores a variety of issues, from task complexity, task
performance, to degree of rationality, clarity (McLeod and Likel, 1992) and others. To support
group-work, collaborative technologies must possess the ability to decipher and distinguish the
characteristics of the task facing the group. Moreover, these are not always the same (DeSanctis
and Gallupe, 1987) so that a GSS cannot be task specific. The capacity to structure and manage
tasks (efficiently and effectively) is a feature that that warrants more research in ass theory and
research.
Identifying the Nature of the task is the first step towards problem resolution or decision making.
In Simon's (1977) model this is the intelligence phase of decision making. Intelligence rests on
the ability to correctly recognize the task characteristics so as to devise solutions suitable to the
task at hand. This includes being able to correctly identify the decision making phase in which
the task nllls (Laudon and Laudon, 1996). Identifying the nature of the task includes being able to
assess the structure and complexity or the task. It also implies ascertaining thc Import4lncc or the
issue and the resulting outcomcs that tcnd to innuencc group mcmber pcrccptions of their
respol1si bi Iity for reachi ng a good solut ion (Stevens and Finlay, I<)<)(»). The Structure or the task
relates to the degree to which onc can define the conditions that allo\v the problcm to bc
recognized (Keen and Scott Morton 197X). The Complexity of a task is a combination of scveral
components: one is the number or alternative solutions or options availablc to the resolution of
the problcm. Related to this is the amount of' information to be eonsidercd in the unravelling of
the problem. Task Uncert4linty is another dimension or task complexity, where uncertainty is
associated with a lack of information regarding the environmental f~lctors associated with the task
and not knowing the consequences or implementing the task (Stevens and !'inlay, 1996). The
third is the number of interrelated activities required to complete the activity (Dennis et al. 1988,
Martz et al. 1992).
With respect to the l1ature of the task, Martz et aI. (1992) divide tasks into three types. They call
these:
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a) Production-Oriented tasks - which require the generation and discussion of ideas.
b) Evaluative tasks- which involve the evaluation of a set alternative issues; and
c) Problem solving tasks - which is when a group must detennine a course of action.
Similarly, McGrath (1984) presents a typology of tasks as being of four general types:
Generating, Choosing, Negotiating and Executing.
The urgency of the task, how quickly an issue needs to be resolved (Gray et aI., 1990) and task
duration, the length of time required to complete a group process are also task characteristics
that affect group performance. For example, if the perceived lack of time to resolve the issue -
what Lasden (1986) calls "a beat the clock" syndrome - looms, it increases the likelihood that
hasty decisions will be made to cut corners, fix mistakes or fill holes.
GOSS research and technology have responded unevenly to the variability of task types. Watson,
et al. (1988: 105) report that much or the intended effects or desired outcomes of GDSS
technology have been demonstrated with respect to a limited number or task types. "To date
positive erfects or GDSS have been ohserved 1'01' idea generation" (Applegatc, 1986, Lcwis,
19X2): prohlem finding (Ciallupe. 19X5): intellectual choice, which is the selection or the correct
answer among a givcn set or alternatives (Turolland Ililtl.. 1(82) and planning tasks (Applcgate.
19X(): Steeh and .Iohnston. I9X I). As this is not an exhaustive list or the task types that f~lcc
managers ill their day to clay runctions within organizations. there is scope for advancing GSS
research and technology with respect to the problem-structuring phase or in other words
exploring Simon's (1977) intelligence phase of problem solving. This is an important motivation
for the research reported in this dissertation as it explores the issue of task structuring in morc
detail in an attempt to build on existing knowledge and previous research.
3.4.3. The Group and Group Characteristics
A decision making group is two or more people jointly responsible for detecting a problem;
elaborating on the nature of the problem; generating possible solutions; evaluating potential
solutions; or formulating strategies for implementing solutions (Jacob and Pirkul, 1992).
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Group characteristics encompass the relationships that exist between group members,
characteristics of the development of the group and the patterned relations among group members
(McGrath: 1984; Stevens and Finlay: 1996). "The group characteristics are contingent upon the
individual characteristics of the participants" (Stevens and Finlay, 1996: 226). Group
characteristics and therefore issues that have been studied include the following: group size;
existing social networks (Pinsonneault, and Kraemer, 1989); group norms; group-oriented
motives; power relationships; status relationships; the breadth of participants; group
cohesiveness; density of group; stage of group development as a result of group history.
The definition and exploration of all group characteristics is beyond the scope of this research.
The aim here is to briefly survey what group characteristics have been the subjects of research,
with the intention of identifying potential future research issues. In examining these issues other
researchers have sought to understand them in order to formulate theories or systems of
taxonomy (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987~ Stevens and [<'inlay, 1996) that would bring more clarity
to the field or GSS. Some issues (like group size) have lent themselves to more exploration than
others. These are discusscd below briefly.
Group size. The efTect or changes in group-size on GSS technology, or thc crrcct or GSS supr>ort
on d i ITerent group sizes is sti 11 an opcn issue. Most GSS research has I<Jcuscd on small groups 0 I'
three to four individuals (Watson et al., 1988, Nunamaker, 1999). It is possible that the elTect or
GSS support is more pronounced the larger the group. Some researchers suggest that classi lying
groups on the basis or size is rather arbitrary, that it is better to think of groups as relatively small
or relatively large (DeSanctis and Gallupe. 1987; Nunamaker et £11. 1989). The difference between
the group's logical and physical size can be significant (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987). A
physically large group with a common culture that has met repeatedly on a task may have a high
degree of overlapping domain knowledge resulting in the group being logically small. A
physically small multi-cultural group may manifest characteristics of a larger group with multiple
and often conflicting perspectives, opinions and knowledge domains (Nunamaker, et aI., 1989;
Stevens and Finlay, 1996).
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The basic principles of group dynamics apply to all groups, small and large, although the
predominant activities of a group differ between small and large groups. As membership size
increases, the number of potential infonnation exchanges rises geometrically, and the frequency,
duration and intimacy of information exchange decline and consensus becomes harder to achieve
(DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987).
Early research of non-supported meeting environments found group process dysfunctions tending
to rise rapidly as group size increases (Midgaard and Underdal, 1977; Steiner 1972), so that larger
groups do not typically generate significantly more options than smaller groups (Fern, 1982;
Lamm and Trommsdorff, 1973). In addition, larger groups were typically less satisfied than
smaller groups (Shaw, 1981; Hare 1981). On the other hand, later studies (Nunamaker, et aI.
1991; Valacich et aI., 1990; Dennis et aI., 1990) of supported (EMS) groups have consistently
found that larger groups were more effective than smaller groups, or nominal groups or several
smaller groups combined. They also found member satisfaction to increase with group size.
These experiments were however limited to option generation tasks only.
Studics or other group characteristics have produccd results that exhibit little consistency across
studies (Srinivasan and .Iarvenpaa. 1()t) I). The characteristics studied therein include group
cohcsivcncss, the degree to which group members are attracted to each other (Shaw. 19R I).
Research has shown that cohesive groups arc more likely to achieve their goals (Lull. 19X4:
DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987). Group cohesiveness can becomc cxtremely impol1ant where
strong morale. long-term cooperation ancl conformity to group norms arc critical to the
organization (Festinger 1968~ Hollander 1964~ Shaw 1973~ DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987). On the
other hand, group cohesiveness has been observed to be irrelevant in circumstances where
decision quality is the primary objective (Pervan, )998; Pervan and Atkinson, 1995).
Group norms arc the set standards of behaviour, which group members, can expect from other
members (Shaw, 1981; Kerr, 1979; Stevens and Finlay: 1996). Group norms are related to the
"group culture" and affect group perfonnance.
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Power and status relationships: power relationships relate to the control or influence which one
person has over another (Shaw, 1981); whereas status relationships refer to an individual's rank,
worth or prestige in the organization or group (Mitchell, 1982). The differences in status are
important as determinants of group process, because members with high status tend to participate
in a greater number of interactions and initiate more ideas (Brown, 1988). Low status members
may tend to defer their participation to high status members.
More recently, the density of the group has also attracted researcher attention. Group density is a
composite factor made up of components like: the size of the group, the size of the room, the
interpersonal distance (proximity) between group members (Pinsonneault, and Kraemer, 1989);
and the appropriateness of group size to task (Stevens and Finlay, 1996). For instance, the
combination of anonymity and low member proximity results in more member input with
increased criticalness and yet low member satisfaction in the process (Nunamaker et aI., 1991).
The study of and research into group characteristics remains relevant in that it hrings the GSS
cOlllmunity closer to the identi fication and definition or an efTective prohlem-solving group.
Defining an effective problem-solving group
It is important to examine what constitutcs an cfTective problcm-solving group. According to
Iluher (1982) an efTective problem-solving group must:
• Meet the requirements of the situation (i.e. accomplish its task, while making acceptable use
of mem bel' ti me.)
• Secondly, it must complete its endeavours with the individual members being generally more
satisfied than unsatisfied. However, this is a contentious point. Some researchers have argued
that the satisfaction of the group is not necessarily a requirement. It would be determined by
the nature of the task (Huber, 1982).
• Thirdly, the group must complete its endeavours without impairing the capacity of the group
to function in the future. (Huber, 1982)
This definition of the terms of performance for group effectiveness is extended to include an
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outline on how to measure group performance. Huber (1982) suggests, the problem-solving
group's Actual Effectiveness be measured in the following way:
(Actual Effectiveness) = (Potential Effectiveness) less (Process Losses)
= (Process Gains)
The potential effectiveness of the group follows from the combined input of its members and
process losses follow from the group process per se. Process losses include the loss of (potential)
decision quality arising from some members not being able to contribute their knowledge.
Typically, production blocking and or evaluation apprehension are the main reasons for this.
These are discussed later in the chapter.
The measuring of process losses and gains is an unresolved issue in ass research. The capacity
of group decision support theory and technology to define, recognize, measure and counter
process losses is a major challenge for the field. Recommending and implementing GSS features
that effectively minimize group process losses across task-types whi le simultaneoLlsly optimising
group process gains is the challenge that f~lces current research (ltuber, 1982~ Nunamaker, 1999).
3.4.4. Process and Process Characteristics
It was mcntioncd that isolating proccss issucs and group issucs from onc anothcr is sometimcs
di rlicult. Process issues relate to thc dynamics surrounding thc actual interaction or thc group
Il1cm bers and that these process dynamics in Iluence group outcomes (Ilubcr. 1982). Process
losses and process gains are next explored before investigating grollp outcomes.
Sources of Process Losses
There arc many sources of process losses that contribute to the communications breakdowns that
are characteristic of group interaction. The process losses discllssed hereunder have attracted
signi ficant researcher attention in GSS.
a) The first is Production Blocking which occurs when individuals cannot express their ideas
because someone else is talking. Production blocking can be overcome if group members have
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the ability to both input and receive ideas simultaneously with other members often through
individual workstations (McLeod and Liker, 1992; Nunamaker et aI., 19R9, Nunamaker, et al.
1991; Dennis et al, 1988; Nunamaker et al. 1999).
b) The second is Evaluation Apprehension which is created by the mere presence of others; this
creates demands on a person to behave in a particular way in order to either not lose credibility to
or to gain positive evaluation from one's peers. In the first case, evaluation apprehension
manifests itself through individuals withholding their input out of a concern (or fear) that other
group members may not approve. The transparency of the contributor's identity in f~lce-to-face
meetings is believed to be mainly responsible for evaluation apprehension. This is known as the
lack of anonymity of the contributor of the idea (or input). Low status members participating in
groups with dominant, high status members tend to suffer evaluation apprehension more (Gallupe
et aI., I()X7). On the other 'hand, the desire to gain positive evaluation may result in an
enhancement or the process. Ilarkins ( 19X7) showed that the presence or others and evaluation
apprehension have ~In additive erfect Oil !1erl'ormance.
c) The third is .\·(}('iall_(}(~/iJlf.:, \\'hL'l'L' IllcllllK'rs in ~I group do not \\'ork as hard as they \HHlld i I'
;IIH.I pl'rl<lI"Ill~1I1C\..' 01' othl'r gmup Illl'llllK'I'S (I':rel ;lIld SOlllL'Ch. I l)l)()), :\ IllL'I;I-:1I1:dy"is 01' 7S
studies Oil soci:" loaling I<HlI1d th:1l thL' L'I'll.Tt orsoci:d lo;tling is rohust :1l1l1 is geIlL'I':IlilL'd acms\..,
t:lsks :lIld \\ork populatiolls (k.:lr:lu :Illd \\'illi:II11S. I<)<n). Ilo\\e\'er thL'l'l' :Ir( v:lriahlcs th:lt
Illoder~lted the telldellcy to ellgage ill social loalillg. 1-'<)1' e\::Il11plc. \\hell tasks \\'cre Illl';lIlillgl'UI.
whell the group culture supported c()lltrihutionto a group. socialloalillg \\a, not ohsel'\'L'd (";Irau
~IIH.I Williall1s. I<)l)~: I·:re/. ~lI1d SOI11L'ch. I<)<)()).
(>hservations hy the author. at Ilulctt 1\lul11iniulll. where she is employed llml il1volved ill lllal1~
task !c(IIl1S. show soe ial loa fi Ilg dl)111 iIlat iIlg becluse the organ izatiollal re\\'ard systel11 i" st i11
based Oil individual per!()rmaIlCC, That is. there arc 110 group perl()rmallce l11eaSUrel1lellls UpOIl
which teams are rewarded. Individuals get a salary every month regardless or the quality or their
contribution to the teams they are part of. The success and f~lilure of teal1lS is not alioned to theco
reward and punishment system or the organization. This observation is validated by other studies
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on social loafing and group-culture, where a distinction is made hetween collectivist and
individualistic cultures. In these studies it is shown that in collectivist cultures such as China and
Japan, social loafing does not occur because collectivists place group goals and collective action
ahead of their own personal interests. In contrast, individualists are motivatcd by personal gain
and contribution to the group is inconsistent with self-intcrest, unless they are held personally
accountable and responsible for their group's performance (Earley, 1989, 1993; Erez and
Somech, 1996). This clearly has relevant implications for individualistic societies whose
organizations are intent on optimising group performance.
d) Group-think (Janis, 1972) is associated with thc trust and mutual support among group
memhers creating a "surreal cuphoria that befuddles even the most astute decision makers luring
thcm to conclusions that fly in thc f~lce of rcality" (Lasden, 1986: 52). Thc "ill-f~lted Bay of Pigs"
(Lasdcn, 19X6) is a well-documented example of thc incptitudc of group-think. The phrase
( i roup-th ink tends to incorporalc a large nUll1ber () I' the ohserved f;li Iings 0 I' groups, three or these
arc hrielly discussed helow:
./ (iroup memhers with dOll1inant personalities or inlcnse inlcrests in the prohlem situation kllll
to p:lrtil'ip:llL' Illorl' tll:lIl tlleir c\llltrihlltioll \\,:IIT:lIlts in grollp di"ClISsi\lll (1IlIIKT, I()X~; llhlill
:llld SlISSlll:lIl. I(OX; VOgl" l't :11.. I()X7). Tllis domill:ltioll 11:- :\ k\\ le:ld" to IO\\'lT ljll:i1ity
decisiolls - tllrollgll tile sllpprcssi()ll or pokllti:t1 contrihutioll or tile otllcr Illl'lllhers. Till' ollllT
sille or dOlllillation hy till' St("()ll~ j" dekrclKe. 1.:lsdell (I ()X()) GIll" this till' Il'il//l' !l/c!(}/', "Thl'
\\illlp 1~lct()r is evidellced h: th~' :lhselllT or criticislll. .. " (l.asdell. I()X():).f), I.o\\" St:ltllS
Illelllhers Ilave heen ohsel'\'ed to telld to dder automatically to tile OpilliollS e:\pressed hy high
status Illelllhers. Tllis Illay he hl'cluse or group-think or e\'aluatioll ;Ipprehellsioll. t'\o!
ullrelatLd is the erICct or ~roup pressure l()r conforlllity which suppresses illl()[,ll1atioll
(Vroolll, I<J(ll): Iluher, I<JX2; \'ogel et aI., I<JX7) alld results ill a reduced qual ity or lkcisiOIl",
./ Till' actual contribution or indi\ idual memhers is adversely arICcted by l1liSCOIllIl1Unicatiolls,
that occur as they attcmpt to share their inrormation and reason with other group members,
(I tuber, 1982) inti III idation, bl ind trust and the di ffusion of responsi bi Iity (Lasdcn, 1986).
('//II[l/t'r J ..r 1.11,·rl1l/1r,' '\/IIT,'\' tI/ ( is.\
./ Problem-solving groups frequcntly give insufficient attention to the problem-exploration and
alternative generation stages and therefore increase the likelihood that they \vill solve the
wrong problem or choose an inappropriate or low quality solution (Huber, 1982). Lasden
(1986) calls this the right answer / wrong question ,syndrome.
3.4.5. On the Decision Process in a GDSS
The objective of a GDSS is to maximize the decision process. Many of the impediments to
achieving this have been well researched in the literaturc. The effect of the anonymity feature
dominated earlier GDSS research. Other process featurcs discusscd in this scction include
mcmber satisf~letion, equality of participation and thc time taken to reach a decision.
3.4.5.1. On Anonymity in GDSS
Typically. wh~n groups get together th~ proc~ss ob.i~etiv~ is to "Illaximil.~ membcr participation
so th~It a hroad input is obtaincd, owncrship is ~stablish~d and that cons~nsus is <.kv~lop~d"
(I kS~Inctis ~lIld (i~IlIup~. I()X7). Lnsuring that cvcryon~ participates is regularly stymied hy
l'\';lIuatioll ~Ippn~llcllsioll in 11OI'Illal or ullsupported envirolllllents. (iellerally. Iow status Illl'lllhers
;\11<.1 or cert~lill person;t1ity prolilL's \\ill telld to express lllelllSel\'es iL'ss 11L'CIUSl' ol'col1ClTII ar'j"illg
l'rolll peer l'v;t1ualioll. ()thers teml to supporlcert;lill ideas purely heclusc certaill indi\'idu;II". c.g.
thl' ('I-:(), suggest those i<.kas. Tltis ohserved Ilegative elh.'ct impacls OIl till' cqu;t1it:· ol'
p;Irticipatioll. 1\ mechallism is required to protecl participating individll~lIs l'rolll the clh'l'ts ol'
percei\'L'd peer evaluation to inuease participation.
Anonymity is a (iSS ICature, \\'hiclt has bcen well researched and successl'ully huill into Illany
(;roup Support Systems. With anonymity group members can contribute idei.ls and yet not hl' ahk
to attribute the ownership or ideas. This is achievcd through technological assistance. In tlte Inrvt
lield studies done by NunllmaKer et al. (19X9) some or the fecdhacK on the process was
speci lically on the advantages or the openness or the proecss and its laCK or intimidation .IS a
rcsul t of anonym ity. Its advantages are that it makcs people frecr to gi ve idcas and discuss thcm
openly. The participants became less apprehensivc than in manual meetings (Nunamaker et aI.,
XJ
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1989). With Electronic Brainstorming Systems (EBS) all communication is electronic and non-
verbal. Previous research shows that anonymity shifts the balance of power within groups, taking
power away from some group members and giving more power to others (Valacich et aI, 1992;
Connolly et aI., 1990).
A lot of research in the GSS field has been directed at evaluating the effects of anonymity, to the
extent that, all Group Decision Support Systems have at least this feature 1• For example, Valacich
et al (1992) present a conceptual framework for the study of anonymity in a GSS. They define
different types of anonymity and describe the general classes of variables (and their relationships)
that influence anonymity in a GSS. They also present the effects of anonymity on the message,
sender, receiver, the group process and outcome. Nunamaker et al (1991) in their experiment test
the ability of anonymity to separate personalities fron1 the problem and encourage more
objectivity. They observe that anonymous groups generate more comments than non-anonymous
groups uSll1g similar EMS, for low-conflict tasks, although this did not lead to more unique
options.
Ilowevcr, there arc some uncertainties abollt the effects of anonymity. For instance .Jessup et aI.,
(1990) suggest that the efTects or anonymity arc less likely to be noticeable in the laboratory than
in field studies and less effectivc within cohesive groups. Connolly et al (1990) recognizc
anonymity as an important factor in the process or de-individuation - thc rceling or bcing
submcrged in a group. They point out that de-individuation can also lead to behaviour that under
normal circumstanccs would be monitored or prohibitcd by onc's inner restraints and inhibitions.
Anonymity removes this check on one's own behaviour, resulting in the exhibition of socially
undesi rable behaviour. "The phenomenon of ~ flam ing' in electronic communication generally -
the expression of uninhibited comments, strong language, is related to the impersonal,
anonymous nature of such media" (Siegel et al. 1986). On the other hand, this should encourage
the expression of unpopular, novel or heretical opinions (Connolly et aI., 1990).
The effect of anonymity on group size has elicited more mixed results with previous research. In
I e.g. Facilitate, Group Systems, CyberQuest and others
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general size-effects have been observed within EMS (Valacich, et al., 1990), that is the larger the
group the more effective the interventions of an EMS. Valacich et al. (1990) found that
anonymity-effects also held for larger groups, larger anonymous groups generated significantly
more options of higher quality than smaller anonymous groups. Dennis, et al (1990a) increased
the group sizes further and found those large groups generated more options than small groups.
Anonymity has also had positive effects on member satisfaction (Nunamaker, et al., 1991r
3.4.5.2. On Understanding the Effects of GSS on Process Gains
The very objective of automated support of a group is to maximize the probability of process
gains that arise from group interaction (Vogel et al., 1987). Process gains are associated with
more ideas; a larger solution-space; a better quality of ideas; group effectiveness and efficiency;
increased member satisfaction and the time taken to reach resolution (Vogel et al., 1987). A
distinction is made between process quality and outcome quality within GSS research, although
the di fferences are not al ways clear (Zigurs, 1993). The di fficulty Iies in the complexity of the
inter-relatedness or group process variahles and the varying situational dynamics of group
interaction (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 19R7). For example, variations in group-size or member
proximity arfect the quality or participation positively or negatively depending on the levcls at
which thc rormer are pegged. As a result, the selcction or variables to study under what
conditions remains unresolved. "To study decision support systcms for spccific cnvironmcntal
scttings and group tasks. a comlllon conccptual schcmc for organizing thesc variablcs is
required." Further. researchers "must COIllC to grips with what issues. among thc many or
relcvancc, they should address" (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987:602).
Identifying the variables to study under specific conditions is directly linked to the capacity to
define and classi fy performance measures or indicators - and therefore defining dependent and
independent variables in a study. f\.10reover, clarity on the manner in which the variables are
measured is still required. (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Zigurs, 1993). GSS research remains at
crossroads on these issues. Many researchers in the field agree at least, that only further research
and proper documentation will help clarify the complexity surrounding the multiplicity of group
process variables (Pervan, 1998; Nunamaker 1999).
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3.4.5.3. On Process Performance
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore in detail all known process variables or
indicators under the varying situational factors in ass research. The objective here is to review
those that have attracted significant researcher attention; and to explore consensus, a process
indicator that shows a limited body of knowledge in published ass literature. The most
frequently studied process variables include the equality of participation, the degree of task focus,
task performance, and member satisfaction (McLeod and Liker, 1992). Process performance
indicators can be tangible or intangible.
When assessing the Equality of Member Participation the number of members participating
and the equality of their participation is examined (Pinsonneault, and Kraemer, 1989; Jarvenpaa
et al. 1988, Hwang, 1998). DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987:604) propose that "the results of using
decision support technology in groups will occur primarily through thc effect these systems have
on mcmhcr participation." GSS dcsign featurcs such as anonymity and the activc solicitation of
mcmbcr input should encourage grcatcr equality of participation. This is significant when
contrastcd against thc casc of unsupportcd envirollmcnts in that grcatcr mcmhcr participation can
cffcct dccision quality and other outcomcs ncgatively or positively. Thc bcnefits of increased
member participation arc self-evident: they are the very essential reason why groups get togcther
in the first place. The full participation of mcmbers allows the extraction of resourccs from a
group and promotes error checking. allowing for better decision making (Hackman and Kaplan.
1974; Holloman and Hendrick. 1972: DeSanctis and aallupe, 1987). Increased participation
should increase decision acceptance and a sense of responsibility for the decision; this alone is
often the sole motivator for involving multiple organizational stakeholders in the decision making
process (Bedau, 1984; Hackman and Kaplan, 1974).
On the other hand, other researchers have suggested that increasing member participation tends to
increase the time taken to make the decision or complete the process (Dennis et aI., 1988,
Hwang, 1998; DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987). Decision time is a process indicator that has also
attracted some researcher attention (Lasden, 1984; Nunamaker, 1999). The increase in decision
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time is associated with the simple logistics of more airtime being utilized; members having to
deal with an expanded number of issues or alternatives, and controversial views being aired freely
and anonymously (Hwang, 1998).
Increasing member participation has also been observed to negatively affect member
satisfaction with the decision process (Nunamaker, 1989). Member satisfaction is the degree of
satisfaction felt by the group with the process used and or the outcome solution. Research into
satisfaction has been plentiful in GSS research (Connolly et aI., 1990; Nunamaker et aI., 1989;
McLeod and Liker, 1992). Yet, the results have been varied. For example, the decline in member
satisfaction as a result of increased participation is believed to be contingent on the level of group
cohesiveness (Nemiroff and King 1975). Where there is a high level of group cohesiveness,
increased participation does not appear to affect member satisfaction (Nemiroff and King 1975).
Member satisfaction has generally been measured in comparative terms. Researchers have tended
to compare satisfaction with a supported environment against satisfllction with an unsupported
environment (Pervan and Atkinson, 1995). Laboratory studies have demonstrated mixed results
in this regard: some have reported high levels of satisfaction (Nunamaker et aI., 1989; Dennis and
Valacich, 1993). Some have round no dilTerence in satisl~lction levels that were attrihutable to the
presence or absence or automated support (Pinsonneault and Kracl11er, 1989); others have even
reported dissatisfaction with automated support processes (Gallupe 1985; Watson 1987).
Possible explanations for the above variations are found in Nunamaker et al. (1989): it is
suggested that, (I) the issue of measurement plays a role. Nunamaker et al. (1989) argue that it is
extremely di fftcult to measure di fferences in satisfaction unless groups have experienced both
manual and automated support for equivalent tasks. (2) The dissatisfaction with the technology in
general, may be the contributing factor. Many Group Decision Support Systems have been
technologically unsophisticated relative to other contemporary computer systems. (3) Rarely do
experimental subjects have a vested interest in the outcome of the comparative studies. Therefore,
they are likely to be less enthusiastic than field study groups who maintain some level of vested
interest in the process.
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Some researchers believe the trade-off between member participation and satisfaction is not an
issue that can be resolved by group decision support systems (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987). In
practice, the acceptance of a group's solution has little correlation with the objective quality of
the solution outcome (Hoffman and Maier 1961). It is always important to keep in mind that
"much of the justification for participative decision making in organizations has been to gain
acceptance of ideas, rather than gain better ideas per se (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987:606).
There are other process variables that have been measured separately that influence member
satisfaction. The participants' confidence in the final decisions (Gallupe and DeSanctis 1988;
Keen 1986); the degree to which individual participants feel they have ownership of the final
decision; and the emotional or cognitive commitment of the participants to implementing the
final decisions reached (Eden, 1992). In the field study conducted in this research, the issue of
ownership of the final decision is set as an imperative sub-goal of the study for successful
implementation.
The willingness to worl{ with the group ngain was defined as heing fundamental to an effective
problem-solving group (Huher. 1982). /\ high degree of member satisf~lction has been observed
to have a positive impact on the willingness to work with the group again (Pervan and /\tkinson,
1(95).
3.4.5.4. On Task Performance
The task is often the maIn reason why groups are gathered. The ability to measure groups'
performance with respect to the task is important for Group Decision Support Systems and
research. The accomplishment of the task is dependent on the communication between members
of the group (Katz and Kahn 1966). The patterns of information exchange in supported
communications are understood to be oriented either towards the task (getting the job done) or
towards group social needs (tension release, agreement/disagreement, solidarity/antagonism). It
has been observed that as the meeting progresses, the relative emphasis tends to shift such that
groups seek equilibrium between the need to complete the task on one hand, and the need to
sustain the group on the other (Bales and Strodtbeck 1951). It has also been found that Electronic
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Meeting Systems increase the degree to which group members are swung to task orientation or
focus (Turoff and Hiltz, 1982; Rutter and Robinson, 1981; Gallupe, 1985).
In measuring task performance and task focus, GSS researchers have examined the depth of
analysis, Le. the number of alternatives generated and examined (Connolly, et al. 1990; Dennis et
al. 1988) and the number and complexity of criteria used to evaluate the alternatives
(Pinsonneault, and Kraemer, 1989; Stevens and Finlay 1996). Decision quality, the degree to
which the participants feel that the decisions made are more intelligent or of better quality
because of using a specific decision process (Stevens and Finlay, 1996, Dennis et aI., 1996) is
another task performance variable that is frequently examined in group support research.
However, some debate continues on how to define decision quality (Zigurs, 1993; Timmermans
and Vlek, 1996).
Consensus is thc ability of the group to converge in their judgments about the relevance and
importancc of issucs within thc contcxt of thc task is also fundamcntal to group work
(Sambal11urthy and Paole, 1993). The purpose of convening a group for bettcr resolution of a task
f~llls flat if the group cannot ultimatcly reach conscnsus and agrcc on a sol ution. Yet, this is onc
task performance measure, which previous GSS rescarch has paid little attcntion to. This justifics
the detailed exploration or supporting conscnsus huilding latcr in this thcsis.
It is suggested that the issuc or consensus is of group relcvance dcpcnding on the task type
(DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987). For example, where the task is merely that of idea generation thcn
consensus is nol an important consideration in the proccss. Howevcr, where the group task is
choice selection or negotiation (Shakun, 1992) then the signi ficance of consensus is considerable.
The effective management of conflict is retlected in the group's perceptions of the outcome and
the decision process itself. The group's confidence in the recommendations and how they
perccive the quality of the recommendations, and their general satisfaction with the decision
process are believed to be important indicators of the degree to which conflict is managed. In
other words, whether consensus has been successfully achieved (Sambamurthy and Poole, 1993).
89
Clwptn J A Utero'u,e Survey ofG.\:\'
3.5. Facilitation of the Group Process
Facilitation of the group process is an intrinsic component of the group process that is directly
linked to group performance in terms of both group efficiency and group effectiveness.
Facilitation is a field of study on its own and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore
the many issues surrounding both traditional facilitation and EMS facilitation. However, the
facilitator skills (defined as role dimensions) discussed by Clawson et al. (1993) are important to
this dissertation's field study on supporting consensus building.
In an empirical study of the human side of facilitation, 1444 different characteristics of effective
and ineffective behaviours in facilitation are divided into 16 dimensions (listed in Figure 3.3
below). Although, the results were similar for both manual and electronic facilitation roles, only
those relating technology, dimensions (3, 7, 14), were seen to be strictly related to EMS
environments.
1. Promotes ownership and encourages
Group Responsibility (58, 4(%) - The
I~lcilitator helps the group take responsibility
for and ownership of meeting outcomes and
results, stays out of their content; turns the
floor over to others.
J. Appropriately Selects and Prepares
Technology (32, 1(1.,) - The I~lcilitator
appropriately matches computer-based tools to
the task(s) and olltcome(s) the group wants to
accomplish; selects tools that lit group
makeup.
5. Develops and asks the "right" questions
(42, 3(1.,) - the facilitator considers how to
word and ask the "best questions: ask
questions that encourage thought and
participation
7. Creates Comfort With and Promotes
Understanding of the Technology and
Technology Outputs (99, 7%) - the facilitator
carefully introduces and explains the
technology to the group; directly addresses
negative comments and inconveniences caused
by technology.
9. Actively Builds Rapport and Relationship
2. Demonstrates self-awareness and self-
expression (82, 6(%) - The I~lcilitator
recognizes and deals with own behaviour and
leel ings; IS cam fortahle heing sel f; keeps
personal ego out of the way of the group.
4. Listens to, Clarifies, and Integrates
Information (177,8(1.,) - The facilitator really
listens to what the group is saying and makes
an effort to make sense out of it; clari ties
goals, agenda, terms and detinitions with the
group,
6. Keeps Group Focused on Outcomerrask
(86, 6(Yo) - The facilitator clearly
communicates outcomes to the group upfront;
makes outcomes visible to the group, keeps
group focused on and moving toward its
outcome.
8. Creates and Reinforces Open, Positive
and Participative Environment (111, 8%) -
The facilitator draws out individuals by asking
questions, uses activities and tech to get people
involved early on; handles dominant people to
ensure that equal participation
10. Presents Information to Group (41, 3%)
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(191, 13%) - The facilitator demonstrates
responsiveness and respect for people, is
sensitive to emotions; helps develop
constructive relationships with and among
members; greets and mingles with the group.
11. Demonstrates Flexibility (75, 5%) - The
facilitator thinks on her feet; adapts agenda or
meeting activities on the spot as needed; can
do more than one thing at a time.
13. Manages Conflict and Negative
Emotions Constructively (47, 3%) - The
facilitator provides techniques to help the
group deal with conflict; uses technology to
gather and check group opinions and
agreement level in disputes.
15. Encourages / Supports multiple
Perspectives (42, 3%) - The facilitator
encourages looking at issues from different
points of view; uses techniques, metaphors,
stories, examples to set the group to consider
di ffercnt frames of reference.
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- The facilitator gives clear and explicit
instructions; uses clear and concise language in
presenting ideas; gives group written
information.
12. Plans and Designs the meeting process
(197, 44%) - The facilitator plans the meeting
ahead of time; directly includes meeting
leader/initiator in planning; develops clear
meeting outcomes; designs agenda and
activities based on outcome, time frame and
group characteristics.
14. Understands Technology and its
capabilities (64, 5%) - The facilitator knows
how to operate the system; clearly understands
the tools and their functions and capabilities;
figures out and solves common technical
difficulties
16. Directs and manages the Meetings (169,
120/0) - The facilitator used the agenda to
guide the group uses tech effectively to mange
the group; sets the stage for the meeting and
each activity; sets time limits, enforces roles
and ground rules.
Fi~ure 3.3 Facilitator rolc nimcnsions. 1444 chnrnctcrs of I:ood nnd bnd fncilitator hchaviour were classified
into 16 different dimcnsions. Thc numhers in hrnckets indicnte the numher of hchnviour s idcntified for cnch
dimcnsion and the pcrcentagc of the 1444 total hehnviours cnch dimcnsion rcprcscnts (adapted from Clnwson
et al., 1993)
Therc are many f~lcilitation tcchniqucs, such as thc Nominal Group Tcchniquc (NGT) used in
manual proccsses and thc Delphi Tcchniquc usually provided within an EMS, e.g. Vcntana
Corp's GroupSystems. Thc challengc for GSS has been to enhancc facilitation methods using the
system. The significance of using a facilitator role dimensions model or any similar checklist is
avoiding thc risk that too much emphasis is placed on the technology. Knowledge of thc
technology and its possibilities is imperative for EMS facilitators, but technology should be learnt
and then "forgotten" (Clawson et al., 1993: 216). More recently there have been discussions
suggesting that in the future GSS technology will see virtual facilitators (GSS-Listserve
discussions, 1999).
The idea of virtual facilitators makes sense in light of the fact that the requisite combination of
facilitation skills typically exceeds the capabilities of a single individual and thus usually calls for
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a team effort (Clawson et aI., 1993). "Multi-disciplinary appreciation of GOSS research is
necessary to gain the full measure of the GOSS impact on development opportunities" (Vogel et
al 1994:253). Those individuals with multi-disciplinary backgrounds and or understanding are
best suited to act in facilitator roles (Vogel et. aI., 1994). A virtual facilitator, backed by an expert
system, is possibly the future of GSS environments.
3.6. The Technology for a GDSS
The interface of a GOSS is a "critical success factor" (Gray and Olfman, 1989). The human
interface for GOSS is more complex than for individual workstations, in that it involves the
dimension of public and private screens and their interaction. This also includes the physical
environment of the facility, the response time of the network and the cognitive style and cultural
differences among the users, where for example translation may be necessary (Gray and Olfman,
1989). The Arizona GOSS, GroupSystems, for example has the following tools: brainstorming
tools, issue analysis, voting, stakeholdcr identification, assumption surfacing and recording what
happened in a meeting (Gray and Olrman, 1989~ Vogel. et al. 1994).
Technology characteristics include hardware. sofhvare and setting configuration.
Typically a GDSS has the following features (I-tuber, 1994)
• ;\ (personal) CRT and input device for each participant.
• ;\ publ ic cl isplay screen, large enough to be seen by all partici pants.
• Computing and communication capability that allows each participant to link his or her input
device to its respective CRT or the public CRT screen.
• Software that provides:
../ Word processing capability to each terminal.
../ Computing capability with a particular focus on drawing simultaneously on data from
several or all terminals.
../ DSS graphics capability I.e. capability for constructing and altering worksheets, bar
graphs and decision trees.
../ Anonymity when eliciting information from the individual participants when this is
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desired.
The hardware, software, setting and "orgware" are critical to the success of any implementation
of a GDSS facility (Vogel, et a1. 1994). The setting of the GDSS covers issues such as room
furnishings, appropriate lighting, group member arrangement and the general atmosphere. These
have long been acknowledged to impact on group processes (Brembeck and Howell 1976; Gray
1981; Vogel 1986). Ignoring these may destroy the nature of the fragile group environment in
which successful group decision making is facilitated (Vogel, et a1. 1994). Vogel et al (1994), in a
paper articulating the determinants of success in a GSS based on the experience of many
researchers in the Arizona facility propose that the following be taken into account:
3.6.1. The Setting
The aesthetics in terms of comfort and familiarity should simulate that which executives are used
to in their organizational conference rooms with appropriate furniture, carpeting and this author
would add air-conditioning. In addition they propose that the setting he flexihle with the ability to
accommodate various group sizes and task environments. rinally, they emphasize that particular
atlent ion must he paid to presentation support (Vogel et aI., 1994), for instancc that the projector
screcn must be clearly visi blc \Vi t!lout bei ng "washed our' by im proper lighting (Nunamakcr. ct
al.. 1999).
3.6.2. Hardware for a GSS
Hardware includes the individual \Vorkstations, the file servers. presentation media and the
communications network that serve to facilitate group communication. Vogel et al. (1994) argue
that group effectiveness and efticiency are enhanced in proportion to the degree of support
provided. They suggest the following:
That each group member be able to interact with the GDSS, by providing an electronic interface
which encourages participation thereby enhancing the efficiency of participation. Having a single
workstation they argue is simply inadequate. Further, it has been recommended that each
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workstation have a high degree of local intelligence; Hin resident" software options that cater for
end-user help and data capturing. A high bandwidth local area network (LAN) would then link
the workstation to central fileservers ensuring high levels of performance thus accommodating
network demands by transmitting both text and screens between the individual decision makers.
This feature is even more important where the decision makers are geographically dispersed. The
central fileservers assist in the coordination and management of input from the individual
decision makers. They act as a source of organizational memory from one session to the next and
would function as a knowledge base repository and access to organizational data relevant to a
specific planning and decision making session. It is understood that the presentation media must
support multi-media technology.
3.6.3. Software for GSS
Software for GSS "includes the spectrum of programs that interface with the communications
network and system knowledge base and the individual decision makers and the group facilitator"
(Vogel ct a1.1994: 248). They acid that additional software would f~lcilitatc summarization,
conscnsus formulation through prioritisation and voting as well the prcscntation of individual and
grou p 0 utpu t.
Thc software IllUst be comprehensive enough to accommodate the varicty of group tasks such as
idea generation, the development or alternatives, choice of action, voting and ranking and
consensus formulation. The flexibility of the software to support the particular purpose of the
group is also important. The group should not be forced or alii ficially constrained to a fixed
procedure or set or tools (Vogel et al. 1994). The group together with the facilitator should have
the option to match the set of tools to the task. From the point of view of the individual
participant, the tools must be integrated with a knowledge base that links data from one session to
the next. It must facilitate the provision of organizational data and give the capacity to do
analyses from various perspectives. The software cannot merely be user-friendly, it needs to be
"user seductive" Vogel et al. (1994). It should encourage user interaction through the effective
use of colour, windowing, on-demand help screens. (See Forrester, 1988 on the design of the user
interface).
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3.6.4. Orgware
Orgwar~ refers to "the organizational data, group processes for decision making and management
procedures for collaborative group work" (Kraemer and King, 1986). It includes meeting
protocols regarding who participates, on what basis, with what voting rights and with what
consequences and commitments resulting from the process" CVogel et a1.1994: 249). Orgware has
increasingly been moving away from the domain of the facilitator to that of the system (Vogel et
aI., 1994).
This includes the anonymity provided by the GOSS to encourage participation. It includes
periods of face-to-face discussion, which are focused around the front-screen display as a
complement to the individual workstatiory interaction. In addition, the group and not the system
should decide the question of voting rights and the associated mechanisms of scaling or
weighting. The GSS should never impose a voting structure (TurofC 1999), for there are many
instances where voting is an inappropriate way of reaching conclusion. Finally, agendas are a
characteristic of most organized meetings and arc used to organize sessions, fostering adherence
to a schedule and providing a source of continuity from one session to the next. It is for those
rcasons that a GSS could systematically gcncrate an agcnda that is uscd to initialisc the tools to
bc uscd in thc current sessions as wcll as coordinate data transfer betwcen the tools (Nunamaker,
et aI., 1999).
3.7. The Context of a GSS Environment
The complexity of a group interaction environment, as outlined above, has necessitated the
increasing need for GSS researchers to define and document the context of their studies. The
context of a GSS environment is a composite of the specific setting where the experiment was
conducted, i.e. who were the group members; were they a cohesive team; strangers or
competitors; what were the site characteristics; what tools and techniques were used; what were
the site tasks and processes; how many people made up the group?
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The importance of context documentation cannot be underestimated. There are two reasons for
this. (1) The recognition that the results of one study will not apply to all group work
(Sambamurthy and Poole, 1993) Thus, it is important to explicitly consider the bounds to which
the findings can be generalized. (2) Context documentation helps clarify hypothesis fonnulation
and results expectation; moreover, it can assist in the development of standardized measurement
instruments in the field (Sambamurthy and Poole, 1993; Zigurs, 1993).
The issue of context is discussed separately to precede the future challenges of group support
systems research, precisely because it is so intrinsically linked to the contributions of future
research.
3.8. On The Future Challenges Facing GSS Research
The major components of a group support environment presented so far are task, process, group,
individual and technology. l~ach component has demonstrated numerous characteristics that
make the group collahorative environment a complex and chaotic one (Kerr, 1(82). It is therefore
not surprising that GSS research is still plagued by inconsistent and sometimes contradictory
results. That no general guiding theory of' GSS has emerged is symptomatic of' its very
complexity (Valacich, et aI., 19(2). The difficulty in dcveloping a comprehensivc theory results
f'rom the many dimcnsions in which group support systems can be configured and used (Valacich,
et aI., 1992). In this section, the issues that contribute to the confusion and the opportunities to
move group support systems research towards lesser levels of uncertainty arc explored.
3.8.1. Improving the Measuring of GSS Outcomes
Traditionally Information Systems has operated on the input-process-output model, where the
focus has been outputs, serving as the dependent variables. However, in GSS the link between
processes and outcomes is not explicit (Zigurs 1993), although some attempts have been made to
establish some linkages. For example Gouran (1988) categorizes the possible number of
outcomes of a GSS into four components only:
• The correctness of a decision
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• The quality of a decision
• The utility of a decision, and
• The acceptability of a decision.
Gouran (1988) also proposes the "appropriateness" of a decision as a concept, which takes into
account the contextual features of a decision, such as the purpose of the group and the
requirements of the task. Other researchers have argued that GSS research should be concerned
with balancing both task performance and member satisfaction, where task performance
includes categories such as effectiveness, efficiency, cognitive products, structural products, or
artifactual products (Pinsonneault and Kramer, 1989). While satisfaction can be personal, group-
related, task-related or system-related.
The most studied outcomes variables pertaining to task performance include decision quality,
decision speed, and thoroughness of analysis (Dennis, George, Jcssup, Nunamaker, and Vogel,
1988~ Dennis et al 1990~ Dennis etal., 1991 ~ Pinsonneault and Kramer, 1989). While those
relating to satisf~lction have includcd decision conlidcnce, satisfaction with the process, and
satisfaction with thc dccision outcome. Othcr dependent variables that have been studied include
cquality or inllucncc or participation, pcrceivcd quality or thc solution and satisfaction with thc
system and consensus.
The cri tieal difficul ty however Iies in the f~lct that where these variables have becn measured,
they have been measured differently across studies, or it is not documented how these variables
were measured (Melone 1990). Member Satisfaction, for example, can mean a different thing to
different people depending on the context. The same measurement applied to different groups
may result in very different perceptions of what is being measured. It has also been suggested that
the very definition of task performance has traditionally been narrow and that many satisfaction
outcome variables have not been studied at all (Zigurs, 1993). Consequently, a broader view of
the dependent variable would bring a richer understanding to ass research (Zigurs, 1993;
Nunamaker et aI., 1999).
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3.8.2. Resolving the complexity surrounding measured process variables and
measurement instruments - and developing a unified theoretical
framework.
Firstly, the measurement of ass variables and the tools with which these are measured is one
issue that contributes to the complexity and chaos identified by Kerr (1982). Within ass, the
issue of measurement explores questions surrounding what dependent and independent variables
should be measured. Which theoretical foundations should underlie this and what measurement
instruments should be used? Currently, there is Iittle consensus in this regard.
This lack of consensus has led some GSS researchers to conduct studies that seek to synthesize
and simplify the existing complexity. An example of such a study is the meta-analysis performed
by Hwang (1998), which tests for the effect of task-type2 on a GSS. She identifies that the impact
of task-type on the use of GSS was significant in increasing group communication, but not
significant in improving decision quality. The use of a GSS will improve decision quality
regardless of task-typc. The meta-analysis also found that task-type is not related to the
improvcmcnt of participation, the relationships involving participation are complex and can be
confounded by variables such as culture and leadcrship (Eom, 1998). The study by Bcnbasat and
I,im (1993) round group history to he the only moderator variable for participation. No variables
can yet conclusively cxplain the result on participation, more research is required in this area
(Hwang, 1(98).
011 tneltlber satis/actioll Hwang (1998) observes user satisfaction to be lowest with negotiation
tasks. This implies that satisfaction should not be a GSS success measure for negotiation tasks
because negotiation, by its very nature, brings about conflict and confrontation.
On decision tinle, Hwang (1998) observes that decision time was quicker with generation tasks
than with either choice or negotiation tasks. This suggests that decision time should not be used
as a measure of GSS success for either choice or negotiation tasks. Information richness and task
interdependence are the main causes of the inefficiency of using GSS.
2 Nl:gotiation, Selection, Generation and Execution (Dt:Sanctis and Gallupe. 1987) were identified as the four main tlli)k-tyJXs.
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The significance of Hwang's (1998) research is in providing direction in the measuring of the
right dependent variable for a specific decision task. Doing so should help future researchers
produce more consistent results on the effectiveness of ass. The research "clarifies" the role of
task type in that it provides a basis for a priori reasoning for the effect of task type. This a priori
reasoning is important in the control and measurement of task type and to the measurement of
ass effectiveness. Findings on other variables under investigation should then be explained
considering the impact of task type. Otherwise, conflicting findings may be construed as a result
of the variables under investigation such as technology and group characteristics, when in fact
the findings are because of task type. For example, because negotiation tasks bring out conflict by
their very nature and thus discourage participation, making members less satisfied. In such a case,
any conclusions about the ineffectiveness of ass, based on the decrease in participation and
satisfaction would be mistaken. Similar meta-analyses on other group process variables in ass
would be instructive.
3.8.3. Improvements in the Development and Documentation of Measurement
Instruments
!\ need exists not only for agreed upon measures but also for validated measurement instruments
in CiSS research. Researchers need to provide more information about the measures they are
using to operationalise their constructs or variables (Zigurs, 1993: Nunamaker et aI., 1999). There
will always he a gap bctwccn a construct and its accurate measurement: it is only through the
validation of instrulllents that a scnse of how large or how small that gap actually is can be
achieved (Zigurs, 1993). Many researchers have studied sali.~laction but say little about thc
instrument used; for example in George et aI., (1990). The current lack of information on
measuri ng instruments does Iittle to promote the greater validity and reuse of instruments. For
instance, decision quality is one of the most important variables in (group) decision support
systems, but the measurement of decision quality is not clear. For tasks where there is no correct
answer, there is especially no consensus on the meaning of quality (Zigurs, 1993). In general the
use of "expert judges" to measure decision quality in small group literature is prevalent, for
example in (Connolly, et aI., 1990; Gallupe and McKeen, 1990; Dennis et al 1996; Nunamaker et
aI., 1991).
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3.8.4. On the Provision for Distributed Features in GSS
[n reality, most organizational teams are convened and reconvened over a period to handle
differen~ issues or problems over several meetings. So for example, a management team may deal
with a specific takeover issue over a two-week period. The same team may be subsequently
assigned the responsibility of formulating company long-term strategy over a six-week period. In
addition, a group may do work before and after a meeting. To date most GSS research, while
acknowledging the importance of group history, deals with single-group/multiple task in a single
meeting. Future GSS research and applications must look at the "Any Time /Any Place"
dimension of the GSS environment (see Figure 3.2). That is, supporting distributed teams, where
real-time communication and co-ordination is essential. Research is needed to expand this to
include coordinating multiple distinct groups addressing interrelated tasks over numerous
meetings (Jessup and Valacich, 1993).
The framework presented by Stevens and Finlay (1996) proposes how through feedback loops
participation and outcomes from one meeting can influence member participation and the group
environment for subsequent meetings. This is a significant contribution in light of the need for
CiSS researchers to explore longitudinal meetings in more depth. It appears the strength or GSS
technology to provide simulatiolls or a 'across the table' rceling 1'01' distributcd groups is vital
here. (Stevens and Finlay, 199G). Technology must bccomc an cnabler or morc dynamic group
configurations (Gcrsick, 1988). The rolc or technology as an enabler could providc scttings whcrc
tcams can design their "own ideal collaboration workspacc without the constraints or physical
rcality" (Johansen, 1991: 524). This could includc a virtual facilitator (Jessup and Valacich,
1993).
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3.8.5. Laboratory Experiments vs. Field Studies and other Research Methods
GSS is a young field. It is not surprising that traditionally, GSS researchers have run laboratory,
experi~ental research where specific variables are manipulated in a controlled environment.
Table 3.1 A Summary of Published Studies by Research Method
Period Field Study Laboratory Design and Other
Development
1988 35% 65%
1989 - 90 17% 300/0 13% 400/0
1984 -96 55.6%
Table 3.2 above shows, in 1988, approximately 65% of published GSS studies were laboratory
experiments (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1989). A review covering a selection of IS journals
published in 1989 and 1990 shows studies published comprised: laboratory experiments [300/0],
field studies [170/01 and design and development papers [130/0] (Zigurs, 1993). In another review
of GSS research for the period 1984-1996, laboratory research represented 55.6(% of all GSS
empirical research on events and processes (Pervan, 1998).
Thcre are other reasons for the prevalcnce or laboratory experiments beyond the youthfulness or
the discipline. GSS research may be more amenable to this type or research because or thc
diverse number of dependent variables it offers to study relating to both process and outcome.
The large number 0 I' variables associated \Vi th the group, task, the process (incl udi ng faci Iitation)
and the technology that affect these dependent variables offers an enormous number of possible
study combinations when one of these is manipulated while controlling the others (Pervan. 1998).
furthermore, 1110st of the research has been conducted within US universities where arguably
laboratory experiments are well accepted as a research approach (Pervan 1998).
This is not to suggest that no work has been done on field studies: Nunamaker, et al. (1989),
Vogel et al. (1990) and Grohowski et al. (1990) conducted their field studies at the IBM site
using Ventana Corp's GroupSystems. Other studies include a study of Groupware at the World
Bank (Bikson, 1997); Post, 1993; Vogel and Vreede, 1999; Vreede and Van Wijk, 1997).
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Nevertheless, field studies have been rare. There are several commercial consultancy
organizations that based on the information on their websites have implemented aoss
technology on a number of organizational sites. (See www.gdss.com, www.facilitate.com.
www.ventana.com)
While field studies are desirable, they are not the only other research method or approach
alternative (Zigurs, 1993; Pervan, 1998; Markus 1997; Lee, 1989; Todd and Benbasat 1987;
Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Vogel and Nunamaker, 1991). Action research; application
description; case study; meta-analysis; surveys; mathematical modelling; ethnography; and
conceptual or theoretical research are other suggested potential ass research methods (Zigurs,
1993; Pervan, 1998).
There have been some meta-analyses in GSS research .(l-Iwang, 1998). Meta-analyses have been
criticized for having the problem of comparing "apples and oranges"- i.e. the mixing of data that
come from studies of diverse settings. Ilowever, if it is noted that within social sciences meta-
analysis is seldolll used to determine the final word in a research area, but rather is best used as a
means or taking stock and providing direction for future research (Ilwang, \998) then the
phenolllenon or mix ing data bccomcs sccondary.
It seems GSS research has almost becn entirely positivist in its assumptions and approach. IS
rcsearchers have been steeped in a rational ity assumption. a functional ist parad igm. an objectivist
approach and a deterministic model (Weill and Olson, 1993~ Zigurs. 1993, Pervan. 1998). ;\
positivist approach is the Hnatural-science model of social-science research" in that it proceeds to
implement, in social science, an image of how research proceeds in physics, biology, and other
natural sciences (Ngwenyama and Lee. 1997: 15\). Social science theories based on this Illodel
IllUSt conform to the rules of formal logic and the rules of experimental and quasi-experimental
design. The rules of experimental design depict the subject matter in terms of independent and
dependent variables (Pervan, 1998). Interpretivist theory, on the contrary, recognizes the "Iife-
world" of mutual understanding between the "life-world" actors (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997).
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In ass, research methods are dominated by field experiments, where experimental controls are
imposed onto the natural setting and variables are measured usually through questionnaires or
positivist case studies that have no experimental design or controls (Pervan, 1998). In another
literature review of effective ass, Srinivasan and Jarvenpaa (1991) conclude that most existing
empirical work can be categorized as exploratory i.e. experimental work that states no formal
hypothesis or no underlying theoretical model. Although other studies have included formal
hypotheses, these hypotheses have not been founded on a well-formulated theoretical model
(Srinivasan and Jarvenpaa, 1991). Seldom are surveys used wherein questionnaires are sent to
many organizations; rarely is instrument development applied where new measuring instruments
are tested in the field (Pervan, 1998). Secondary data studies where results from previous studies
are combined and analysed are scarce.
Of the 131 empirical papers reviewed by Pervan (1998), only four use an interpretive approach.
This suggests an opportunity exists for aDSS researchers to advance knowledge in this field by
investigating ass use in field settings, using interpretive approaches such as phenomenology,
action research, ethnography and grounded theory.
Thc abscncc or groundcd ass thcory is onc or major future challcngcs in thc licld. In thc cxisting
'chaos' or knowledge it is userul to hccd Duhin (1969). lie suggcsts that whcn developing a
thcory it is oftcn instructive to start with an author's statemcnt of hypothesis and attempt to
reconstruct his or hcr thcorctical modcl from only that statcment as thc only available piece of
evidence. Doing so ror scveral pieces of research is particularly useful in an attempt to discover
whcther thcre is some convergence among thc separate hypothescs that lead to the conclusion that
they may be derivable from the same theoretical model. Srinivasan and .Iarvenpaa (1991) suggest
that in the myriad of 'ad-hoc reasoning' surrounding many studies the goal should be the
identi fication of studies for re-constructive analysis.
The work of Srinivasan and Jarvenpaa (1991) deals with this process of linkages between
seemingly 'ad-hoc reasoning' from previous researchers and the theories of communication,
minority influence, the limitations of human information processing and computational abilities.
They arrive at some useful propositions. For example, that anonymous communications will be
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more useful in groups where members are reticent than where members are not reticent; or that
anonymous communications will be more effective for creative tasks than for choice tasks. The
usefulness of such propositions is unquestionable because existing research simply suggests that
anonymity enhances participation. This statement may not be strictly true as evidenced by the
inconsistencies in the many reported research studies (Nunamaker et aI., 1999). The work of
Srinivasan and Jarvenpaa (1991) goes one step further than the contribution of Hwang (1998)
which isolates the effects of task-type. The work of Stevens and Finlay (1996) echoes similar
approaches to these studies. These contributions should help researchers state their hypotheses
more accurately and more usefully.
The challenges posed by critical social scientists apply equally to the future challenges of GSS
research. Ngwenyama and Lee (1997), in a paper looking at "communication richness in
communications media and the contexuality of meaning from a critical social theory perspective"
offer some llseful guidelines not only for Information Systems research in general but guidelines
that can be used for GSS speci lically. They propose a critical social theory (eST) perspective to
research. eST Hposits that there arc difTerences between observing nature and observing people;
and inquiry into social settings should focus on understanding meanings from within the social
context and the li lcworld actors" (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997: IS I). This is in contrast to
positivist and intcrprctivist approaches. The positivist type of inquiry is inadequate in an
environment where the subject mattcr consists of a world of consciousncss and humanly created
meanings -a Hlife-world". HUnlike atoms, molccules and electrons, people create and attach their
meanings to the world around them and to the behaviour that they mani rest in that world.
8ecause of this, the social scientist may not only collect facts and data describing purely the
objective, publicly observable aspects of human behaviour. These subjective meanings constitute
a different subject matter from objective facts and require research methods that have no
counterparts among those of natural sciences" (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997: I5 I).
eST researchers believe that they cannot merely be observers. They believe that their very
presence influences and is influenced by the social and technological systems they are studying
(Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997). Researchers less steeped in positivist tradition argue that theories
generated from qualitative research must in the end be applied and extended in practice (Pervan,
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1998). It is only by studying GSS in support of actual stakeholders solving their own problems
that we can really appreciate the complexities of the group environment and learn how to use
GSS more effectively (Pervan, 1998).
3.9. Conclusion
Since decision making is a process and not an event, this research focuses on two important
components of that process: solution generation and consensus building. The practical research
focuses on two distinct task-types: Generation and Selection. The Generative task, deals with
problem structuring for generative tasks. The justification of this research is although a lot of
research has been conducted in electronic brainstorming, to the best of the author's knowledge,
only two studies have been conducted with a focus on problem structuring of the generative task
(Dennis et aI., 1996, 1999). The selection task is explored focllsing on the issue of consensus
building. While consensus is an important variable in the study of the effectiveness of GSS, it is
an area that has seen little research directed towards it. This is another justification of this
research. Finally, both studies arc linked by the investigation of the explicit and implied need to
structure the GSS environment to achieve effectiveness. The generative task is explicitly
structured as discussed in the next chapter, while the selection task is structured more implicitly
using the Analytic Ilierarchy Process.
The identified need for morc field studies (Pervan. 1998) has been taken into account in
rormulating the goal or this dissertation. Chapter Five will present the results of a field study on
consensus building within a multi-criteria decision making group support environment.
Another conclusion that can be made concerns the need for a combination of multiple methods in
group decision making, as this is assumed to provide a greater power of understanding of the
socio-technical issues with which GSS deals (Zigurs, 1993). A combination of approaches aims
to address the needs of di fTerent aspects of research in group decision making. this dissertation
reports on a laboratory experiment related to an idea generation task and a field study on
consensus building in a group multi-criteria environment involving real stakeholders.
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The next chapter will argue for the appropriateness of these two approaches to the chosen
research sub-goals.
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CHAPTER 4. A SURVEY OF THE RESEARCH WHICH INFORMS THE DESIGN
AND SPECIFICATIONS OF THIS THESIS' PRACTICAL WORK
4.1. Introduction
As seen in Chapter Three, this investigative study is informed by the need for further research
in the area of problem structuring for generative tasks and consensus building within selection
tasks. In addition, an undesirable decline in the number of field studies conducted within GSS
research is observed. Thus while investigating two important variables in group interaction,
the method of exploration is diversified to include both a laboratory study and a field study as
the latter is significant in advancing the GSS field and group multi-criteria decision making.
In this chapter, the main foundations of the experimental research conducted for this
dissertation are explored. These are on task and time structuring for idea generation tasks and
on consensus building.
4.2. On Brainstorming Research
In Chaptcrs Two and Three it was established that to respond to today's quick-changing and
highly complex husiness environment, not only do organizations rely on the co-operation or
groups to deal and manage complex environments, organizations require their memhers or
employees to be increasingly more innovative or creative in dealing with the challenges they
face. Many or today's successful organizations attribute their success to their ability to
cultivate creativity and innovation. Microsoft, Exxon Corporation and others regularly spend
"corporate dollars to nurture the creative spirit of their men1bers" (Massetti. 1996:83). In
addition many techniques ain1ed at enhancing creativity are flourishing (see de Bono, 1993;
Couger, 1995). This has grown to the extent that creativity support systems, which are
computer-based tools, aimed at enhancing "boundary breaking, and insightful thought during
problem-solving"(Massetti, 1996:83) have been built and continue to grow in popularity.
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4.2.1. Brainstorming effects on verbal and nominal groups
Several studies have demonstrated that the use of computer-based tools leads to more ideas
being generated by the subjects, the issue of the improved quality of ideas being concomitant
with the process is not a conclusive one (Massetti, 1996, Nunamaker et al. 1999).
Creative responses are known to categorically result from two types of mental processes:
generative and exploratory processes (Finke et al. 1992). Within the generative mode,
divergent ways of thinking, including remote association and pattern switching produce novel
and unique concepts (de Bono, 1993; Ackoff and Vergara, 1981). In the exploratory mode,
convergent thought such as elaboration or successive refinement reformulates a unique
concept into a n1eaningful and valuable response (Ackoff and Vergara, 1981). While both
processes must occur for an individual to perform creatively, the nature of the decision task
defines which mode is likely to dominate response-forn1ation (Finke et aI., 1992). Thus,
depending on the whether the task is aimed at the generative or exploratory mode, the
response produced will tend to be more novel or n10re useful.
Brainstorn1ing has receivcd considerable rescarch attention. I:ver since Osborn (1957)
published his thcory of brainstorming. the idea that brainstorming groups as opposed to
ind ivid uals work ing by thelllscI ves producing signi ficantly larger nUIll bel's of ideas has been
traditionally well received. This syncrgy is premiscd on the perception that within groups.
mcmbers hcar other people' s ideas. ideas thcy would not have otherwise thought of and that
they can then build on those ideas. As a result, brainstorming groups arc gcnerally cxpected to
be more productive than individuals working alone. The original brainstonning principle
requires group members to initially just state as ITIany ideas as possible, thc wilder the ideas
the better (Osborn, 1957). The second step is for men1bers to improve on or combine
previously stated ideas while suspending all judgment of those ideas. It is in1portant that they
do not criticize any ideas: "the average person can think up about twice as n1any ideas when
working with a group than when working alone" ... provided the "individual ideators adhere
to the principle of suspended judgment" (Osborn, 1957:228-229).
However, research over time has repeatedly found several impediments to the synergy of
brainstorming groups. Verbally interacting groups have consistently been observed to be less
productive than nominal groups (McLaughlin-Hymes and Olson, 1992; Diehl and Stroebe,
1987; Dennis et aI., 1990; Gallupe et aI., 1991)). For the same number of individuals, more
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ideas and more quality ideas have been generated by having the individuals work
independently and then subsequently pooling the ideas together. This is in contrast to having
these individuals verbally interact as a group. The reasons for this are many. However, four
issues have been regularly identified as dominant and these are social loafing or free riding,
evaluation apprehension, production blocking and cognitive inertia. Since these issues are
central' to this discussion, they are briefly redefined. Social loafing is where group members
do not work as hard as they would when working alone. Evaluation apprehension is the
concern group members get about how other members of the group are going to react to their
ideas in spite of the brainstorming instruction to suspend all judgment. Production blocking is
as a result of the serial nature of communication within group interaction in that only one
person can speak at a tin1e. Members cannot necessarily express their ideas as these occur to
them but must await their turn, resulting in either them forgetting their ideas or making ideas
appear irrelevant by the time they are expressed (attenuation blocking). The serial nature of
con1munication also contributes to cognitive inertia, because at any moment in time only one
line of ideas is being generated or explored, groups tend to pursue fewer different kinds of
ideas.
Production blocking and limited airtime appear to be the dOlninant reason why interacting
groups are out-performed by nominal groups (Diehl and Stroebe, 1987). For the comparison
of nominal groups and interacting group the results have been consistent. Nominal groups
consistently and regularly outperformed verbal groups. Furthermore, the di fTerences appeared
more pronounced for larger groups (Gallupe et aI., 1991 ~ Gallupe et aI., 1992a). It appeared
that Osborn (1957) had been too generous about the benefits of intcracting groups. \Vhen
groups interact there is a balance of forces between process losses and process gains. It seems
that the process losses usually overwhelm the process gains. It is reported that during the last
thrce decades, more than 50 studies have made the con1parison betwecn nominal
brainstorn1ing groups to verbal brainstornling. (McGrath, 1984; Dennis and Valacich, 1993;
Dennis, 1993)
"For this comparison, the evidence speaks loud and clear: individuals working
separately generate many more, and more creative (as rated by judges), ideas
than do groups, even when redundancies among member ideas are deleted,
and, of course without the stimulation of hearing and piggybacking on the
ideas of others. The difference is large, robust and general" (McGrath,
1984:131).
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4.2.2. The Introduction of Computer Supported Brainstorming Groups
With the emergence of group support through computer-based tools, the scenario has changed
somewhat. The introduction of electronic brainstorming computer-mediated communication
replaces verbal communication. Each member anonymously enters his or her ideas into a
computer workstation, which records them and sends them to the "workstations of others".
The other members can then in turn read the ideas and respond by building on them to create
new ideas or by ignoring them and generating unrelated ideas or by doing nothing (Dennis
and Valacich, 1993). These tools contain features designed to reduce if not eliminate process
losses. Electronic brainstorming can affect process gains and losses in at least three ways: (1)
through enabling parallel communication, (2) through the provision of group memory and (3)
through facilitating anonymity. Parallelism mitigates the effects of production blocking. It
may also mitigate the losses resulting from free riding, caused by competition for airtime. In
this way electronic brainstorming assimilates nominal group brainstorming. The group
n1enl0ry made available through the recording of all ideas is observed to reduce the incidence
of redundant ideas building on synergy because lTIen1bers can see the ideas that have already
been contributed (Dennis and Valacich, 1993; Nunamaker et aI., 1999).
However, anonymity can also increase the incidence of free riding. It becomes diflicult to
determine who is and who is not contrihuting. Evidence shows that anonymity has had little
effect on low threat tasks, but can be important in settings with conllict and where power and
status differences exist (Nunamaker, et aI., 1991).
The possibilities madc available by the ability to electronically support brainstorming groups
shifted researchers focus to comparing electronically interacting groups with nominal groups.
The expectation was that electronically brainstornling groups would outperform nominal
groups because electronic brainstonning exhibits characteristics of both interacting and
nonlinal groups by allowing ideas fronl one participant to stilTIulate ideas in others and
through anonymity and parallelism (Dennis and Valacich, 1993, Nunamaker et aI., 1991).
However, earlier studies (Gallupe et ai, 1991), comparing nominal groups and electronic
brainstorming groups, found no significant differences in performance, although the authors
speculated that the results could have been different for larger groups. Later studies found that
larger electronic brainstorming groups generated more ideas than nominal groups (Valacich et
aI., 1994, Dennis and Valacich, 1993) and that there was no difference in performance
between the two types of groups for smaller groups of six members and less. Other studies
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(Mclaughlin-Hymes and Olson, 1992) found somewhat contradictory results, although under
different conditions.
Although the results of such comparisons have not always been conclusive, they have been
revealing and some consensus about the effects of electronic brainstorming is starting to
emerge'. These results have demonstrated that electronically interacting groups are at least as
effective as nominal groups and in some cases perform even better than their nominal
counterparts (Nunamaker et aI., 1999).
4.2.3. The Effect of Group Size on Brainstorming Groups
The emergent consensus is particularly prevalent around the effect of group size with respect
to electronic brainstorming. The disparity between nominal and verbal groups is observed to
increase with group size. In general, while the number of ideas generated by nominal groups
increases rapidly with group size, the number of ideas generated by verbal groups typically
does not (Dennis and Valacich, 1993). For larger group sizes, nominal groups outperform
verbal groups, often generating three to four times as many ideas (Dennis and Valacich, 1993;
Diehl and Stroebe, 1987).
Similarly, the magnitude of process losses or process gains is affected by the size of the
group. The synergy that results in process gains is likely to occur more with larger groups
because members are more likely to have different information and skills. Production
blocking however, is n10re severe in larger groups silnply because blocking is morc likely and
because when one member speaks more 111embers are blocked (Lamm and Trommsdorff,
1973). Evaluation apprehension may be stronger in larger groups, as there are more
opportunities for members to disagree and become antagonistic toward others ideas (Dennis
and Valacich, 1993). Free riding also increases in larger groups because one's contributions
are nl0re dispensable and there is more competition for airtilne. In the n10re than 50 empirical
studies conducted by the san1e authors, at no stage did the verbal groups outperforn1 non1inal
groups. Instead, in a few cases there was no recorded difference in performance (Dennis and
Valacich, 1993).
Empirical studies have shown electronic brainstorming groups of larger sizes generating more
ideas than verbally brainstorming groups, especially for larger groups (Gallupe et aI., 1991;
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Gallupe et aI., 1992). They were also found to generate no fewer ideas than nominal groups
for smaller sizes (Gallupe et aI., 1991). For larger sizes electronic brainstorming tend to
generate more ideas than nominal groups (Valacich et aI., 1994).
4.2.4..Task, Process and Time Structuring in Brainstorming Environments
The mere provision of computer-support for group brainstorming is therefore not sufficient
for optimizing group· creativity and idea generation. More is needed from technology-based
support beyond merely eliminating process losses. Features that actively direct group
brainstorming in a way that enhances the number and quality of ideas generated must be
incorporated. Research into task and time structuring for generative tasks is a recognition of
this need. It is also in line with the proposals of DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987) on the
development of Level 3 Group Support Systems.
Although the results on prevIous research on idea generation may not be sufficiently
conclusive, it has however become clear that research in the field is moving past the point of
comparing manual brainstorming groups to electronic brainstorming groups or nominal
groups. The findings of McLaughlin-Hymes and Olson (1992) comparing both supported,
nominal and interacting brainstorming groups are helpful in this regard. The challenge is for
researchers to enhance the electronic brainstorming environment towards Level] systems.
This may mean intervening in structuring the electronic brainstorming session in specilic
ways to optimize the group's performance (Dennis et aI., 1996). It also means understanding
the role, played by the nature or the task in the brainstorming setting.
The very idea of structuring a brainstorming session, in any way, intuitively sounds like a
contradiction in tenns. Ironically, according to the original foundations of brainstorn1ing
principles, "anything is possible"; therefore even considering structuring a brainstorming
session is a concept that possibly should have emerged a while back. This nonetheless is not
the case. The idea of structuring brainstorming sessions was first introduced by Dennis, et at..
1996, to this author's best knowledge. Dennis, et aI. (1999) pursue the same issue further.
One aspect of brainstorming that has received little research attention is how the
brainstorming problem should be presented to the group (Dermis et aI., 1996, 1999). In that
regard the authors present two groups with the same brainstorming problem. The first group is
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presented with an intact problem question and the other \vith a series of separate questions
each focusing on a sub-aspect of the problem.
The thinking behind the decomposition of a problem into sub-categories is based on theories
of cognition and problem structures. Most problems have a hierarchical or tree-like structure
(Rosch', 1978). The highest level in the structure, its root, is known as the "super-ordinate
level". The super-ordinate can be decomposed into a set of more specific categories known as
the "basic level". The basic level can in turn be decomposed further into more specific
categories known as the "subordinate level". These levels are relative, as one organizational
level may view the super-ordinate level as the highest level, while another, higher,
organizational level may view the same problem as a subordinate within a more complex,
holistic problem. The issue is: which leads to more ideas, posing the problem to a
brainstorming group at the highest level as one all-encompassing question or at the basic level
as a series of distinct questions each addressing one sub-category of the overall problem
(Dennis et aI., 1996)?
4.2.5. Problem Structuring and the Cognitive Phenomena related to the
Individual Decision Maker
While group brainstorming is inllucnccd hy both cognitive phenomena and social or group
phenomena (Nagasundaram and Dcnnis, 1993), social phenomena have dominated previous
research, although cognitive factors arc still important (Dennis ct al. 1996). Theory on human
cognitive phenomena suggests, when presented with an all-encompassing problem,
individuals will produce a set of related ideas focllsing on only a small set of problem
subcategories (Dennis et aI. 1996, (Anderson, 1983, 1987».
Cognitive phenomena are related to the production rules that control cognitive behaviour
through the specification of cognition steps that in turn produce ideas when activated. These
rules are activated automatically by input stimuli without human conscious control
(Anderson, 1992). So for instance, for any given stimulus, there are several rules that can be
activated, but the rules that are more closely related to the stimuli (and to each other) are most
likely to be activated. These closely related rules are likely lead to the production of closely
related ideas. Thus each individual is likely to produce a set of closely related ideas (Dennis et
aI., 1996; Anderson, 1987). To that extent, individuals presented with an all-encompassing
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problem would tend to focus only on a small fraction of the potential solution space while
believing themselves to have produced a comprehensive set of solutions (Dennis et aI., 1996;
Connolly et aI., 1993; Gettys et aI., 1987). They explore a few related sub-categories in depth
rather than contemplate a broader range of sub-categories in the overall problem. "The result
is individual problem solving often misses key solution opportunities because of this narrow
focus" '(Dermis et aI. 1996: 269).
Problem structuring is the activity of identifying the relevant variables in a problem
situation and the important relationships among those variables (Pitz, et aI., 1980). It is
closely related to "act generation" which is the process of generating actions that might solve
ill-defined decision problems. Because problem structuring occurs in the early stages of
problem solving, it has considerable effect on the direction and successes of the succeeding
stages. (Mintzberg, et aI., 1976; Winkler, 1982; Mitroff and Linstone, 1993; Ackoff, 1974).
Although there are many examples that show that incorrectly defined problems can lead to
problem solving ineffectiveness and significant tTIonetary losses (Jennings and Wattam,
1994), decision tnakers as well as analysts seldom use problen1-structuring strategies (Bell,
1982). Related literature descriptions of problem structuring heuristics can be organized in a
continuum or expansion-reduction Volkema (1983).
•
•
On thc Expansion cnd therc arc problcm structuring hcuristics which start with a
problcm that is small and spccific. which thcn broadcns thc problcm dcfinition to
hc morc cxpansive.
On the Reduction end there are those problem structuring heuristics that start with
a global objective and narrow the focus to smaller, nl0re manageable objectives
unti I a cause effect relationship is defined.
Similarly, there have been studies that have explored problelTI structuring techniques based on
the divergent and convergent heuristics. Problem structuring heuristics are decision aids
designed to help people structure problen1s. This taxonon1y is appealing because it is parallel
to two known types of thinking: divergent or expansionist and convergent or reductionist or
thinking (Abualsan1h et aI., 1990). These studies have shown that divergent approaches to
problem structuring are most effective (Jennings and Wattam, 1994). Further, people with
high levels of divergent thinking are better at act generation (Abualsamh et aI., 1990) and at
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hypothesis generation (Manning et aI. 1980), which is associated with creativity. On the other
hand, convergent approaches to problem structuring are most efficient (Maier, 1970;
Abualsamh et aI., 1990) and are associated with the straight-line application of standard
knowledge. Intellectual tasks would be more suitable to convergent heuristics.
An ind'ividual' s ability to structure a problem is largely dependent on and limited by his or her
cognitive abilities. For the purposes of creatively solving problems, some intervention is
necessary. Since solutions are based on conceptualisation, the ability to solve problems
depends on how well the problem structure is conceptualised (Loy, 1991). Therefore, if the
conception of the problem structure is wrong or incomplete the decision maker will fail to
solve the right problem (Loy, 1991). It is precisely because of such errors of conceptualisation
that it has frequently been observed that we fail to face the right problenl as opposed to failing
to solve the problem we face (Ackoff, 1974). For complex problems, a construction of a good
mental model Le. conceptualisation is critical for successful problem solving (Loy, 1991).
The objective of a computer-based decision support system is to provide support to human
decision nlakers dealing with unstructured and semi-structured problems in all phases of
decision 111aking. In particular, to provide support for problem representation or problem
formulation processes, there is a need to develop problem-structuring tools with the
unJerstanding or the mental processes ano abilities involved in human problem solving.
;\ proposed solution is to adopt proccss structuring techniqucs that attempt to change the
individual's focus on the problem, either by decomposing it into sub-categories or expanding
it into a higher level problem (Volkcma, 1983 and Dennis et al., 1996). Volkcma (19R3)
provides some evidence that problem decomposition can improve the number of solutions
identified. There is also evidence that decomposing the problem by breaking it into a set of
sub-categories which are then considered separately ilnproves performance, because it
encourages individuals to devote their attention to the entire set of categories more evenly
(Pitz et aI., 19RO; Dennis et al., 1996; Dennis et al.,1999). Even a modest amount of
decol11position should lead to better perfornlance (Samson, 1988).
115
Chapter 4. Research Infnrmin~ the [)esiRn of Investigative Studies
4.2.6. On Problem Structuring and Nature of the Task
It is intuitively appealing that the nature of the task will have some effect on structuring
efforts; and that some thinking or cognitive skills would be suitable to certain types of tasks,
while others to different types of tasks. More specifically, for generative tasks, what are the
cognitive abilities that a computer-based solution should seek to enhance? Therefore, what
would be the measure of success (effectiveness) for an electronic brainstorming support
system? Using the meta-analysis by Hwang (1998) discussed in Chapter Three is relevant
here.
There are two variables that GSS can affect in generative tasks; the first is decision quality
and the other is decision time. Although Hwang's (1998) work, a meta-analysis, is based
mainly on studies comparing the supported environment and non-support environment, these
effects can be extended to comparisons of supported environments. That is seeking to impose
further GSS capabilities (through task and tinle structuring) to enhance both decision quality
and decision time is appropriate. However, the issues surrounding participation and member
sali.\/aelion arc still unclear, so that for generative tasks, formulating hypothesis about the
elTect of GSS around these variables would not be appropriate.
4.2.7. Problem Structuring and Group Phenomena
I t was notcd earl ier that groups tend to su frcr from cogni ti ve inertia, a phenomenon sim ilar to
individual cognitive limitation. This is thc tendency of thc group to focus thcir discussion to a
limitcd linc of thought in onc sub-category of an issue. As groups interact they may
consciously or unconsciously adopt behaviour norms. Thcse norms or structures n1ay
constrain behaviour (Giddens, 1984). One of the structures typically found in groups is not
~~changing the subject" (Laml11 and Tromnlsdorff, 1973 :382). Repeatedly changing the subject
to look at new ideas becomes socially undesirable. Menlbers nlay think of unrelated ideas but
it becomes socially undesirable to contribute these ideas to the discussion. This behaviour has
been observed within electronic brainstorming groups and is associated with the generation of
fewer ideas (Dennis and Valacich, 1994, Dennis et aI., 1996).
That which is achievable through problenl decomposition for the individual may be partially
achieved by the formation of a group for that same problem. Groups are partly formed to
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provide a diversity of approaches to a problem in order to counter the potential narrowness of
anyone individual's perception. The diversity of ideas proposed by the group can overcome
the cognitive limitations faced by individuals. However, cognitive inertia can counter these
efforts. Problem structuring for a group environment must then employ methods that are
effective for both the individual and the group. Problem decomposition recommends itself for
these p·urposes.
4.2.8. Time Structuring with Problem Decomposition
Decomposing the problem into sub-categories that are addressed sequentially divides the
amount of time available to solve the problem into several smaller intervals of time, each
devoted to one problem sub-category. There is an adage that work expands to fill the time
available for it. McGrath et al. (1984) observed that when groups had short time limits
in1posed, they solved problems faster than when they had more time. Breaking the problem
down into several categories, each addressed under tighter tin1c constraints n1ay encourage the
group to work fastcr, resulting in bettcr group productivity i.e. more ideas than when
presenting thc group with thc problem framed as a single question with more time available.
The goal of task structuring is to encourage members to allocate their effort more evenly over
the indi vid ual sub-categories wi thi n the task. With ti me structuri ng members arc forced to
break their work pattern and think about something unrelated and this is designed to break the
cognitive inertia (Dennis et aI., 1996: Dennis et al 1999). When the individuals resume work
they Illay focus on a different part of the task and in this way they may direct their efforts to
di fferent sub-parts of the task that were previously overlooked (Dominowski and Jenrick,
1972).
There is evidence that externally imposed time constraints affect the pace of group work
(Gersick, 1988). If groups perceive that they have a short period relative to the task, they work
more quickly to accomplish the task (Kelly, 1988; Kelly, et aI., 1990; Locke and Latham,
1990). The reverse is also true; if groups perceive that the time period is sufficient to complete
the task, they work more slowly. A shorter tin1e period may increase the rate of task
performance resulting in more ideas but quality may suffer. This is because time pressure
tends to focus attention more narrowly so that some sub-parts of the task are overlooked
(Kelly and Karau 1993; Kelly and McGrath, 1985). To some extent, the perception of time
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available may be more important than actual time available (Dennis et aI., 1996~ Dennis et a!.,
1999).
Decision time, as a measure of effectiveness for a ass that supports generative tasks is a
relevant independent variable in the design of experiments (Hwang, 1998). This notion is
included in the hypotheses of Dennis et al (1996) and Dennis et al (1999).
It is reported that the "results from both experiments were clear and consistent: decomposition
lead to more ideas. For two different tasks, subject populations, and settings decomposing an
idea-generating problem into subcategories and directing subjects to work sequentially on
each generated some 600/0 more ideas than did presenting them with the same problenl as one
question" (Dennis et aI., 1996:274). However, decomposition had no effect on the subjects'
satisfaction or perceived effectiveness.
Dennis et al. (1999), find somewhat different results under slightly varied circumstances and
different hypotheses. They divided their brainstonning groups into those tackling intact tasks
and those tackling the decomposed tas,ks. In addition, those working on the intact task had 30
minutes to work on the tasks, while those working on the dccornposed tasks had 10 minutes
for each of the sub-tasks. In this study, it was found that the decomposed task treatment group
generated 40CXl more ideas. Ilowever. no time effects were found in this study.
On the other hand. there arc risks to using task structuring that researchers and practitioners
need to take into cognisance. Dennis et al. (1999) found that the subjects in the single intact-
question treatment were more likely to produce ideas that fell outside of the three pre-delined
main categories. Although it is not clear what the quality of those same ideas were from their
paper. They conclude that one risk of problenl structuring is that the structure may not
completely cover the problem space; that is, it nlay nliss important sub-categories (Dennis et
aI., 1999). In other words, the constraining of the ideas to predefined categories may result in
the group intentionally or unintentionally missing ideas that lie outside these categories. This
point is important and needs to be tested by further research, which justifies this research.
A second risk is, it may be more difficult to create good, holistic solutions without
considering all sub-categories of the task simultaneously. For instance, the ideas developed
when focusing on one sub-category nlay violate constraints imposed by the requirements of
another sub-category thus compromising the overall usefulness of the solution (Campbell,
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1988, Dennis et aI., 1998).
In this dissertation, the methodology on problem structuring by Dennis et al. (1996) is used as
a starting point. However, the questions asked are different in content.
In the decision making process, brainstorming or generating ideas is an activity characterized
by the stimulation and support for divergent thinking by the decision making group. It was
noted that people with high levels of divergent thinking are better at act generation and at
hypothesis generation (Abualsamh, et al., 1990). The next stage in the decision making
process is convergent thinking. Building consensus is associated with convergent thinking
(Abualsamh, et al., 1990).
4.3. On the Issue of Consensus
An outstanding group-generated solution can rarely be implen1ented if the group, or other
stakeholders with a vested interest in the decision, cannot agree and reach consensus on the
solution. Par today's organization creativity is essential~ however the ability to get buy-in for
those creative solutions is equally important. The second part of this research exam1l1cs
conscnsus building in a group multi-criteria dccision making.
4.3.1. What is Consensus, and why is it Important?
In Chapter Two. group decision making contexts and how the AI-IP facilitates them were
briefly explored. The contexts defined were comnl0n objectives. non-common objectives and
conflict. In this section, focus is turned onto the group decision making context of common
and non-conlnlon objectives, the latter being where parties have some non-shared and
sOlnetinles hidden objectives. The purpose of this section is to explore the attendant strategies
that can be employed to assist the group in reaching a consensus decision where they are
starting from non-shared or hidden objectives. The strategies lnentioned in Chapter Two
included voting, compromise and consensus. It was discussed that in the AHP, consensus can
be arrived at through the discussion of the hierarchy and the judgments (Saaty, 1991).
However, discussion may not be adequate, possible, or even desirable in a decision making
situation. In such cases, there is a need to be able to facilitate consensus with the employment
of other useful strategies.
119
Chapter 4: Research Informinf!, the De.~ign ofInvestigative Studies
There have been several field and laboratory studies conducted by GSS researchers testing the
efficacy of group support systems on group consensus. The results however have been less
than consistent. In some cases, they have been conflicting and contradictory. For example,
there are studies that have reported negative GSS effects on group consensus (George et aI.
1990; Ho and Raman, 1991; Watson, et aI, 1988; Hwang, 1998). Although, this inconsistency
in findings has been attributed to the differences in research methodologies (Dennis, et aI.,
1991); differences in technology (Kraemer. and Pinsonneault, 1990); differences in the
adaptation of technology by groups (Poole and DeSanctis, 1989); a lack of theory (Rao and
Jarvenpaa, 1991) and low statistical power in MIS (Baroudi and Orlikowski, 1989), there
remains sufficient cause for further investigation, which justifies this research.
Yet, one may ask is there consensus on the very definition of consensus? Some researchers
have defined consensus by juxtaposing it with polarity (Coman 1996:247). Coman defines
polarity as "the level of conflict associated with an issue" and consensus as the "the
complin1ent of polarity", although he suggests consensus is often confuscd with position or
opinion. t,xplicitly diffcrcntiating bctwccn thc position that the group holds and thc cxtent to
which the group is polarized on the issue is important. Consensus is the level of agreement
associated with an issue (Coman, 1996). Consensus has also been defined as a collective
opinion or accord (Zeleny, 1(82). Accord means agreement. This is distinct from a
compromise, which is a solution or settlement of differences in which each side makes some
concessions. Accordingly, there may be several compromises but only one consensus (Zeleny,
19R2).
Consensus is a process of general agreement on public issues (Bazak and Saaty, 1993). This
begs the question: how many individuals must agree in order to carry the group? In practice
one or several people can dictate decisions for a group, [ronl within or outside the group. or by
partial or total participation of the group. When the decision is made through participation.
Bazak and Saaty (1993) propose that there are at least three known types of consensus -
spontaneous, emergent, and manipulated consensus.
Spontaneous Consensus is exhibited in traditional con1ffiunities, with very few public issues,
who change their decisions as a collective entity.
Ernergent Consensus occurs only in non-traditional societies, which are relatively secular and
urbanized. Typically, after all points of view have been considered, each individual weighs
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and judges the ideas and then draws a rational conclusion. The crystallization of these
judgments becomes public opinion. If the emergent majority is sufficiently forceful, the
minorities would adopt its view and emergent consensus arises with the viewpoint of the
majority.
Finally, Manipulated Consensus exists in .societies In which emergent consensus can
theoretically occur, but general agreement then depends on who controls the means of power
or persuasion.
Given that there are various types of consensus and different definitions of what consensus is,
in this research consensus will refer to a generally agreed upon level of agreement by the
group. That some n1embers of the group may need to make compromises in order to arrive at
that level of agreement is viewed as part of the consensus building process. In other words,
this investigative study on consensus examines a type of emergent consensus as described by
Bazak and Saaty (1993).
4.3.2. Group Decision Support and Consensus
Thc important role that groups play incrcasingly in organizations was discussed in Chapter
Thrcc. Thc cconomic successes or Japanesc firms had an efrcct or inducing western
organizations to replacc their authoritarian managcmcnt structures with thc consensus seeking
managcmcnt structures that are common in Japan (Ouchi and Price, 19R3). Total Quality
Management (TQM) is one such exam plc that gaincd popularity in thc west, cmploying
quality circles or teams charged with both the initiation and implementation or quality
improvement (e.g. sce Deming, 1986). Quehi and Priee (1983) examine Japanese decision
making practices that are 'polarity-averse'. They describe how information is assembled rrom
as many as 60 to 80 stakeholders who are directly involved in making the decision. A process
or decision structuring is rc-i terated unti I true consensus is reached.
Making a decision in this way takes a very long time~ however once the decision is made,
everyone affected by it is likely to support it (Coman, 1996). How often in western societies
does one hear Hthat is such a good idea, they just don't know what is good for them." The
advent of Group Support Systen1s "facilitating solutions of unstructured problems by a set of
decision makers working together as a group" (Huber, 1988) brought new promise to the
ability to effectively enhance consensus. Polarity is described as an eminent metric of the
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decision process (Coman, 1996:247). In their paper, DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987) identify
communication and consensus as a capability and feature of a Level 2 GDSS. Collaborative
technologies offer other features such as anonymous communication and voting, real time
feedback and group memory (discussed in Chapter Three) which facilitate more sophisticated
decision models, processes and structures that can serve to enhance the building of consensus
(Sambamurthy and Scott-Poole, 1992).
Why do organizations and groups insist on consensus for some decision contexts? It has been
frequently suggested that consensus in decision making is important because of the belief that
groups interacting together can synergise to produce more and better quality solutions (Saaty,
1994; Coman, 1996). The basic notion underlying consensus is, human wisdom is worthy of
aggregation in making a decision (Basak and Saaty, 1993). As illustrated with creativity and
idea generation, and the greater productivity and effectiveness of group interaction versus
individual contribution, it is argued that consensus decision making is associated with the
effectiveness of (or lack thereof) group processes. For Basak and Saaty (1993), "the
aggregation of the preference rankings of individuals into a consistent group ranking is the
most important problem" in group decision making. In othcr words the dcrivation or
measurement of the consensus vcctor or group preference n1ean vector is the most important
consideration.
Groups are sometimes convencd to makc dccisions that promotc \vider acccptancc or and
grcater commitmcnt to thc rcsults (Tan, ct aI., 1995). To meet this ohjectivc, groups often
nccd to achieve an acceptable or prcdcfined level of consensus. Further, "in many decision
si tuations there is 110 objecti ve measurc of decision qual ity avai lable. Rather th~ grollp mllst
reconcile differellces in opinion, personal preferences, or judgmcnt and achieve consensus
about a particular mode of action" (Watson et al. 1988: 463).
Face-to-face meetings can be very timc-consuming even though this is one feature of
organizational life that is used over and Over again. This is an attestation of the critical role
meetings play in communication (Anson, et aI., 1995). With Group Decision Support
Systen1s, face-to-facc meetings have been tnade n10re effective. Past research has found, there
are certain types of interventions in group processes that improve meetings by structuring the
group interaction process. This intervention has been tested by vvay of both introducing GSS
software tools and or human facilitation (Anson, et aI., 1995). The results of such
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interventions have varied across research, ranging from improved participation to reduced
consensus (Benbasat and Lim, 1993).
However, consensus is not always the best way to obtain a group decision (Saaty, 1994).
Disagreement within groups can be either an asset or liability (Maier, 1970). Groupthink for
examp1e is consensus, which is as a result of a strong desire to preserve harmony within the
group environment or as a result of a strong manipulative group (Janis and Mann, 1979). In
the study by Janis and Mann, evidence is given showing that cohesive groups sometimes
reach decisions that are inferior to less cohesive groups.
Intuitively the proposition found in the study of Ouchi and Price (1983) is appealing. They
suggest that good decision making is the product of a heterogeneous group that deliberates
until disagreements have been resolved. High polarity at the beginning of the decision process
and low polarity towards the conclusion of the decision process would be characteristic of the
process. The reduction in polarity comes about through conflict nloderation, so that a general
decline in polarity over time would he indicative of a productive decision making process. On
the other hand, processes that start at a low level of polarity (i.e. high consensus) could
indicate an exceedingly homogenous group or the presence of manipulative individuals.
Equally. decisions reached with a high level or polarity (Iow consensus) are likely to fail in
the implemcntation phase as disscnting group mcmhcrs actively or passively sahotage the
process. (Ouchi and Price, 19RJ; Coman, 199()).
In real ity groups are somcti mes convened for the purposes of mak ing decisions that require
wider stakeholder consultation. In South Africa. from a public and business point or view
especially, consultation of stakeholders or lack thcreof is often reflected in thc reception or
rejection of the end product. In situations like these, particularly ones that are characterized by
high lcvels of polarity in thc initial stages of the decision process. consensus building and
achievenlent by the group, and by extension consensus facilitation are issues that warrant
somc attention. Group Dccision Support Systems offcr ways that bolster consensus. More
specifically, most GSS offer nlechanisms to address evaluation apprehension or the pressure
to confornl through anonymity. A decision arrived at through dornination by a minority, or as
a consequence of pressure to confornl is unlikely to be accepted and committed to in the
implementation phases of the process (Tan et al. 1995). The perceived quality of a decision
reached with consensus is higher than that which is not.
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The act of voting is often used to determine or arrive at group consensus, although voting
itself is not consensus. The point at which a voted solution becomes a consensual solution is
something that the group must define upfront, before the decision process begins. "Current
voting mechanisms operationalise polarity aversion in the group through preferred majority
require'ments in the group (as applied in many important decisions) or through full consensus
(as applied by juries)" (Coman, 1996:247). However, with the kind of tasks that groups
tackle, it is difficult to know when a high quality outcome has been reached through the
defined consensus (Hart, 1985). Many voting models incorporate the intensity of the
individual positions into a weighting mechanism, for example the Analytic Hierarchy Process.
A major body of research employs Bayesian probabilities as n1easures of correctness (Ahituv
and Ronen, 1988; Hanson, 1998). The study of the value of an additional information source
is characteristic of Bayesian decision making. Each information source is described by the
probability that its forecast is correct. All sources are then aggregated under the assun1ption
that they are independent of each other (Ahituv and Ronen, 1988). In practice and in realistic
situations it would be impossible to assess the probability that a group member's position is
correct, or that every two group members are independent of each other (Coman, 1996).
4.3.3. Some Group Support Frameworks for Calculating and Measuring
Consensus
Several frameworks have been investigated in pursuit or estimating or measuring group
consensus. These arc required in view of the following conclusion:
"The present approach (~lusing the technology to f11(!chani:e group processes such as voting. Delphi and
tire Nominal Group Technique is crude and rudifllentwy al best. Wc anticipate tlrat nell' ways of gaining
group interaction and group consensus }I'ill del'e/op Ihat lake ad\'(mtage (!l the capabilities (~/Iered hy
CDSS" (Gray and Nunarnaker. 1989:283].
Very little research has been undertaken that explores the process of consensus building
(Bryson, 1996). In the next section, the specific features of the AHP that can be used in
estilnating and nleasuring group consensus will be discussed. In addition two models, namely
Coman's (1996) Intensity-Polarity-Voting-Model (IPVM) model and the fratnework by
Ngwenyan1a et a1. (1996) on consensus relevant information will be examined. The latter will
be exan1ined in more detail for the reason that more research has been done and written on it.
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In Chapter Five this framework will form the basis, together with the Analytic Hierarchy
Process, for the practical investigation of supporting consensus building and measurement.
4.3.4. Consensus Priority Weights within the AHP
When 'several people are involved, working closely together, they usually justify their
judgments in a reasoned debate (Saaty, 1991). Often consensus may not be reached and one
must synthesize the judgments (Saaty, 1991). When all the voters in the group are of equal
inlportance, the Analytic Hierarchy Process can use the deterministic approach wherein the
individual judgment matrices are synthesized using the geometric mean of the entries. In this
case the geometric mean is the "proper way to synthesize group judgments given by the voters
as reciprocal matrices" (Aczel and Saaty 1983). Alternatively, if the participants are believed
to have unequal importance, then a weighted, synthesizing method would be appropriate
(Saaty, 1991, 1992; Hamalainen et aI., 1992). In either case, the eigenvalue method is used to
find consensus priority weights of the alternatives in a specific level of the hierarchy. These
priority weights are then aggregated for an overall judgment.
Basak and Saaty (1993) discuss consensus within the context or the AliI> and its
implementation. They also propose two differcnt approaches, the deterministic and stochastic
or statistical methods or consensus with respect to the preference rankings or individuals in
applying group decision making. One mcthod is applicable to small groups and the other to
opinions at largc where one cannot dcal with the people on an individual basis. Basak and
Saaty (1993) consider the case of deri ving the consensus vector 1'01' both 'face-to-face' and
geographically distributed groups. In the case where the group is small with individuals
interacting' face-ta-face,' thus innucncing each othcr. Basak and Saaty (1993) propose that
the detenninistic approach is appropriate. Here the judgments are synthesized by using the
geOlnetric nlean. In the case where the group is large and geographically scattered, they point
out that the inconsistency between the individuals providing judgnlents is far more important
than the inconsistency of a single one or them. Therefore, there is a need for a statistical
procedure to deal with the variation among several people to surface a single ranking for the
weights of the alternatives.
125 .
(,hapter 4: Research Informing the Design ofInvestigative Studies
4.3.4.1. Coman's Intensity-Polarity-Voting-Model (IPVM) for Estimating and
Measuring Consensus
Conventional measures of consensus have traditionally excluded both the amount of
dispersion surrounding an issue and the intensities associated with it (Bryson, 1996;
Ngwe~yama et aI., 1996; Coman, 1996). In his model Coman (1996) seeks to provide a
measure of intensity that is simple and inexpensive to use. A member's intensity is defined as
a function of both competence and power in a group. In fact, the model is restricted to issues
of competence. It assumes that problems are a function of knowledge and expertise.










Figurc 4.1: Intcnsity-Polarity-Voting Model (IPVM) individual input and group output. (Adapted
from Coman, 1996:2"9)
Most decision making models assume that preferences are given and prescribe ho\\! to use
them when dealing with a set of alternatives (Coman, 1996). In this model the intensity
measure enables group members to position themselves anywhere bct\vcen the two extrcmcs
of 'vote' or 'abstain'. The polarity mcasurcment allows a conOict-avcrse group to position
itself any\vherc on the continuum bctween a simple majority and full consensus (Coman.
1996).
Conlan's n10del, the IPYM addresses all stages of decision n1aking in Simon' s (1960) model:
Intelligence, Design (using an MCDM framework), Choice and Implementation. However in
this study it is of interest in as far as it provides decision n1akers with a set of variables that
describe the group's stance over an issue at any given mornent in time. That is, it can be used
to facilitate the process of consensus building.
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The IPVM deals with the aggregation of individual stances into a group stance. Two metrics
that define the individual stance are described:
1. Position - which indicates what the individual thinks on the issue and
2. Intensity - which is an indicator of the weight associated with that individual's
.position in the group context.
Members can vary in stance for vanous reasons, for example due to .differences in
con1petence, power or commitment (Coman, 1996) or vested interest in the specific issue
under discussion. Individual stance is calculated through representation on a three
dimensional cube, with alternatives on the X-axis, attributes on the Y-axis and group
Inembers on the Z-axis. Each cell on the XY-plane represents the rating of one alternative
with respect to a specific attribute, and the number of XY-planes equal the number of group
members and each XY-plane contains the total set of positions expressed by a specific
melnber. Each YZ-plane represents all the data relevant to a single alternative (the rating of
that alternative, over all attributes by all group members).
If there are N-members discussing A-alternatives broken into M-attributes, then there are N x
A x M cells in thc cube.
;\ si Jl1 ilar cube is llsed to depict intensi ty, (i ntensi ty, attri bute, al ternati ve) where intensity is
gi ven as function 0 f the ind ividual 's expertise or expcricnce, that is the indi vidual's in flucnce
011 the decision outcome.
The function of thc model is to aggregate the individual stanccs into group stances and to
aggregate attribute data in alternative data. (See Figure 4.1 - a!Jo\'e)
Individual stances are concluded on to a two-dimensional space, where a member's position
on a specific issue is presented on the Y-axis, while the intensity is presented on the X-axis
(Figure 4.2 below),
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Figure 4.2 Individual stance: position and intensity space (adapted from Coman, 1996:250)
Three metrics are used to define the group stance:
(1) position - what the group thinks on that issue,
(2) intensity - how firm the group is on that issue and
(3) polarity - the conflict or controversy associated with that issue.
The description of the group's stancc is richer, according to Conlan, because the group is the
source of controvcrsy. The qucstion of interest is how can the group stance be synthesized?
lie argues that "this resembles the question of where the centre of gravity for a group of
objects can be found"(Coman, 199X:250). Each object has a distinct position, and an intcnsity~
in addition for every attribute, each member carries a di fferent weight as a result of their
competence.
COlllan cOlnputes the group's posi tion as the 'centre 0 f gravi ty'. For example, on attri hutcj
the group posi tion would be descri bed by a 1 x M matrix vector generated from the.i group
positions- indi vidual intcnsi ties for that attri bute. Group intensi ty ror the attri bute,.i is deli ned
as the sun1 of the individual intensities. Group polarity on the other hand, is similar to the
conventional disensus measure of the proportional head count or the ratio of opponents to
proponents. When there is full consensus, polarity equals zero The amount of disensus is a
function of dispersion and intensity (Coman, 1998). This 111akes intuitive sense, the more
apart group mernbers are on an issue, the higher the discnsus and the stronger the hold on
differing positions, the higher the disensus. With this in 111ind one would expect that for
groups with a vested interest in the outc0l11e and therefore a higher intensity will exhibit more
disel1sus, while those who are indifferent to the outcome would exhibit lower levels of
conflict.
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Conlan uses the physics analogy of the second moment around the centre-of-gravity to
compute polarity. The second moment around the centre-of-gravity is defined as the sum over
all elements of the product, of the squared distance between the element and the object's
centre-of-gravity times the elements mass. By analogy, member q's contribution to the
polarity surrounding issue j (denoted as pqj), is a function of the member's distance from the
group's position and of the intensity with which the member holds to that position (Coman,
1996).
The polarity contributed by a member to a given attribute is defined as
p . = i . x (r . _R·)2cv cv Cl) J
where iqj is the intensity of member q with respect to issue j and
rqj is the position or rating of member q with respect to issue j
(1)








whcrc N is thc numhcr or mcmhcrs
Polari ty can also hc totallcd for a gl ven mcm her thus provid ing that mcmbcr' statal
contribution to controvcrsy.
The Ill0del gencratcs measures of polarity among pairs of mcmbcrs of the group. This
inforIllation can bc used for example to exclude pairs or membcrs that historically havc been
systenlatieally adversary or those that are redundant i.e. whose polarity is 10\\/, when task-
groups are fornlcd. Coman proposes his model as a support tool for analysis and feedback on
group states throughout the decision I1laking life cycle (Coman, 1996). This model is also
based on dyadic discourse, which is explained further in thc next section.
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4.3.4.2. Measuring Consensus using the Analytic Hierarchy Process and a
framework for consensus relevant information
Ngwenyama et al (1996) and Bryson (1996) propose a method that is conceptually similar to
Coman's (1996) in as far as the measuring of consensus information is concerned.
Ngwenyarna et al. (1996) quite aptly describe theirs as consensus relevant information. It is
this framework, articulated by Ngwenyama, et al. (1996); Bryson (1996); Bryson (l996a),
Bryson et al. (1994) and Bryson (1997), that is investigated with reference to its practical
usability in this research. Firstly, the framework and its mathematical foundations are
described in this section. In the next chapter the framework is applied to a real life group
decision making environment in a field investigation.
With Group Support Systems the rating and ranking features are well supported by existing
software, arguably because preference tasks occur frequently in organizations (Bryson, 1997).
However, Bryson argues that this area of research has not received the attention it deserves in
that ratings in group decision making contexts require techniques for synthesizing individual
scores into group judgments. Yet the application of these techniques is only meaningful where
there is a relatively high level of consensus that is ohtained through human interaction and
there is the need for techniques to assess the level of the group consensus, and for huilding
consensus (Bryson, 19(7).
Thc framcwork is motivated hy the need to possess the capacity to idcnti fy avcllucs or
conscnsus building and to explore thcse opportunitics constructivcly in ordcr to improve the
productivity of thc group and the outcomcs of thc nleeting. The question is: how is this done?
For rcal Iifc groups where decision consensus is an issuc, nornlally some protocol already
exists in terms of what constitutes consensus. For cxample Amcrican juries must reach a
unanimous vcrdict, while in most western democracics a two-thirds nlajority is considered
group consensus. Therefore in using the framcwork defined by Ngwenyama et al (1996) and
I3ryson (1996, 1997) the starting point is for the f~lcilitator to establish what the desired level
of consensus is, within the group. That is, what is the stopping rule? At what stage could one
say that a sufficient level of consensus has been rcached? In the investigative study of this
research the stopping rule was established as a two-thirds nlajority.
The second thing with respect to the framework that needs to be established is defining what
the authors call the threshold values of agreenlent and disagreement. These values will be
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used to evaluate the level of agreement or disagreement between pairs of decision makers or
between any decision maker and the group as a whole, through its group preference mean.
The meaning of these threshold values becomes clearer in context with a similarity function
defined later in this section. Strong agreement is set to (a) and strong disagreement is set to
The framework relies on the generation of individual preference vectors. derived from
pairwise comparisons and the calculation of the group preference mean vector through the
geometric mean. For example, where t is each individual decision maker with T being the
index set of the group of decision makers, i.e. (t E 1) and M is defined as the total number of
decision nlakers. For example, M = 8 in this study's investigation.
To define the individual preference vector from the pairwise comparison information entered
by each individual on all the problem criteria and sub-criteria. The matrix:
At = {a\.i } (3 )
is first formed (as already seen in the discussion on the Analytic Ilierarchy Process) and then
the preference vector:
t I I
W=(WI, ..... WN) (4)
is calculated for each group member. This preference vector is essentially the priority for each
(sub)criterioll. Accordingly, w l would be generated within a pre-detined level of consistency
of usually less than 0.2.
Having defined the individual preference vector or sub-criteria priorities, the framework
defines three indicators which are used to estimate group consensus (Bryson : 1996,
Ngwcnyanla et al. :1996, Bryson : 1997). These are:
a) The Group Strong Agreement Quotient, GSAQ
b) The Group Strong Disagreement Quotient, GSDQ and
c) The Group Strong Disagreement Indicator, GSDI.
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The GSAQ and the GSDQ identify the percentage of pairs of group members who have a
reasonably strong level of agreement or disagreement respectively, whereas, the GSDI value
estimates the breadth or dispersion of opinions within the group. The GSDI shows the worst
disagreement between a pair of individual group members.
The use of these group indicators however requires the definition of what the authors call a
Similarity Function,
(5)
where t and r are a pair of the individual group members.
The Similarity Function allows for the comparison of the level of agreen1ent between any pair
of preference vectors. It also allows one to answer the question: when are two members said
to be in strong agreement or strong disagreement. That is, the definition of interpretable
threshold values for strong agreement (a) and strong disagreement (P )can be defined, so that
two individual group members can be said to have strong agreement if their Similarity
I:unction,
(6)
In other words ir the similarity function is greater than somc pre-ddined level a, then the
interpretation is that. strong agreement exists between members I and ,.. On the other hand,
where the similarity function is less than some pre-defined level r3 then the interpretation is
that strong disagreement exists between members t and ,..
(7)
This is different to inquiring about the level of consensus existing within the group. This
merely sets the scene for defining and subsequently identifying pairs of members who show
pre-defined levels of agreement (or disagreement) that can be used in the process to build
further agreement. In the case of strong disagreement it allows for the identification of those
members who may serve as obstacles to reaching consensus. In the latter case, for example,
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the facilitator could identify members who consistently show high levels of disagreement with
each other and be able to recommend that during task group formation these members be
substituted, as in Coman's model.
Finally, the similarity function needs to be calculated and this is done as follows:
(8)
where the sine is used a preferred method of estimating the similarity of the pair of vectors wt
and wr • It takes on values between [0,1]. It is also independent of the magnitudes of the
vectors (Bryson, 1996). Various measures have been proposed for estimating the similarity of
a pair of vectors, these include the Euclidean distance, L-l norm distance, the cosine and sine
of the angle between the vectors (Bryson, 1996). He adds that "none of these measures,
however, offer obvious choices for ex and p, and at this point, it is not clear if any of the
measures is better than the rest". Accordingly, Bryson (1996) and Ngwenyama et al. (1996)
give no indication which suggests what the optimal value for a and p should be. They only
state that rcasonahlc valucs of ex and r3 should be set.
For any given similarity measure Sew!, w(jM) the Group Strong Agrecment Quotient (GSAQ)
is defined as follows:
whcre
GSAQu = L (lET) r(t, GM)/M (9)
f(t. GM) = 1 if
r(t, GM) = ° if
S( t (iM) >'- W, 'vV = ex
I (iM· I C 11 .an( W IS t 1C current group prelcrcnce mean vector. 1C group prcfcrence mean vector IS
derived from the geometric mean of thc individual preference vectors. In other \V'ords if an
individual's preference vector, \\.1 \vhen compared to w(,f\1 is greatcr than the pre-defined level
of strong agreen1ent then r(t, G1\1) = 1, otherwise r(t, GM) = 0.




GSDQp = ~ (teT) <D(t, GM)/M
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(10)
<D(t, GM) = 1 if
<D(t, GM) = 0 if
The rationale behind these variables is that consensus only exists if at least a specified
proportion of the individual members of the group have strong agreement with the group mean
preference vector, wGM, and no more than a specified proportion of the group members have
strong disagreement with the wGM (Bryson, 1996, 1997). However, it is obvious that the
GSDQ is an alternative measure to the GSAQ.
Finally, the measurement of the dispersion of opinion within the group on an issue, the Group
Strong Disagreen1ent Indicator (aSDI) is defined as follows:
( 11 )
Thcsc Group indicators arc useful in as far as they can be uscd for thc purposes of estimating
thc cx isti ng levcl 0 f group consensus. Thcrc arc addi tional ind icators that scrve to identi fy
ind ividual group mcmbers who have the highest capaci ty to serve as conscnsus bui Iders. In
that for instance some mcmbers may form sub-groups 0 f agrccmcnt among thclllscl vcs. For
such individuals thc framcwork proposcs individual consensus indicators.
These are, namely:
a) The ISAQ, Individual Strong Agreelnent Quotient.
b) The ISOQ, Individual Strong Disagreernent Quotient.
c) The ISOI, Individual Strong Agreement Indicator.
These are defined sinlilarly to the group consensus indicators.
where
ISAQta = L (reT) f(t, r)/M
ISDQ l l3 = L (reT) $(t, r)nv1
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<D(t, r) = 1
<D(t, r) = 0
if
if
The similarity function upon which they are based is of the form S(wt,wr) where t and r
represent a pair of individual group members. The objective is to identify any existing subset
of members whose current position makes them likely agents of consensus building. There are
questions that one may ask in order to establish this (Bryson, 1997; Bryson, 1996) For
example,
1. Is there a member who shares strong agreement with an overwhelming majority?
2. Is there a subset of the objects such that if this subset were removed the agreen1ent
quotient between a given pair of individual group members would be increased and
therefore the group's consensus index would be increased? (I3ryson, 1996)
To achieve the identi lication of such individuals and objects, Bryson suggests that there is a
speci fie type or individual that should be or interest:
• Those individuals whose preference vector wt, IS 111 strong agreemcnt with \\.(j~l AND
whose ISDQII\ valuc is less than thc disagrcement thrcshold. Thus, or interest is the pair:
[S(W
I
,\y(iM),ISDQ1Id· These individuals are to be encouraged to express and promote the
compromise group rnean position.
This concludes the definition of the framcwork as defined by Ngwcnyama ct al (1996),
Bryson (1996), Bryson (1997) and Bryson et al. (1994). In the section on the conduct or thc
field study, this franlework is used to facilitate and build consensus.
4.3.5. On Problem Structuring and Facilitation of the Group Process
A facilitator is SOlneone from outside the group who has skills in assisting the group
interaction "while remaining neutral as to the content of the discussions" (Anson et aI., 1995).
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The facilitator role dimensions identified by Clawson et al (1993) are observed when
conducting the field study and the investigation follows a facilitation framework, which
consists of the following three phases.
1. Process Planning and Design
'This phase of getting together with the group leader(s) and others to design group
process:
o Defining process ground rules and participator roles.
o Problem formulation and identification of desired outcomes
o Developing and agenda.
2. Preparation and Setup.
o Selection of appropriate technology, and preparation for group process by
facilitator.
3. Process Management.
o Managing group process and promoting effective task behaviour.
No attempt in this section is made to define in detail the procedure followed for this
would amount to a repetition of the investigation procedures.
There arc several di friculties with field investigations. One being, for instance, i I' onc wanted
to test for propositions expounded hy Adaptivc Structuration Theories (AST), it would not be
feasible to do so. According to AST, over and beyond the role of exchanging information,
group interaction is also a mcans to appropriate technology-based and non-technology-based
structures to guide further group interaction (Poole and DeSanctis, 1989).
Structures are formal and informal procedures, techniques, skills, rules, and technologies that
organizc direct group behaviour processes. "Appropriation is the fashion in which the group
uses, adapts, and reproduces a structure." (Poole and DeSanctis, 1989)
This theory presupposes that groups that are supported be it through facilitation or ass
software or both would derive certain benefits of appropriation that an unsupported group
would not derive. This issue is easy to prove within controlled experimental environments.
The experiments could be repeated, varying only certain test variables. In this investigation
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this is not possible because real life stakeholders have no vested interest in repeating the
study. The extent of appropriation can only be speculated. The probability of finding real life
actors with exactly the same problem in the same vicinity at nearly the same time is very low,
so that direct comparative studies cannot be performed. Only similar future research
elsewhere can form a basis for comparison.
There is ample evidence suggesting that each type of intervention i.e. facilitation and GSS can
improve meeting productivity (Nunamaker, 1999). However prior research is incomplete in
certain critical areas. Firstly, both have not been evaluated side by side under the same
conditions i.e. where GSS and human facilitation have been put side by side and evaluated.
Secondly, numerous GSS researchers (Vogel et aI., 1987; Kraemer and King, 1988) have
stressed the importance of including facilitation in GSS settings, as is the practice in real
applications (McGoff and Ambrose, 1991) However, there has been little empirical
assessment of their combined effectiveness (Nunamaker, 1999).
Another problen1 in research is how facilitation is applied. Most GSS and group dynamics
experin1ental studies examine how a given procedural structure e.g. the nominal group
technique or a specific ass tool or tool set, is used. The facilitator or experimenter follows a
pre-written "script" of what to say and how to act whcn applying the treatmcnt structure. This
scri pted or fi xed approach enhances internal val id ity by control Iing the I~lci Iitator as a source
or confounding variance. Ilowever thc fixed approach sacrilices external validity regarding
raci Iitation in real seui ngs. Normally f~lci Iitators act with flex ibi Iity to hel p the group select
and adapt procedural structures to meet their specific needs. J-lirokawa and Gouran (1989)
argue that a scripted approach is inappropriate for studying process interventions. given the
fluidity and unpredictability of typical group interaction.
4.3.6. On the Challenges facing the investigation of field studies and
Participant- Observation Type Studies
The participant-observation method described by Yin (1984) and employed in the field
study of this research is used in cultural and sub-cultural groups. It creates the following
opportunities -
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D ability of an investigator to gain access to· events or groups that are otherwise
inaccessible to scientific investigation. For some things there may be no other way
of collecting data
D ability to perceive from the viewpoint of someone inside the case than outside of
it. This is valuable to the 'accurate' portrayal of the case.
D Investigator's ability to manipulate events or situations.
On the other hand, it creates the following problems -
D Potential biases are likely to generated - the investigator has less ability to work as an
external observer and may at times have to assume positions or advocacy that is
contrary to the interests of good scientific practice
D The investigator is likely to follow a common phenomena of becoming a supporter of
the group being studied if such support did not already exist
D This role may require too much attention relative to the observer role and therefore
allow little time to take notes and to raise questions about the events and the different
perspectives (Yin, 1984)
4.4. Conclusion
This chapter has explored the detailed foundations for both divergent i.e. idea generation and
convergent i.e. consensus building activities within the group decision making process.
Chapter Five will use these in experimental and licld conditions aiming to provide evidence
for the practical validation of the theories discllssed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. DEFINITION, DESIGN AND FORMULATION OF EXPERIMENTS
In this chapter the definition, design and formulation of the electronic brainstorming and
consensus building experiments are explored in detail. These are based on the theoretical
foundations and the scope of this research addressed in the previous chapter. Two tasks are
performed. The first task is an experiment on the effect of task structuring in idea generation and
the second is a field-study of consensus building in a multi-criteria ass.
5.1. Task One: The Idea Generation-Electronic Brainstorming Laboratory
Experiment
This part of the research partially replicates the work done by Dennis et al. (1996) and Dennis et
al. (1999) on task and time structuring in an electronic brainstorming environment. An
information systems analysis and design problem was selected and presented to two homogenous
groups of post-graduate information systems students for brainstorming, using Team Expert
Choice, a multi-criteria group support environment.
5.1.1. The Design of the Experiment
The first treatment group was presented the problem as a single. all-encompassing problem. The
second treatment group was given the same problem in two distinct categories. In addition. the
second group was given fixed and shorter time slots to solve each category of the problem. It was
hypothesized that the second group would produce a larger quantity and a better quality of ideas
measured using three separate measures. The latter group was expected to be able to focus more
definitively on the problem at hand and to perceive the time constraints inducing its members to
work more efficiently.
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5.1.2. Hypothesis Formulation
There are three factors that affect interacting brainstorming groups: cognitive factors, social
factors and time effects. The theoretical research about the three factors suggest that presenting a
group with a single intact problem should produce fewer ideas than presenting a group with a
series of questions, with each question focusing on one sub-category of the total problem (Dennis
et aI., 1996; Dennis et aI., 1998). In the first instance, cognitive factors are believed to encourage
individuals to focus only on a few sub-categories of the problem, thereby overlooking other
factors. Secondly, social factors within the group are believed to encourage group members to
work on the same area of the problem rather than exploring the problem from multiple angles all
at the same time. The effects of time structuring are not tested in this research. The idea behind
time structuring is, when presented with a series of shorter time intervals as opposed to one single
large time interval individuals may perceive the time constraints. The perception of time
constraints may cause the group to work faster. However, neither Dennis et al (1996) nor Dennis
et al (1999) confirm time effects. Testing for time effects was considered beyond the scope of this
research largely hecause of the inherent complexity of testing for time effects as distinct from
task structuring effects. This requires the performance of many iterations which i's beyond the
scope of this thesis. The exclusion or testing for time effects is also justified by the fact that
()ennis et al. (1999) conclude that the contribution to performance lies in task structure and not
time structure. "Merely separating the ideas into the topic pools is sufficient to induce
partici pants to allocate thei I' effort more evenly; placi ng add itional ti mc rcstrictions does not
improve performance" Dennis et al (1998:6).
Finally, it is postulated that the decomposed task formulation should also result in a higher
quality of ideas. Previous research has consistently found the number of ideas as a reliablc
predictor of the overall quality of ideas (Nunamaker et aI., 1999).
Stated formally, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1: The decomposed task formulation will stimulate groups to
produce more unique ideas titan tlte intact task formulation.
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Hypothesis 2: The decomposed task formulation will stimulate groups to
produce ideas ofhigher quality than the intact task formulation.
5.1.3.' Subjects: Profile
The subjects were from the Computer Science and Information Systems Honours class at the
University of Natal Pietermaritzburg. Their participation in the experiments formed a part of the
requirements of the Decision Support Systems course module. The group was familiar with
Systems Analysis and Design issues and methodologies, to the level taught during the
undergraduate years and their current year of study. Nonetheless, in order to simplify the
requirements of the task for its intended audience, the task-handout given in Appendix A
contained leading information on the structure of the business environment, thus requiring no
remembered knowledge from the participants (Haines and Amabile, 1988). Finally, all
participants were familiar with the Team Expert Choice environment, having used it for problem
structuring purposes in the same course.
5.1.4. The Group
The flexibility offered by Team Expert Choice allowed for an optimised configuration of the
process. ;\ combination of levels of interaction was practiced consistently throughollt the
experi rnent. Ouri ng the fi rst hal f of each session the groups electronically operated like nom inal
groups, where no verbal comlllunication was allowed. In the second hal r of each session. they
operated as fully interacting groups allowing for both electronic and verbal interaction. The latter
was however not mandatory. This condition was applied consistently to both treatment groups.
This is important to the objectives of this research in supporting the move away from comparing
nominal groups to interacting groups. The results of such previous comparisons have been
consistently reported, as discussed in chapter three.
The group was divided into two sub-groups of six members each. The division was random; it
was based on the availability of the participants at the designated times. Dennis et al (1996) use
group sizes of eight and nine members, and most small group research in GSS has experimented
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with group sizes of between four and nine. For this reason, the group size in this study was
considered comparable to the study of Oennis et al. (1996) and similar research.
It can b~ argued that the groups thus formed are biased as they are drawn from a small section of
the student population, studying towards an Honour's degree in Information Systems or
Computer Science. Achieving representativity of the group is· not an easy task, given the time
constraints of this research, and the South African context, as the University of Natal is one of
two institutions that possess a aoss of this nature. The goals here are to partially emulate the
experimental work on aoss carried out by others and compare the outcomes for the purposes of
finding possible common features.
In addition, there are some likely nuisance variables in the sense that the groups were not
identically paired for gender or previous educational background in the streams of Computer
Science or Business Information Systems. However, the given task was so constructed that the
participants only required knowledge of systems design and analysis and decision support
system. Both modules are studied equivalcntly in both streams. Secondly, research into computer
science education in South Africa shows that at undergraduate and Ilunours levels, the pass rates
ror men and women are similar (Sanders, 1(92). Age was not an issue with this group as the
participants were or the same age group, without any prior work experience.
Lastly, because the sizes of' the two groups are small, one needs to use small sample tcsts based
on the I-distribution.
5.1.5. The Role of the Facilitator
The author acted as facilitator in both sessions. The facilitator's role was limited to explaining the
task, re-explaining the objective of the sessions, explaining the principles of brainstorming and
how the Team EC brainstorming environment works. She was responsible for administering the
process in terms of time keeping and ensuring the participants moved onto the next phase when
required to do so. The facilitator was not to arbitrate on idea disagreements between group
members. She merely observed the process and arbitrated on procedural issues. The facilitator
was also required to explain the questionnaire.
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5.1.6. A Description of the Technology
The experiment was run within a client-server environment running the following operating
systems: Windows NT on the server side and Windows 95 as the client using Team Expert
Choice software. The problem structure was set-up prior to the actual sessions. On arrival into the
GSS room participants were required to merely log onto the Team EC brainstorming module and
the login process called the brainstorming task onto the first screen.
The hardware environment was as follows: each group member was assigned an individual
Desktop PC, connected to the Local Area Network (LAN). The facilitator used a separate PC to
administer and manage the group process. A group screen was not physically necessary and
therefore was not used. The software manages and delivers a "group view" to each PC when
required.
Thc Tcam (CC) 's Electronic Brainstorming Module presents the user with the brainstorming
qucstion centred horizontally and vcrtically across thc scrccn with a bright, colourrul dcsktop
background whcn using thc Single Qucstion Mode. Altcrnativcly. all items arc listed on the same
scrollablc screcn.
Team CC fully supports anonymity. and the parallel entry or ideas by participants. Subjects were
explicitly made aware of these features. However. subjects also understood that the software had
the ability to privately attribute ideas. This was necessary for the analysis of the equality or
participation. for example.
Team EC also supports the generation of ideas by category. This feature was lIsed with relative
ease for the decomposed task, whereby merely switching category for the task, subjects could
enter their ideas related to the next sub-category and these would be logged separately.
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5.1.7. The Task.
The experimental task was extracted from a Systems Analysis and Design text case study (0'
Brien, 1992). With respect to the design of creativity experimentation tasks, Haines and Amabile
(1988) 'suggest, that to decrease the potential for response bias, tasks requiring no specific
knowledge or training should be used, ones where common knowledge would suffice for solution
formation. Given the subject's knowledge of systems analysis and design issues no additional
training of the participants would be required.
The subjects were asked to design a system that would support the business imperatives facing a
virtual company, Fields Cookies. Fields Cookies is described as a medium sized chain of biscuit
stores, which employs managers whose commitment levels are high on customer service issues
and necessarily low on business, financial and administration issues. They therefore require
compliance measures to support the financial and administrative aspects. The system analysis and
design imperative is to optimise the balance between the compliance-commitment dichotomy of
its store managers abilities given specified objectives and constraints. More details can be found
in the experimental Task Handout in Appendix A.
III this experi ment. the first trcatment group was presented wi th a si Ilgle. intact problem. The
subjects were required to consider the I~lcts about the business and identi fy the requisite support
features 0 f system. The brainstorm ing task was del iberatdy set out so that the functional
components 0 ra busi ness entity were outl ined expl ici tly. This was anticipated to si mpl ify the task
for all subjects, see Appendix A.
The all-encompassing, intact question was phrased as follows:
"What characteristics and components should the Fields Cookies business
,\)lstem have to support and enhance managers' conlfnilmenl to cllstomer
service,' plus support and enforce compliance to sound business practices
in the administrative-financial aspects afrunning the business?"
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The intact question and the decomposed questions were designed to be consistent in terms of
style and scope. So that the decomposition was constructed into two sub-categories, as shown
hereunder:
i. "What characteristics and components should the Fields Cookies
business system have to support and enhance managers' commitment to
customer service?"
ii. "What characteristics and components should the Fields Cookies
business system have to support and enforce compliance to sound
business practices in the administrative-financial aspects ofrunning the
business? "
The task was explained to the groups before they were required to embark on solution generation.
5.1.8. Treatment
Both treatment groups were given fifteen introductory minutes to understand the task and to
clariry any issues or questions with thc f:1cilitator rcgarding what the task entailed and what was
expected or the group.
The first treatmcnt group worked on thc intact (singlc-question) problem and was glvcn 40
III inutes to gcnerate idca sol utions usi ng Tcam Expcrt Choicc. The forty-m inute session was spl it
into two sub-sessions. In thc first 20 minutcs, the mcmbers of group were instructed to
anonymously entcr their ideas into the system without any vcrbal communication and without
posting their idcas to the central database rcpresenting group memory. During this period, verbal
communication was limited to clarifying individuals' undcrstanding or the task, where this was
still required. At this initial stage, no single group member was aware or what the other group
members' idea solutions were. All individual idea solutions were saved onto the individual client
PC's.
Once the first 20 minutes had lapsed, group members were then requested to post their individual
ideas to the central database to be immediately viewable by all. Members could then discuss the
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contributions of other members and enter more ideas arising from the discussion and or the group
database. At this stage, subjects post their entries immediately upon entering them. This part of
the session also lasted 20 minutes.
The second treatment group worked on the decomposed (multiple-question) problem. This
treatment group was given 20 minutes to fully explore each question. Each 20-minute session
was divided into two sub-sessions of ten minutes each. The participants were instructed to
silently brainstorm for the first 10 minutes of the session (on just the one question).
Similarly, once the first ten minutes had lapsed, members posted their ideas to the group database
and the session was opened for participants to view or add to other group members' contributions
on that single question. The interactive session lasted ten minutes for the sub-category question,
making up the total required twenty minutes to tackle the first sub-category question. The second
sub-category question was then introduced to the group and treated in exactly the same way as
the first onc. Note that while the group was brainstorming on the second sub-category, they were
not allowed to nor could they revert to the first sub-category question.
5.1.9. Measures of Performance
Two dependent variables were observed in this experiment - the numher or unique ideas and
their quality. The first variable is self-explanatory while the second can be defined in terms or
their relevance to problem racing fields Cookies. A final transcript or the ideas generated rrom
both treatment groups was collated and given to an expert judge ', who was bl ind to the treatment
of the groups. He had first eliminated all redundant ideas within each treatment group's solution-
space. He also grouped the generated ideas by category i.e. commitment vs. compliance support.
The following was used to identify the categories:
Category code Task sub-category
2 = Commitment Support
4 = Compliance Support
1 The expert judge was selected because he instructs the subjects the Systems Analysis and Design and DSS Courses
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Finally, the judge was asked to apply the following measures of performance similar to (Dennis
et aI., 1996).
./ The total number of unique ideas
./ The total number of good ideas
./ The total number of good ideas by category
./ Total Quality.
./ Mean Quality
o For each unique idea generated, the following scale is applied to rate its quality.
Quality Meaning
Rating:




5 = Very Good
o For the second dependent variahle. quality, three measures of quality were used:
./ Total j2uality, which according to Dermis et al (1996) has proven to be the
most reliable measure across most studics. Total quality is the summation of
all quality scorcs for each uniquc idca gcncrated by a group. This mcasurc
rcwards groups for all ideas generatcd including very poor ones.
./ Mean Quality, which according to Dennis et al (1996) has been most
unreliable across studies. This measures the average quality of ideas generated
by a group. It is the total quality score divided by the number of ideas. This
measurement is biased towards groups that generate high quality ideas and
against groups that generate poor quality ideas. So for instance a group that
generates one high quality idea (score = 5) would have a mean score of 5.
Whereas a group that generated 3 high quality ideas (score = 5) and 3 neutral
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ideas (score = 3) would have a mean score of 4, less than the group that
generated just a single idea.
./ The, Number of Good Ideas, that is ideas scoring at three or above on the
defined five point scale. This measure tries to strike a balance between the
total quality and mean quality measures (Dennis et aI., 1996). This measure
re\vards groups for all ideas generated, except those ideas that are poor or very
poor. This measure had an intuitive or common sense appeal to this author.
Finally, a post-session questionnaire given In Appendix 8 was conducted to measure the
participants' perception of the time-pressure with respect to the task and the available time. The
questionnaire also assesses the subjects' perceptions of the effectiveness of the process and
satisfaction with the process. In the second case no hypotheses are made with regard to these
variables, for that is beyond the scope of this research. However, general reflections will be made
partially guided by the future challenges of GSS research as discussed in chapters three and four.
It is hoped that the recording or these variables may serve as a basis to ask more questions about
this type of research. In addition, Dcnnis et al. (1996) measure member satisfaction and perceived
elTectiveness, and Dennis et 411. (1999) also measure satisfaction in a post-session questionnaire
wi thout provid ing a detai led .i usti Iicatioll,
5.1.9.1. Post-Session Questionnaire Measures
In the post-session questionnaire outcome and process variables were measured.
o The Effectiveness of the Process. Two components, the quality of the session process and
the quality of the outcome are measured. The quality of the process includes a measure of the
equality of participation through log files, the questionnaire and facilitator observations. In
addition memher sali.~faction, production blocking, evaluation apprehension and the e.lli:cts un
individual cognition are included in the questionnaire for the purposes of comparison of this
study with the studies of Dennis et al (1996) and Dennis et al. (1999).
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No differences are expected with respect to member satisfaction in the process, process
effectiveness as reflected by equality of participation, production blocking, and evaluation
apprehension. Both groups used equivalent features of Team EC; the GSS environment was equal
in all but the presentation structure of the problem task. In addition, Dennis et al. (1996) do not
report any differences in the post-session questionnaire measures (of effectiveness and
satisfaction) for both experiments.
5.1.10. Analysis and Results of the Idea Generation Experiment
Upon analysis of the results by category it became apparent to the expert judge that some of the
proposed ideas although not invalid to the solution did not apply strictly to the two pre-defined
categories. There appeared to be a "both" category, whose application was holistic and system-
wide. This did not strike as an aberration to the results. It has been suggested in the literature that
one risk of structuring is that "the structure may not completely cover the problem space"
(Dennis et aI., 1999:6). In this research, the phrase "solution space" is preferred to "problem
space". The reason for this is while the scope of the problem was clearly delimited with relatively
fixed constraints, the provision of a good creative solution, an "imaginatively gifted
recombination of known elements into something new" is not limited (Hwang, 1998).
Thc cxperimcnt rcsults are shown in Tahlc 5.\ helow.
Tahle 5.1 Results comparin~actual results data from the two treatment groups
Intact Task Treatmcnt Dccomposed Tnsl, Differcnce
Treatment
Numbcr IX, Number 0;1, 0;1,
Total Number of unique ideas 32 52 38.5%
Total Quality (index) 124 184 32.6%
Mean Quality 3.88 3.54 -9.6%
Number of good ideas 27 84.3 45 86.5 40.0%
Table 5.1 shows that the treatment group brainstorming on the decomposed task generated more
unique ideas. This group generated 38.50/0 (i.e. 20/52) more unique ideas than the single-question
treatment group. They also generated 400/0 (i.e. 18/45) more good ideas and 32.60/0 (i.e. 60/184)
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more ideas of higher total quality than the single-question treatment group. These results compare
favourably with the results of Dennis et al. (1996) and Dennis et al. (1999).
5.1.10.1. Effect on the Number of Unique Ideas Generated
Although, the multi-task group generated 38.5% more unique ideas than the single task-group,
the question whether the results are due to the decomposition of the task or merely because of
chance must be addressed. This is done by way of the t-test for two independent samples with
equal variances (Pollard, 1977).
This test is robust for moderate departures from the assumption that the populations are normal. It
is also robust for the moderate departures from the equality of variance assumption, when the
sizes of the samples are equal (Pollard, 1977: 160).
The assumption of equal variances needs a little discussion. In most applications, this assumption
is satisfied (Alder and Roessler, 1977: 178; Pollard, 1977). Thus, the assumption is not a severe
restriction. However, when questioning the validity of the assumption that two given samples are
drawn from two populations of identical variances or standard deviations, one can use a test for
the homogeneity of two variables (Alder and Roessler, 1977:314; Pollard, 1977). (See Appendix
C where it is shown that the differences in the variances of the two sets of data used for testing
the Hypothesis below. arc not signi licant)
Hypothesis 1: Tlte decomposed task formulatio1l will stimulate groups to produce more
u1Iique ideas tlta1l tlte intact task formulatio1l.
By Let X denote the single-task treatment sample and Y the multiple-task treatment. The
assumption for their respective populations are that X and Y are two normally and independently
distributed populations having the means mx and my respectively. The procedure for statistical
verification of the hypothesis will be applied (Pollard, 1977: 133-134). We inquire if the mean
number of unique ideas in the multiple-question treatment (Y) is significantly higher than the
mean from the single-question treatment (X). This corresponds to the alternative hypothesis, HI
in the formulation below.
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Thus, we define
Hi: mx < my
(where mxand my define the means of the X and Y data sets respectively -see Table 5.2)
The null hypothesis will be tested using the t-test for two independent samples. Since it is a test
for inequality of the two means, the critical region is less than the lower 5 percent point of the t-
distribution with (nl+nr2) degrees of freedom (Pollard, 19977: 160). It is extracted from the
statistical Student's table that for the t-distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to 10, the
critical value of t at the 5% level of significance is equal to -1.812 (Pollard, 19977).
Table 5.2 Analysis of the test statistic on the number of unique ideas generated1•
v X-X (X-X)2 Y-V (V-V)2
Member 1 5 9 -0.333 0.111 0.333 0.1111
Member 2 7 7 1.667 2.778 -1.667 2.7778
Member 3 11 7 5.667 32.111 -1.667 2.7778
Member 4 3 7 -2.333 5.444 -1.667 2.7778
Member 5 2 13 -3.333 11.111 4.333 18.7778
Member 6 4 9 -1.333 1.778 0.333 0.1111
10
Group Total 32 52.00 0.000 53.333 0.000 27.333
Mean 5.333 8.667














(r-or v = 10, t () 05 = 1.812 (Pollard, 19977:327) where the degrees of freedom v= n,+n2-2, nl and
112 being the samples of the first and second group respectively).
The test statistic, t = [(5.333-8.667)(10)1/2] / [(1/10 +1/10)1/2 (9* 10.6667+9*5.4662)]112
t = -1.95605
2 Table 5.2 was generated using Microsoft Excel
IS I
Chapter Five: Design and Formulation o/Experiments
Since, t < terit it is significant (Pollard, 1977) and the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, we
conclude that by breaking the task into subtasks (corresponding to data set V), we can achieve a
greater number of unique ideas on average, at the 5% level of significance. This leads to the
conclusion that for the original hypothesis, Hypothesis 1: The decomposed task formulation will
stimulate groups to produce more unique ideas than the intact task formulation is accepted at the 0.05
level of significance.
5.1.10.2. Effect on the Quality of Ideas
Hypothesis 2: The decomposed task formulation will stimulate groups to produce ideas of
higher quality than the intact task formulation.
For the second dependent variable, quality, the following measures: total quality, mean quality
and the number of good ideas are analysed. For all three measures, the null hypotheses are tested
using the same statistical method as shown above. The detailed results showing the calculation
are set out in Appendix C. Underneath follows a summary.
a) For the Mean Quality of Ide~ls (see Section 5.1.9)
The mcan quality of ideas was found to be seemingly marginally higher for the single-question
treatment group at 13.88 against. 3.591 as shown in Tablc 5.1.
We defined as
Iln: lIx ~ uy
HI: UX < u y
(where uxand uy refer to the mean quality ordata sets X and y respectively)
By analogy to the prcviolls casc, tcril = -1.812. The critical region is the lower 5 percent region of
the t lo-distribution: that is less than - 1.812. The test statistic was calculated as' = 0.83005. Since
0.83005 > -1.812, we conclude that this value is not significant. Details of the calculation are
shown in Appendix C.
Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis, Ho, at the 5 percent level of significance. We can
conclude that the mean quality of data set (X) is higher than that of data set (Y). Thus, by original
hypothesis, decomposition did not result in a higher quality of ideas, as measured by the mean
quality.
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b) For Total Quality of Ideas (see Section5.1.9 )
We define the null hypothesis similarly
Ho: ux ~ uy
HI: UX < uy
Again the critical value of the t-distribution is - 1.1812.
The test statistic was calculated as t = -1.41229, therefore it is not significant. Therefore we
accept the null hypothesis, Ho, and reject the alternative hypothesis H I at the 5 percent level of
significance. It can therefore be concluded that the average quality of ideas for the multiple-
question treatment [the (Y) data set] is not higher than that of the single-question treatment group
[data set (X)]. This result is important because as mentioned earlier it is known as the most
reliable measure of quality; it rewards both good and poor ideas (Dennis, et aI., 1996).
c) For the Number of Good Ideas
Again, similarly a null hypothesis is defined as
Ho: ux ~ uy
HI: UX < uy
Again, thc critical valuc of thc t-distribution for 10 degrees of freedom is - 1.1812. The test
statistic was calculatcd as , = -1.93167, therefore it is significant. Hence, the null hypothesis, Ho
is rejectec.L and the alternati ve hypothesis I1I accepted at the 5 pcrcent level of signi licancc. It can
be concluded that using the Ilumber of good ideas as a measure, decomposition of the task
produces more good ideas than the intact task trcatment at the 5 percent level or significancc.
For two of the three defined measures, the results lead to the conclusion that. the original
hypothesis, Hypothesis 2: The deconlposed task fornlulation will stimulate groups to produce
ideas of higher quality thatl the intact task fornlulatiotl cannot be accepted at the 0.05 Icvel of
signi ficance. However, the number of good ideas increases vvith task decomposition, according to
the above results. It can be noted that our results regarding Hypothesis 2 coincides with those of
Dennis et al (1996) who found no differences in the mean quality in their experiments.
These results compare favourably to the work of Dennis et al. (1996) and Dennis et al. (1999),
with their results possibly getting more smoothing by virtue of the large number of groups whose
aggregated mean quality is reported. The interpretation of the mean quality score suggests that
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the multiple-question treatment group "did not resort to poor ideas to any greater extent than the
single-question group" (Dennis et aI., 1996).
5.1.11. The Distribution of Ideas Across Sub-Categories
The task had two defined sub-categories to the solution space, commitment and compliance. In
practice, a third sub-category emerged which addressed the problem more holistically, a both
category. This phenomenon is mentioned in Dennis et aI. (1996) and Dennis et al. (1999). In this
section, the issue and results surrounding the both sub-category are explored in more detail.
Table 5.3: Analysis of the number of ideas generated by sub-category
Intact Task Treatment Decomposed Tas Difference
Treatment
Number 0/0 Number °/0 °/0
Total Number of Uniqu 32 100 52 100 35.8°/0
Ideas by sub-category:
Commitment 2 6.3 8 15.4 75.0%
Compliance 23 71.9 13 25.0 -76.9%
Both 7 21.9 31 59.6 77.4<Yo
5.1.11.1. Interpretation of the results from the intact treatment group
Thc trcatment group dealing with the intact problem appears to have interpretcd the task to relate
predominantly to one sub-category of the problcm. 720/0 of the total number or uniquc ideas
gencrated rclated to "compliance" issucs and measures. Only 60/0 related to the "commitment"
sub-category whi le 22% could bc general ized as system features that appl ied to '"both" sub-
catcgories (see Tablc 5.3). Two factors frol11 the theoretical framework. discussed above. may
contribute to members exploring only a single linc of thought. The first is members' individual
cognitive behaviour~ the second is (group) social norms that can inhibit the contribution of ideas
that are not related to the "subject being discussed".
Dennis et al (1996) report that this treatment group should be more inclined to viewing the
problem more holistically as they are presented with a complete problem. The results in this
experiment however show the contrary as only 220/0 of the ideas could be classified as of the
Hboth" category.
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5.1.11.2. Interpretation of the results from the decomposed task treatment group
For the ~ecomposed task treatment group, it was expected that their contributions would be more
evenly spread across the two sub-categories and they would be more inclined to view the problem
in chunks missing out on a holistic solution. The analysis of the results, shows their ideas to be
biased towards the "both" category, with 60% of all unique ideas generated falling into this
category, 25% being compliance ideas and 15% being commitment ideas.
The nature of the "both" category ideas requires some elaboration. The ideas falling under the
"both" category were superior ideas to the other sub-categories. It is assumed that they show that
the problem is considered more holistically. They were idea solutions that contributed to solving
both commitment and compliance issues. A sample of a "both" category ideas is:
/I Pro1Jide a simulation of customer buying Irabits to determine tire future
stock 1l'1 1e!s, to always prOlJide what tlte cllstomer wa11ts ana wlte11./I
The system function suggested above enhances knowledge about time-related customer buying
hahi ts and needs, which in turn would improve customer service (commitment). It also
strengthens stock control measures by setting stock holdings and rc-order points (compliance).
Iknee, this idea was rated as a "both" idea.
In most cases, the ideas falling into the "both" category were of higher quality. Analysis of the
hoth sub-category idea scores for the Illultiple-question treatment shows the following: The total
quality of ideas is 115 (versus 184 for all generated ideas), a contribution of 63% to overall Total
Quality. In addition, the Mean Quality of these ideas is higher at 3.7 (versus. 3.5 for the entire
solution space for this group).
155
Chapter Five: Design and Formulation o/Experiments
5.1.11.3. Discussion and Facilitator Observations
The single-question group was hesitant to verbally interact, although members were informed
they could do so. Members were content to merely interact through the group support system.
Group inembers were happy to read each others contributions and respond by adding or more
ideas electronically. On the other hand, the multiple-question group made use of the opportunity
to verbally interact once allowed to do so. Members articulated their disagreements both verbally
and through group support system software. The verbal discussion was observed to have
specifically led to the following: initially a number of the members had trouble interpreting the
meaning of the phrase "system characteristics and components" as opposed to the actual
environment in which the system would operate. For example an idea advocating "a policy of
hiring and firing inefficient workers" was considered (verbally and electronically) irrelevant to
the task by the group so that individual members who misunderstood the task changed their ideas
to make them more relevant.
Although the single-question group also shows having had similar difliculties of understanding,
no group efrort at clari fying the problem were observed. It is unclear why the two groups were
different in this specific way. It can only be speculated that decomposition brought about clarity
and that human heings arc f~1r more at ease verhalizing what they understand without rear of peer
evaluation, than that which they arc unsure or. Further research is required in this regard, to test
for example for thc effects of decomposition on group cohesion.
The single-question group appears to have interpreted the task to be concerned primarily with the
support or enhancement of managers' compliance to the financial and administrative procedures.
Only 6.30/0 of their ideas address issues of commitment and 220/0 are more holistic in nature. The
restricted problem exploration seems to have also led to limited problem understanding.
Cognitive inertia appears to have taken over within the group even with interaction.
By contrast and surprisingly, the multl/Jle-question group generated more ideas that were of the
"both" type. It was earlier noted that with decomposition there is the danger that in restricting
ideas generated to a sub-category, the group may become self-censoring from producing ideas
that are not immediately related to the sub-category being examined (Dennis et aI., 1996).
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However, in this research decomposition appears to have instilled a better understanding of the
problem as a whole. On observation of their verbal interaction particularly, this group
deliberately sought solutions that addressed both categories, especially during the second session.
Consequently, the occurrence of holistic idea solutions is at 50% of all ideas generated during
their second session. This group produced more "both 11 idea solutions than commitment and
compliance solutions combined.
The multiple-question group appeared more concerned about the quality of their output. For
example, when brainstorming on the second sub-category, members often wanted to discuss with
each other whether a generated idea was in the right sub-category. This observation is supported
by the output ideas, no occurrence of "off target" ideas is observed for this group. That is, no
ideas were generated in the second sub-session that strictly related to the first sub-session. The
surprise however, was the intention of the group to refine their ideas making them globally
applicable to the problem, especially with respect to the second sub-session.
Finally, the sin~/e-(llIeSlion group appeared to have run out of idcas in thc last tcn minutcs of the
session judging from the f~lct that all but two members had stoppcd typing into the systcm. The
multiple-qucstion group complained about not having cnough time to complcte thc task. These
complaints were also articulated in the post-session questionnaire.
Comparing the results hetwecn thc two treatment groups in whichever way, one condition
remains consistent; the decomposed task treatment group outperforms the intact task treatment
group overall and by category. The superiority of results produced by the decomposed task
treatment is comparable with the results of Dennis et al. (1996). They found "this superiority also
appeared in all three sub-categories, suggesting that the decomposition had its intended effect"
Dennis et al. (1996:274). They also observed that the decomposed task treatment developed a
greater number of ideas for two of the three sub-categories and no differences for the third
category. Groups in the decomposed task treatment generated ideas more evenly among the three
categories (Dennis et a\., 1999).
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5.1.12. Other Post-Session Questionnaire Results and Conclusion to the Idea
Generation Task
Significant differences between the two groups for the post-session questionnaire results were not
expected. The questionnaire measures member satisfaction with the process; process
effectiveness as reflected by equality of participation; production blocking, and evaluation
apprehension and perceptions oftime constraints. The results can be found in Appendix C. Both
groups used equivalent features of Team Expert Choice. The ass environment was equal in all
but the presentation structure of the problem task.
In general on the satisfaction measures, the multiple-question group reported being marginally
more satisfied than the single-question group. Both groups observed that having to write their
thoughts down meant they had to be more careful about what they were trying to say. The effect
of the aoss on the member's cognitive phenomena is reported as positive for both groups.
Dcnnis et £11. (1996) do not report any di fTercnces in the post-session questionnaire measures
efTectiveness and satisfaction for their experiments. On perceptions of time constraints, 670Jcl of
multiple-question group report feeling Hthere was not enough time to complete the task" whereas
]]<Y., or thc singlc-qucstion group rcport the samc. Nonetheless, no conclusions can bc drawn
about timc cffects in this rcsearch.
The results or this research show the decomposition or the task in the brainstorming session Icd to
40{Yo marc unique ideas. Thcse results are consistent with the results of Dennis et al. (1999). They
observcd "decomposing an idea generating problem into sub-categories and directing the subjects
to work sequentially on each, generated some 40°1£) morc ideas than did presenting them with the
samc problcm as one question". Dennis et al (1996) show the effects of decomposition resulting
in 600/0 morc ideas for the Illultiple-task treatment than the single-task treatment.
As with the studies of Dcnnis et al (1996), the results of this research suggest that individuals
tend to explore only a few sub-categories of the solution space rather than examine a broader
range of sub-categories. An illustration of cognitive activity tending to favour the processing of
related concepts rather than unrelated concepts. The single-question treatment group in this
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research directed 72% of its effort towards compliance factors and only 21 % of their total effort
provided for holistic solutions (the "both" category). Decomposition has the effect that "forces
the subjects to focus on new and other potentially profitable sub-categories" (Dennis et aI. 1996).
The multiple-question treatment group appears to have accomplished this with a better spread of
solutions across the problem space.
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5.2. Task Two: On the Facilitation of a Group Decision Task with AHP and
Supporting Consensus Building Using Consensus Relevant Data
5.2.1. Introduction
Idea generation creates solution possibilities. However the solutions are of no use to the group if
the group cannot reach agreement on adopting them. Reaching consensus on solutions is as
important as being able to generate possible solutions for the measured effectiveness of groups.
This is why strategies around building consensus are important for group work. Task two of this
research is a consensus-building field study conducted with the Students' Representative Council
(SRC) of the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg (UNP) over a period of six months.
This study is of the participant-observer nature as discussed by Yin (1984). This author
recognizes that for that reason it provides several major challenges as well as many opportunities,
the details of which have already been discussed in the previous chapter. It presents problems of
the unsettled "dilemma" of the value of quantitative research as opposed to qualitative research in
Information Systems. It is, however beyond the scope of this research to expound on the merits
and shortcomings of each. Suffice it to say that the original goals and objectives of this research
rest mainly on reflecting a study, which focuses on. (but not exclusively), quantitative
foundations. This is not to discount or invalidate the qualitative characteristics and issues that this
study has had to confront in the pursuit of a complete study.
Secondly. it is important to note that although this part or the research focuses on the consensus-
building phase of the group exercise. in reality the entire exercise is a resource-allocation task
incorporating all aspects of group problcm solving: starting from problem identification and
definition, idca gencration, selection. evaluation and implementation. Thc focus on consensus is
justified by the fact that GSS research has paid little attention to this important aspect of group
work.
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The goals and sub-goals of this part of the research
The goal of this study formulated in preparation for the field study is to facilitate and support the
resource-allocation, decision problem faced by the UNP's SRC using a formalized multi-criteria
decisio~ approach, the Analytic Hierarchy Process, as it were using GSS software. This includes
the following sub-goals:
a) To systematically go through the decision phases of Intelligence, Choice, Evaluation and
Implementation (Simon, 1957), by identifying the goal of the decision makers, generating the
criteria and sub-criteria upon which the alternatives would be evaluated, structuring the goal,
criteria, intensities and alternatives into a problem hierarchy using the AHP. Finally, to rank the
criteria, intensities and alternatives to allocate the resources to the alternatives on the basis of the
standards established during the evaluation process.
b) To conduct the intelligence phase unsupported, and to use Team EC In the choice and
cval uation phases.
c) To evaluate through the gathering of field data the use of consensus relevant information as
defincd by Ngwcnyama, et al. (1996); Bryson (1996) and Bryson and Mobolurin (1995) as a tool
for f~lcilitating conscnsus building during the decision making process. The consensus relcvant
information would be used in the evaluation of the criteria and intensities, which form the basis
upon which the alternatives will be evaluated.
d) To conduct the study with the objective of providing a usable solution. More specifically, to
endeavour at all times to ensure that the decision makers are not alienated from the process by the
tools and techniques used to support the decision making. To this end, no time and effort would
be spared explaining the tools, techniques and the underlying concepts to the decision makers.
The evaluation and selection phase would not begin until all decision makers understood and
accepted the proposed methods, tools and techniques.
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The above objectives together with the setting of the study inevitably imply that the study
contains both quantitative and qualitative research aspects. As a result, documentation of the
study contains both positivist and interpretivist approaches.
The successful completion of this study would contribute some experiential evidence of the
application of multi-criteria decision methods using multi-criteria grol,lpsupport software and
support strategies in a "live" decision making environment. This is in order to propose that these
methods are not restricted merely to theoretical expositions, descriptions and discussions but can
be successfully applied to practical decision situations, such as the one facing the SRC.
On some background on the SRC and its decision objectives
The Students Representative Council is a parent body of all other recognized student
organizations, clubs, societies and faculty councils at UNP. These will be referred to as SRC sub-
structures. On an annual basis, the University Administration allocates a grant to the SRC with
the objectivc that thc SRC, through its structures and processes, identify and allocate portions of
the SRC Grant to registered sub-structures.
Any student is rrce to rorm an association or organization or any kind. Ilowever, in ordcr to get
university (SRC) funding for such an association, one has to demonstrate three basic f~lctS. These
arc, firstly the association has a definite purpose as expressed in the association's constitution. In
theory, the requirement is that the association is of benefit to some members or the student body.
Secondly, the association must have duly elected officials who are accountable for the
association's activities. Thirdly, the association must have a demonstrated membership of at least
two persons in the initial stages. As a result, there are several different types of organizations,
ranging from political, to religious, to purely entertainment-based associations, registered with
the SRC.
The SRC has recently come under pressure from both the University Administration and the
student body because the basis upon which the SRC allocates funds to its sub-structures is at best,
unclear and at worst, arbitrary. The SRC now seeks to specify definitive criteria for the allocation
of its funds. The SRC also seeks to document the allocation criteria and make them available to
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all interested parties. The ability to justify and defend its ultimate allocation decisions is a related
requirement. In the history of the SRC these deCisions have never been systematic; hence, the
SRC was unclear on how to go about duly performing this task.
It is important to note that the SRC is a democratic institution. It strives for full consensus in the
decisions it makes, although this is not always possible. Prolonged debates or discussions leading
to decisions are characteristic of this organization. The current SRC president describes these as
"prolonged acrimonious discussions" (SRC President, 1998/99). This is not surprising because
the SRC is a diverse group of individuals with different political affiliations. The imperative to
solve the problem in a sound manner is induced by the fact that the University Administration has
declared that the SRC Grant will not be released prior to the SRC formulating clear budgetary
allocations for its administrative expenses and sub-structure allocations. This study however will
report on the allocation to sub-structures, because of the perceived contentiousness of this part of
the problem by the decision makers.
This author was approached to facilitate the process with the SRC. This presented itself as a
suitablc opportunity to conduct a longitudinal lield study with real stakcholders.
Techniques employed in this part of the research
In pursuit or the goals and objectives or this rescarch task, several techniqucs arc applied. They
relate to the application or thc principles or f~lcilitation discussed in the previous chapter to
problem structuring using the Analytic Hierarchy Process and reaching consensus by identifying
the avenues and opportunities for consensus building (using consensus relevant information). The
study uses the Team Expert Choice to support the group decision making process and to serve as
a database ror group memory as \Veil as a database for the purposes of recording and
documenting the decision making process.
In the previous chapter, the phases of facilitation were defined. In this section, these phases are
documented as the foundation defining the process of facilitation for the decision task. The three
phases are: Process Planning and Design; Preparation and Setup and Process Management.
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5.2.2. Phase One: Process Planning and Design- Getting together with the SRC.
Two informal, exploratory meetings were held with the SRC Executive- to establish inter alia:
what th~ problem task as perceived by the SRC was; the perceived needs of the task, what would
constitute resolution of the problem, timing, required resources, available resources, and the
number of players involved. During this phase the facilitator set out to clarify what SRC
expectations were. These meetings were typically defined by: the SRC providing information on
what was expected of it by its various stakeholders and the facilitator mainly listening and taking
notes. The facilitator was restricted to merely asking questions of clarity. This phase was
important for building rapport, relationships and trust between the facilitator and the SRC. The
value of this cannot be over-stated, in view of sub-goal (d).
During these meetings two issues became apparent. Firstly, the desire to provide a respectable
solution was strong. The SRC expressed a strong desire to distance itself from the perceptions of
financial corruption. Its expectations meant the final solution had to be "transparent to our
constituency" (Zondi, 1998). However, the group had almost no idea of how to solve the
problem. Some or their recorded reelings on the issue were:
"Wc don 'I kilo\\' hOIl' l1Iany ,\'tIh-slr/lcl/lres arc going hc Ihcf'(' Ihis year, holl' can Ihe Uni\'crsily cX/Jecl /IS 10
kno\\' hO\l' m/lch \I'C orc going allocale 10 Ihel1l. "
",)'OI1lC moy 1I0t C\'(,II exisl an.l'l1Io,.c? "(5;/wngasc, 1C)c.N,')
"I am s/lre Ihis isj/lsl a /J!o)' nollo give /IS Ihe granl, Ihis year"
The lack of structured thought regarding the task stood out as the main issue to tackle for the
facilitator. The next immediate step was getting the group to identify and formulate the problem
and the desi red state objectively.
Defining the Process, Ground Rules and Participator Roles
Stage Onc: Defining the role of SRC Executive, the facilitator and the rest
During this stage it was agreed that the SRC Executive would present the problem to the
facilitator, "seek a way forward, from the facilitator," and evaluate any proposals. If satisfied
with the facilitator's proposals, the Executive would convene a full SRC meeting and present the
·The SRC Executive comprises the President, the Deputy President, the Secretary General and the Treasurer of the organization.
164
Chapter Five: Design and Formulation ofExperiments
proposals to the rest of the SRC. Should the group endorse the approach, the facilitator would be
invited to continue the process with the entire group.
The first formal meeting was a structured verbal, face-to-face discussion attended by the SRC
Executive. The purpose of this meeting was for the facilitator to propose a method(s) for
approaching the problem having understood the issues around the task. From a facilitation point
of view, two objectives were to be accomplished:
• Getting the SRC Executive to view their problem from a different angle, away from the
evaluation of alternative sub-structures, to the definition of the problem; this required problem
exploration. The facilitator had prepared questions to pose to the group to induce problem
exploration.
• Secondly, the facilitator had to introduce the Analytic Hierarchy Process as an approach in a
simple, context-related manner, to ensure that the subjects did not lose ownership of the solution
and its derivation. In other words, the 1\11i> was not to dictate or prescribe a solution and neither
was the software nor the f:1cilitator.
Stagc Two: thc prohlcm formulation and identification process for the desired outcomes
This phase had two distinct sessions. The first session was dedicated to "asking the right
qucstions" in order to induce the group to arrivc at a definition or the problcm. The qucstions
were poscd informally in a manncr familiar to thc group. Somc or thc questions asked arc
documented in order to illustrate the raci Iitation process and thc feasi bi Iity of breaking down a
problcm into a hierarchy in a uscr-friendly way. Some questions that werc asked of the group
were:
What is /he end reslI// (i.e. GOllI) a/whot yOIl are supposed /0 be doing?
Who/lI/tima/ely do you have /0 do? Is there anything else?
From thc above interaction the group initially settled on: "To allocate funds to the various sub-
structures" as its definition of the goal. Through further probing and discussion it was apparent
that this definition was incomplete because of the budgetary constraints that are beyond the
SCR's control. The goal was the re-defined to: "To allocate funds to the various sub-structures,
given a limited budget (R60, 000)"
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The next challenge was to allay the group's persistent concerns about not knowing who the sub-
structures seeking their funds were. This concern alone posed the single most difficult obstacle to
getting the group to think differently about the nature of problem. A considerable amount of time
was spent illustrating that this was least important. The important question to answer was "Why
do you want to give sub-structures hard-earned taxpayers' money?" When the answer eventually
came out as "because they have some contribution to make to campus life", the perception of the
problem became more systematic. The group was able to discuss more specifically what the
nature of contribution could possibly be and therefore the nature or general characteristics of the
different sub-structures. Key to the progress of the session was steering the subjects away from
thinking about "how much money would be given to any particular sub-structure". This is
something the participants consistently wanted to do. This point is important because the answer
to this question was the ultimate solution to the problem; something that the group was still a
long way from being able to do. It illustrates the tendency of groups and individuals to frequently
circumvent the problem-solving process thus affecting the final output and the ability to
implement the solution.
The following were provisionally agreed as being the things the SRC would want to know about
any suh-structure applying for funds: In other words these arc the base criteria for evaluating any
sub-structure.
Thc Sub-Structurc's Stated Constitution/Objcctivc: i.e. its contribution to campus life.
The Sub-Structure's Current or Estimated Membership Size.
The Total Amount Requcsted for the Current Budgct.
The Total Amount Awarded in the Previous Year's Budget.
The History of Expenditure Management, with specific rcfcrence to the previous year.
Perceptions about the said sub-structure(s).
History of Income (Membership Fees and Sponsorships).
The intensities were elicited in a similar manner. Participants generally relied on their knowledge
of existing sub-structures to generate the intensities. This concluded the first session of this
phase.
166
Chapter Five: Design and Formulation o/Experiments
The second sessIOn with the SRC entailed the introduction and explanation of the Analytic
Hierarchy Process to the group using the problem definition generated by the participants in the
first session. With this, the problem was hierarchically structured into goal-criteria-intensities-
alternatives. Although, the alternatives could not be specifically enumerated at this stage, the
AHP approach could be easily mapped to the problem as defined during the first session. This is
the significance of the first session; without the systematic facilitation of the first session the
application of the AHP to the problem in a manner easily understandable to the participants
would have been very difficult. This would have violated one of main sub-goals of this research
Le. ensuring that the decision makers are not alienated from the process by the tools and
techniques used to support the decision making.
Stage Three - Expanding the involvement of SRC Stakeholders
Thus far the process had by design included a small portion of the decision makers within the
SRC, the executive. The time was right to involve the entire SRC because the process to be
followed had become clear. Two meetings were held without the facilitator being present. In the
first meeting the executive reflected on the process and on whether they were satisfied with it. In
the second meeting. they convened the entire group, explained the adopted approach and
cOllllllunicated their reflections on the process. The purpose of ooth meetings was for the SRC to
decide on whether to continue with this process. They decided to continue. Secondly. the entire
group decided to change the proposed hierarchy slightly.
The signi ficance of the absence of the facilitator at these meetings relates to sub-goal (d) in
ensuring that the ownership of the problem and process remain with the decision makers. The
confidence of the executive to explain the approach to the rest of the group was a positive signal
in this regard.
Stage Four - Data gathering -getting to know the alternatives
With the problem hierarchy agreed, with respect to the goal-criteria-intensities, it was time to
understand the alternatives, the individual sub-structures. A new request for funds (RFF)
application form was drawn up to capture the required data. The application form would provide
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sufficient information to evaluate the sub-structures with respect to the defined criteria. The
questions asked of the applicants included the following for example: what is your constitutional
objective; how many members does your organization have; How much was allocated to your
organization last year; Give a clear account of how that money was spent; How much did you
raise by way of membership fees and sponsorships. The new application form was important in
that it represented the first tangible output of the process after weeks of meetings. There was
observed satisfaction with this achievement.
However, from an AHP point of view the hierarchy was incomplete. The relative importance of
each criterion or intensity with respect to the goal had not been ascertained. Several meetings
were held to explain how the AHP concept of pairwise comparisons, its nine-point scale,
inconsistency and absolute ratings work. This was the first time the group was being introduced
to the details of the approach. The significance of this is that the group was not frightened off by
unnecessary technical detail in the initial stages. At this stage the group had "bought into" the
method and had demonstrated satisfaction with it.
5.2.3. Phase Two: Preparation and Set-up using Team EC
To capture the pairwise judgments or the individual mcmbcrs. the problem hierarchy was set up
within thc Tcam EC environmcnt assuming equal importancc of mcmbers. ;\ people database
was set up so that cach individual was allocated his or her own Hmodel". Each individual would
entcr his or hcr own judgmcnts about the criteria and intcnsitics separately. ;\ synthesis or these
would then be performed to arrive at a group score.
For this study, the following Team EC hardware was used because the participants, although
computer literate expressed discomfort about working with computers.
• The Radio Frequency (RF) Receiver, which connects to the serial port of a computer.
• Eight individual wireless keypads that are used by the group members to input their
judgments. These keypads have internal identification numbers. The numbers are
programmed through the software before the group session begins
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• A single-barrel, lens-style projection system that connects to the laptop computer and
projects the proceedings onto an overhead screen.
The use of keypads to enter judgments is relatively more simple and intuitive than the use of the
mouse or keyboard. The keypads look like calculators with half as many buttons, whose size is at
least three times that of a normal calculator. The software was run on questionnaire mode in
order to capture the decision makers' preferences.
5.2.4. Phase Three: Process Management
Facilitation theory guides the facilitator to engage in managing the group process and promoting
effective task behaviour; to skilfully and unobtrusively steer the group towards the desired
outcomes, through being able to identify and understand the positions of the participants. The
facilitator must also be able to identify opportunities for dialogue in pursuit of being able to move
the participants towards consensus and commitment (Ngwenyama et aI., 1996). This requires a
high level of skill (Hoffman and Maicr, 1959), using appropriate methods, techniques, and
software tools (Jarke et aI., 1987). This phase includes preference elicitation: the ranking of
alternatives and providing comparison data: thc definition of thresholds of agrcement i.c. dcfining
the stopping rules that will detcrmine when conscnsus has been reached. Data analysis and
reporting: identifying sub-groups, key individuals and or problcmatic options during the process
is included during this phase.
5.2.4.1. The use of pairwise comparisons to evaluate the criteria and intensities
Team EC produces eight di fferent "models", one for each participant and records or tracks each
individual's judgments separately. It also generates a group model. During the judgment
elicitation session, members were given instructions regarding the capturing of their judgments
into Team EC. They were instructed not to worry about the inconsistencies of their judgments.
Where necessary the judgments would be revisited and changed. This is, notwithstanding the fact
that the facilitator had explained the concept of inconsistency at length. Again, it was important
not to confound the group decision making process with the technicalities associated with the
Analytic Hierarchy Process or the software support. Although the consistency of judgments is
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recommended within the Analytic Hierarchy Process, it is by no means a requirement (Saaty and
Foreman, 1996).
The SRC elected to run the evaluation session in anonymous mode with judgments entered
sequentially until the last pairwise comparison in the hierarchy is made. The session was then
reconvened to give members a break, and the facilitator time to analyse the results using the
consensus relevant indicators.
5.2.4.2. Using Consensus Relevant Data
In order to facilitate the building of consensus use was made of the agreement and disagreement
quotients as described by Ngwenyama et al (1996) and Bryson (1996, 1997). These were used in
conjunction with the data generated by Team EC. The analysis of consensus relevant data is
restricted to the prioritisation of the criteria. No consensus measure is required for the rating of
the alternatives, because the alternatives are evaluated using the criteria and intensities as the
standards of measure. Team EC derives the priorities from the simple pairwise comparisons,
which are synthesized to obtain overall priorities for the intensities at the bottom or the tree. The
result shows the ranking of the intensities, and provides a meaningful ratio scale measure or the
di fTercnccs betwccn thc intcnsitics. Thc cvaluations or thc individual membcrs arc comoincd
using thc geomctric mean to dcrivc a group prefercncc vector.
Ancr thc .i udgmcnts ror cach node are entercd with rcspcct to the goal, Team EC calculatcs the
derived priorities with respect to the parent node. The method of evaluating consensus relevant
data was used once thc priorities or vector preferences wcre calculated through Expert Choice.
The results were givcn back to the group members. In practice the data given to the group
members was in mainly graphical form, which proved quicker to understand and interpret.
In general, the SRC functions on the basis of full consensus. However, the SRC President has
rormal authority to elect to call for a poll of votes. Where this is the case, sufficient majority is
deemed a 2/3 majority. In this research the facilitator was requested to assume a 2/3 majority as
the requisite level of consensus. For ease of reference the consensus indicators are briefly re-
stated in this section:
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The Similarity Function which calculates the level of agreement between consecutive pairs of
preference vectors is calculated as follows: S(wt, w) = I - sin(wt, w). It is used to identify strong
agreement between any pair of members (t, r) for any criteria (aj), where a = 0.25, so that for any
S(wt, w) ~ U, relatively strong agreement is said to exist between those members.
The Group Strong Agreement Quotient (GSAQ) identifies the percentage of pairs of group
members \vho have a reasonably strong level of agreement. This stems from the idea that
consensus develops from pairs of group members who are engaged in a dyadic discourse.
Consequently, the objective is to measure the agreement in the opinions between each pair of
group members. The GSAQ is an indicator of strong agreement in a dyadic discourse
(Ngwenyama, et aI., 1996). The Group Strong Disagreement Quotient (GSDQ) is an equivalent
and alternate indicator.
The Individual Strong Agreement Quotient (ISAQ) of an individual is a measure of the
agreement of that individual's preference rankings with each of the other group members. It is
used as an identi fier of individuals who share a fair level or agreement with other group members
who in addition do not have any "'apparent insurmountable harriers" as identified by their
Ind ividual 5 trong Disagreement Ind icator (I SDI) value (Ngwenyama. et al 1996. Bryson. 19<)6).
The ISAQ and the Individual Strong Disagreement Quotient (15DQ) mirror each other
(Ngwcnyama et al.. 19(6).
The Group Strong Disagreclncnt Indicator (GSDI) value, on the other hand, provides an
estimate of the breadth of opinions in the group.
In this study a and p, were set at the following levels:
a = 0.25 -+ strong agrcement threshold (i.e. sufficicnt consensus)
p= 0.17 -+ strong disagreement threshold.
The justification for the above is in the fact that these correspond roughly to the sine of 15° and
10° degrees respectively, which are the values used by Ngwenyama et al (1996) and Bryson
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(1996; 1997). The GSAQ and ISAQ were set at 0.667, which reflects the required two-thirds
majority in the first instance and a 67% strength of agreement between any pair of members. The
latter measure is guide to indicating the strength of agreement between any two members; in
theory it could have been set at 51 % for example, it's significance becomes apparent when sets of
measures between different pairs of members have been taken. Those pairs that exhibit relatively
higher ISAQ act as sources of opening and pursuing dialogue towards agreement.
How the consensus relevant data were used in practice
During the analysis phase of the process, group members were given both their own individual
"models" and the group "model." From these most members simply examined their own
preference ratings and compared them to the group preference mean. On the basis of any
similarity or variation, they tended to object to or support the group position. This naturally
stimulated discussion, although the facilitator directed the process. The consensus data models
were llsed in the following manner. Prior to the start of the session, the facilitator calculated and
analysed all indicators. A summary of key indications was compiled, especially in cases of strong
disagreement. This information was then used to support the consensus building during
discussion.
In gcneral. thc first conscnsus indicator assessed was thc group strong agreement quotient
(GSAQ) shown in Appendix D in the last column. Thc criteria were examined one at a time: thc
similarity functions and the individual strong agreement quotients (ISAQ) were examined
thereafter, if there was not enough group consensus as reflected by the GSAQ.
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Figure 5.1 The synthesis of the individual pairwise comparison into R group score.
It is beyond the scope of this research to demonstrate every single instance of the use of the
consenSllS indicators and the concomitant facilitation strategies therefore followed. Such a
detailed documentation is a dissertation topic in its own right. Rather, one example is selected to
illustrate which consensus indicators were used, how they were used and what the outcome of
their use was on the group position or polarity. A summary of the results for all criteria and
intensities is given in Appendix D. Further, it is not the purpose of this section to rc-define the
definitions of the consensus indicators~ this was accomplished in Chapter Four.
The important factor to note is that the consensus indicators were calculated and used by the
facilitator to identify those individuals and or sub-groups that posed as obstacles to reaching
consensus or alternatively that presented an opportunity to build group consensus around
themselves. Upon identi fication, these individuals or sub-groups were encouraged to speak and
lead discussion, in the cases where they presented opportunity for consensus building. They were
strategically softened, challenged or ignored where they posed as obstacles to reaching
consenSllS. The fact or the participants understanding in principle the existence and use of these
indicators cannot be overstated, this knowledge by the participants contributed positively to the
facilitation of the process.
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In order to illustrate by way of example, the intensity named "diversity promoting," which is an
instance of the criterion Constitutional Objective, is discussed in detail. It is necessary to put it
within the context of the entire hierarchical model showing how the synthesized group judgment
had been ranked using the geometric mean to illustrate the initial positioning, the process and the
resolution. Figure 5.2 below shows the hierarchical model. As can be seen "diversity promoting"




















































Figure 5.2 Problem lIierarchy for the SRC AllocHtion of Funds Task
Aftcr all the pairwise comparisons had bcen performed, the criteria ranked and discussed the
constitutional objective was agreed as the second most important criterion after the ability to
manage expenditure (see Appendix D).
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Figure 5.3 The synthesis of the individual pairwise comparison into a group score for the intensities of the
constitutional objective
Figure 5.3 shows that the intensity, Hdiversity promoting" was ranked as per geometric mean as
the third most important intensity with respect to the constitutional objective. However, the
rcsults and subsequcnt discussion show that the group aggrcgatcd ranking was extrcmely
controversial. The Group Strong I\grecment Quoticnt (GSI\Q) examincd first to asccrtain thc
pcrccntagc of pairs of group membcrs who have a reasonably strong levcl of agreemcnt was
equal to a lowly 13tXJ, against a rcquired 67%. Only a single mcmber's own rating (wt )
dcmonstrated a level or agreemcnt above the defined threshold when compared to the (wGM ) to
givc rise to thc GSAQ of 130/0 (The formulation of the GSAQ was discussed in detail in Chapter
Four). This membcr was thc SRC Presidcnt.
The objective is to answer the question of whether there is a member who shares strong
agrcement with an overwhelming majority? The answer to this question is not in this casc. To
answer the question, Bryson (1997) suggests, there is a specific type of individual that is of
interest: individuals whose preference vector w\ is in strong agreement with wGM (The SRC
President in this case); AND whose ISDQtp value is less than the disagreement threshold. The
latter was not the case for the President his ISDQtp value was much higher than the disagreement
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threshold. Where this is the case, these individuals are to be encouraged to express and promote
the compromise group mean position.
From a. facilitation strategy viewpoint, the information on the GSAQ was important but not
sufficient on its own. Other indicators were required to ascertain which individuals exhibited
more agreement with other individual members of the group, even though not with the group
position per se. The ISAQ provides more information in that it shows specifically those
individuals who share a fair level of agreement with other group members. Notice from Chapter
Four, the ISAQ is aggregated using the similarity functions. In this case, the level of
disagreement was so strong both the ISAQ and ISOQ merely confirmed this, given the agreement
and disagreement thresholds. Hence, a direct examination of the similarity functions is more
revealing. To recap as in Chapter Four:
"The Similarity Function allows for the comparison of the level of agreement between any pair of
preference vectors. It also allows one to answer the question: when are two members said 10 be in strong
agreement or strong disagreement. That is, the definition of interpretahle threshold values for strong
agreement (aJ and strong disagreement (fJ) can be defined, so that two individual group members can be
said to hm'e strong agreement (f thei,. Similarity Function : S(wl , w r) ~ a" where land r are the
individual memhers.
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Out or thesc idcntified mcmbers the support goal is to find thosc membcrs that are likcly agents
of consensus building. These members have to also demonstrate that they do not have any
"apparent insurmountable barriers" as identified by their ISOI valuc. An examination of their
respective ISOI for all or the above pairs did not show "insurmountable barriers" (see Appendix
D). However, in this case members 5 and 6 appear to present more opportunitl. Also noted
before the discussion, were members showing high levels of disagreement, from their ISDQ:
Members 4, 8 and 3 particularly.
3 References to members in this section is made by numbers
176
Chapter Five: Design and Formulation oj£tperiments
Discussion \-vas resumed when the facilitator had examined the above data. The strategy was to
allow everyone an initial say for two reasons. (I) To fulfil the desire to be heard for each
member.. (2) For the facilitator to verify or discard the information revealed by the consensus
indicators. The latter is important in practice, especially where high levels of disagreement exist.
It places the paired agreements or disagreements into a contextual meaning. For example, while
Members 2 and 7 may be seen to agree strongly with each other, their opinion or position may be
diametrically opposed to the other pairs of members who show relatively strong agreement.
The discussion showed that the consensus indicators were a relatively accurate reflection of the
existing controversy and the high levels of polarity. It emerged for the first time, that a member
with a hidden agenda had proposed the intensity. Whoever mooted the idea in the first place was
in the process of lobbying for a "diversity promoting" sub-structure. The group was aware of this
but the facilitator was not. The dilemma with the intensity was its intrinsic goodness or appeal as
a desirable concept for campus life. The apparent conflict of interest created by the member
caused consternation. Consequcntly, the group was dividcd into a sub-group that was completcly
"horrified" by such qucstionable ethics (Members 3 and 4 werc a vocifcrous part of this sub-
group) and another. The latter sub-group hcld firmly that the proposal was a highly desirable one
and had to be attrihuted objectively without recourse to who had suggested it and why (Members
2 and 8 formed part or this sub-group). These two sub-groups represented the polar positions
about the group.
Where did the President, Member I, stand? When airing his views it became clear to see why his
. d' d t' . S I (iM) I d I . IIII Icate unctIon (w, w s lowe t le most agreement WI t 1 the group. In practice he said
while he felt that objectively the intensity was more important than entertainment for example, he
had compromised, 1'01' ethical reasons to givc it an average rating. There were two other members
who had also compromised. Thesc were Members 6 and 5. This confirmed the similarity
functions observed earlier.
All three members could be purposefully directed to lead discussion. This was done. After some
further discussion, Member 7 was the first to decide he was persuaded to join the compromise
position, by changing his vote. Member 2 and 8 then agreed to join the compromise position in
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principle. Discussion around this issue could have carried on to sway the other two, but it was not
necessary, as the required level of consensus had been reached.
A similar approach was taken for the discussion on all criteria and intensities. The results are
summarized in Appendix D. Once all of the ratings of the criteria and intensities were finalized,
only the group "model" was changed to effect the changes and absolute ratings used to evaluate
the sub-structures that eventually submitted application forms for funds. The actual individual
amounts allocated were calculated from the ratings (see Appendix D).
The issue of "diversity promoting" is a good illustration of why the consensus indicators were
instructive in supporting the building of consensus. Pre-planning and understanding the indicators
beforehand enabled the facilitator to identify the areas of agreement or disagreement, verify these
through dialogue and embark on strategies to promote the more agreeable or compromise
solutions. The indicators were observed to be accurate most of the time, particularly because
there are several indicators offering measures. This justif1es the practical use of the model.
5.3. Discussion of Process and Results
In this section. some observations are made about the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the
consensus ind icators.
The first round of getting the group to brainstorm the possible criteria and subsequently structure
the problem hierarchy was successful. The difficulty with a field study is balancing the needs and
objectives of the decision makers under observation and the objectives of the study. for example,
the consensus stopping-rule was initially defined as a 2/3 majority; however during discussion the
group did not deem it necessary to physically re-enter their ratings in order to reach the required
level of consensus. Time considerations meant the group was satisfied with discussing apparent
disagreements with the view of arriving at consensus through principled agreements. This
obviated the need to physically alter individual ratings in most cases. The principled agreements
became actual votes for the purposes of the group so that a state of 50% agreement easily
becomes 75% agreement on the strength of discussion alone. The study is then presented with the
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dilemma of whether to go back and actually change all the ratings to effect the initially agreed
upon level of consensus or does one leave the results as is and document accordingly. This author
chose the latter option. The results are left in the way the group initially entered them and
changes.made through discussion are documented.
The general use of the consensus indicators was instructive. However, it is speculated that using
them without understanding the group dynamics could be misleading. The similarity function and
the ISAQ were used to identify members who were prime candidates around which to build
consensus and such members were appropriately encouraged to lead discussion. In so doing, they
expanded on their opinions or positions. However, in practice when the identified candidates
have a non-constructive history with the group for instance, the attempt to use them as vehicles
for building consensus can be counter-productive. In this study, for example, Member 8
illustrates the point. On many occasions he was identified as a suitable candidate around which to
build consensus through virtuc of the relationship between his rating and the group rating
S(wt,wOM ). Yet, usmg him was oftcn counter-productive, because thc group considered him
immature and playful.
On the contrary, knowing who the individuals with powcr werc was also uscful. Understanding
the dynamics and history of the group was just as important as using the conscnsus data to
support thc bu i Id ing or consensus. Ccrtain mcm bel's of the SRC com mandcd respcct ror di rferent
rcasons, be it formal authority as in case of the President~ referent powcr or expert powcr as in the
casc or Members 2, J, and 4. Thcsc individuals could provide opportunities for building
consensus, even where statistically they were not fi rst choice cand idates. Whi le the indicators
assisted particularly in the planning and anticipation of the consensus building sessions. there
appears to be no substitute for the facilitator spending a lot of time in the early stages with the
group in order to understand important group dynamics and member roles.
At the same time, there is a caveat that by spending too much time with the group the facilitator
can willingly or inadvertently become part of group or part of the solution. This author
experienced many a time being consulted formally or informally outside of the meetings on what
she thought was the better way of doing this or that. It seemed some members were prone to
losing sight of the role of the observer-facilitator. The group had to be consciously and
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persistently reminded that the facilitator was merely facilitating the process and had no role to
play beyond that.
Finally,. a post-session questionnaire was designed to test for satisfaction with the process,
effectiveness of the process, and ownership of the problem. The test for ownership of the problem
entailed testing for facilitator effects, technology effects and decision approach Le. AHP effects.
In sum, all the members felt that the process had been effective and would recommend it for
future use. In addition, all participants felt that the technology did not affect their ownership of
the solution. Similarly, everybody felt the decision approach had no effect on their solution. We
interpret this to mean that the methods applied to support the group were successful, in assisting
the group to explore the problem and build consensus, without jeopardizing the ability of the
group to work together again. However, on facilitator effects, the results were not as straight
forward. On average, on a score of 1-7, with 7 being no effect, 6.13 was awarded to facilitator
effects. (See appendix E, for the detail post-session questionnaire and results). The post-session
questionnaire also inquired for a general feeling of ownership. The overall feeling of ownership
scored an average 6.5. The average valuc for thc supportcd process' effcct on the futurc ability of
thc group to work togethcr was 7. It is obscrvcd that in this study the facilitator introduccd thc
participants to both the decision approach and technology for the first timc. The combination or
rcsul ts. between feel ings or satisf~lction and somc anxiety about thc structured faci Iitat ion
process. ind icates that further research tl1 ight bc useful in provid ing more understand ing on how
to achieve the often connicting goals or the structured f~lcilitation process toward rcaching
consenslls.
5.4. Conclusion to the field experiment
The field study had both certain research goals and a responsibility to assist the participants to
make an important decision in a systematic defendable way. The implications were articulated as
sub-goal (a) of this part of the research: undertaking the entire decision making process until a
final decision was made and amounts allocated to the more than 20 sub-structures. This was
accomplished. The use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process to structure the problem into a
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hierarchy model proved successful as the participants who had never used the AHP responded
well to its application. The responsibility to the participants meant sub-goal (d) of this part of the
research was of paramount importance. By all accounts verbal and questionnaire, feedback from
the participants indicates that sub-goal (d) was accomplished.
From a theoretical point of view, this part of the research set out to support consensus building by
applying consensus relevant information as defined by Ngwenyama, et al. (1996); Bryson (1996);
and Bryson and Mobolurin (1995). The implied use of the consensus indicators is to test whether
or not the indicators can work in practice. The significance of this study is that the application
and therefore testing of these indicators is performed within a live environment of real
stakeholders. Real stakeholders have a vested interest in the decision making process (Banville, et
ai, 1998) and building and reaching consensus is therefore not a contrived exercise. Under such
conditions, the test is a justified one. In this study, the consensus indicators were found to offer a
largely accurate interpretation of the polarity or consensus around issues. However, caution is
made that these indicators should not be used in isolation, understanding group dynamics and
member roles is essential if these indicators are to be applied efficiently.
5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter. the theoretical assumptions about the efTect of task structuring on crcativity in a
group session and about supporting consensus in a multi-criteria group support systcm wcrc
cxplored in practice. Thc results that wcre obtained in the creativity expcriment comparc
favourably to those in the recently published papers by Dcnnis et al. (1996) and Dcnnis et al.
(1999). The framework for supporting consensus by Ngwenyama et al. (1996) was originally
tested by them in a laboratory experiment. This study provided further evidence for its usefulness




The aim of this research was to investigate two important aspects of multi-criteria group decision
making: the role of task structuring on a generative task and ways of supporting consensus
building. To conduct this study within an appropriate context of the existing body of knowledge
in Multi-Criteria Group Decision Making, literature surveys of both MCDM and GDSS where
undertaken. This was done specifically to:
• Present an overview of the state of both MCDM and GDSS in a world that increasingly
requires groups of individuals to solve unstructured and semi-structured problems.
• Examine the theory and techniques in group support for creative tasks and consensus.
• Survey future research opportunities in the field of multi-criteria group decision making.
How the Goals of this research were implemented
Two practical tasks were performed. The first was a laboratory experiment exploring task
structuring in a brainstorming sessions. Two treatment groups were set up. The first group was
given thc problcm in a single qucstion. Thc sccond group was given thc same problem as a
dccomposed task, made up of multi plc qucstions. Thc objectivc was to test whether
dccomposition positively affects both quantity and quality of ideas generated. Both variablcs
quantity and quality of ideas were measured. The measurement of quantity was simply the total
Ilumber of ideas generated by the group. Quality was assessed using three measures: total quality,
mean quality and the number of good ideas. This first investigative task was a partial replication
or the work done by Dennis et al. (1996) and Dennis et al (1999). The interpretation of the results
in both studies led to similar conclusions.
The second task, a field study, investigated the effect of implementing strategies to support
consensus building in a multi-criteria group decision making environment. A group of decision
makers was required to make a fairly complex and contentious resource allocation decision.
Although, the decision makers were supported throughout the decision process from Intelligence
to Implementation (Simon, 1960), only the consensus building phase and techniques are mainly
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reported in this study. Consensus building support techniques identified by Ngwenyama et al
(1996); Bryson; 1996; Bryson, 1997 and Bryson et al. (1994) were implemented into the decision
support process and used to identify avenues, individuals, issues or sub groups that lent
themselves to consensus building and compromise positions.
Characteristics ofthe main outcome of this research
There were three main outcomes to the research, relating to the current state of multi-criteria
group decision making, the effects of task structuring in generative tasks and consensus building.
With respect to the literature survey, it is evident that multi-criteria group decision making is still
in its infancy. Some fundamental theoretical issues remain unresolved in both the fields of
MCDM and ass. In a world where the general level of complexity and the costs of making
errors have increased, the requirement for groups to solve organizational problems has also
increased. Research in MCDM needs to grow significantly if it is to support group decision
making. At the same time, ass research and technology, in the main, needs to build a strong
theoretical foundation upon which to conduct systematic studies.
The difficulty with studying group interaction is that unlike atoms and molecules, it defies neat
analysis or the scienti lie method (Ngwenyama and Lee. 1997). GSS research needs to utilize
more or other research methods, other than laboratory experimcnts that usc subjects without a
vested interest in the process or results. It appears more meta-analyses, action research, field
studies and others are required to grow the field. Consensus is starting to emerge among GSS
researchers that a judicious combination of multiple methods has the most potential, for a multi-
methodological approach provides the greatest power of understanding of the complex socio-
technical issues with which GSS deals (Zigurs, 1993).
The results on task structuring were consistent with previous similar research. In this dissertation
the decomposed task treatment group generated 400/0 more ideas than the intact task treatment
group. The results on the quality of the ideas also reflect that the multiple-question group did not
resort to poor quality ideas, the total quality, mean quality and the number of good ideas were
found to be higher and statistically significant.
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These results confirm that
((Using a GSS with task structure adds no measurable cost compared to using no task
structure, but produces a significant improvement in performance.... Task structure has
received relatively little attention compared to other factors in GSS use (e.g. anonymity). A
recent meta-analysis found GSS use without this task structuring to increase the number of
ideas produced compared to verbal brainstorming by a mean effect size of0.80 (Dennis, et al.,
1996). In our study, the effect ofsize due to task structure (compared to no structure) was 0.95.
In other words, the use of this simple task structure had about the same effect on performance
as the mean effect of using a GSS in the first place! This suggests that there may be
considerable opportunities for even greater performance improvements from GSS use through
more sophisticated applications" (Dennis et a!., 1999: 18).
Within the field study of supporting consensus building, it was observed that the use of the
consensus relevant data indicators as defined by Ngwenyama et al (1996) was fairly accurate in
identifying the issues, individuals and sub-groups about which there was polarity or agreement.
This enabled the management of the decision process in such a way as to strategically solicit
those elements in the quest for reaching a consensual decision. These indicators were also useful
in determining the intensity or polarity.
The brainstorming task has some weaknesses. The first is. because of structural time restrictions
the laboratory experiment considered only one group each for the single-question treatment and
the multiple-question treatment, whereas, Dennis et al. (1996) and Dennis et al. (1999) consider
18 groups and 40 groups respectively. However, they have signi ficantly larger teams worki ng on
these. The second weakness is the experiment is limited to an idea generation task, whereas this
could be expanded to other group tasks. However, this is justified by the fact that GSS research in
task structuring is sti 11 new. To date to this author's best knowledge Dennis et al (1996) and
Dennis et al. (1998) are the only similar studies to be conducted, and both are based on the
generation task. This research is intended to add to this new body of knowledge, however there is
scope for future research to expand task structuring to other task types. The third weakness
relates to the limitations of all laboratory experiments in general, such as the lack of a vested
interest in the task and process (McGrath, 1982; Dennis et a!., 1991), although to date no
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empirical evidence exists suggesting that laboratory studies with students produce different
conclusions than similar studies with managers (Dennis et aI., 1996). In this study, the use of a
laboratory environment was justified by the need to make comparisons that require two distinct
treatment groups. This was not practical within the field study, precisely because the vested
interest of participants required all of them to participate in the idea generation at the same time
and same place. Dividing the members into two groups for the field study would have
compromised the main objective of the study (building consensus) at the start of the process.
However in the problem-exploration phase of the study the group was directed to de-chunk the
problem.
What is the theoretical and practical contribution of this research to the field of GSS,
MCDM?
An important feature of the laboratory study is that it is the first of this type to consider an
information systems and analysis task. At the same time, there are no similar studies, to the best
of this author's knowlcdgc being conducted in South Africa. The most important practical
outcome about this study is, simi lar to Dennis et al (1996) and Dennis et al (1999), thc results
send at least one message: whcre the opportunity to decompose a problcm into sub-categories
exists managers should use that opportunity.
The field study builds on the decomposition or the problem in the problem-exploration phase as
part or the facilitation process or generating effective solutions and building group consensus
around those solutions. In addition. the field study is a contribution to the field of GSS in that it
adds to the body of knowledge on strategies to support consensus building. within a field study of
real decision makers with a vested interest in the process and the outcomes of the decision
process. This is signi ficant, when considered against the background that this body of knowledge
remains small in the field of multi-criteria group decision making.
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Possible Directions for future research.
In this research, the author decomposed the idea-generation task into two sub-categories. There
are other options regarding how far the problem is decomposed and who decomposes it. For
instance, the problem could have been decomposed into more sub-categories. There may be an
optimal point of decomposition, a point beyond which further decomposition would have
diminishing returns, or there may be a minimum number of sub-categories that should be
presented. On what basis are sub-categories selected to decompose the problem? Should there be
a method for decomposing a task or is it strictly problem context dependent? These questions
require further research. The group could have decomposed the problem with the sub-categories
nominated by the group itself. It is likely that clearer understanding of the problem by all group
members would result from this and thus more ideas could be generated per member. Further
research is also needed in this regard.
Another conclusion on this research relates to the main challenge to GSS research in general. The
need for more studies involving real stakeholders is unquestionable. However, until well-
accepted methods of documenting and reporting on studies arc developed, the real value of
conducting field studies will be lost. The report of the field study contains some exclusions. The
study contains other factors of a more interpretivist nature. These were excluded to some extent,
precisely because no well-acceptable method of documentation exists within the field of MCDM
or GSS. New methods of analysis and documentation of Group DSS processes are required and
possibly critical social theory could be of assistance in this regard.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the practical results of this research, as well as the theoretical
investigations support the idea that Group Decision Support Systems and Multi-Criteria Group
Decision Support Systems can contribute to the enhancement of the effectiveness and efficiency
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APPENDIX A: Task Hand Out for the Idea Generation Laboratory Experiment
This section shows the Task Handout, which was given to both treatment groups for the idea
generation task structuring exercise, which was run under laboratory conditions. It is noted that
although the group was given a hand out, this served to supplement the problem explanation
provided by the facilitator. The handouts given to both groups were identical in all respects
except on how the problem question was structured.
The text immediately below was handed out to the subjects as is. Part a) shows the case for the
single-question treatment, whereas Part b) shows what modifications were made for the multiple-
question treatment group.
a) Team Expert Choice Brainstorming Session 1:-Task Handout To Single-
Question Treatment
Prohleln: Generate ideas on the design of an information system to assist with thc promotion of
enthusiasm for customcr scrvice (at Ficlds Cook ies, Pty Ltd.) and whcre necessary. with the
compliance with this important company goal: financial and administrative functions.
I. Principle Underlying The Business Problem, explored through an IT solution.
There is a universal truth that states:
HPeople generally tend not do those things they do not like doing~ plus they will do those that
they like doing extremely well."
More formally:
There is a continuous spectrum between levels of commitment or enthusiasm and compliance
within individuals. In order get things done, people are motivated by one of the two factors:
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• They have an intrinsic commitment to or enthusiasm for the tasks they perform. This
commitment and enthusiasm drives individuals to perform optimally without much external
intervention or interference.
• On the other hand, when individuals are required to perform a task for which commitment or
enthusiasm is lacking, then compliance measures must be set in place in order to ensure that the
task will be performed.
2. The nature of the IT task on which Creativity will be studied
Fields Cookies Pty Ltd. is a medium sized chain of Biscuit Stores, which employs, as a matter of
company policy, managers whose commitment levels are very high on Customer Service Issues.
They have found that frequently their managers have limited commitment or enthusiasm towards
other critical business issues. This is particularly true for issues concerning matters financial and
administrative. To close this gap, the company has decided to implement a business system that
will support their managers in what they do best, but also to ensure that they perform the tasks
they do not necessarily like doing. In other words the company wants systems are in place to
make their managers comply with financial and administrative functions.
In sum, the company wants to:
Design a system that supports the company's desire to maximise the balance between the compliance-
commitment dichotomy of its store managers given the following company objectives and constraints.
3. The Conlpany Policy Objective is to
(a) To employ managers whose strengths and job focus are in maximising Customer Service. For
example friendly staff, high response times, cheerful decor etc. Hence, managers are employed
on the basis that their over-riding quality strength lies in their ability to provide excellent
customer service. These people have high levels of commitment and natural enthusiasm for
cllstomer service, above all else.
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(b) As for other management functions (e.g. financial administration.) it is calculated that the
accomplishment of these functions will be as a result of compliance measures that the company
puts into place.
4. The Constraints faced by the Company:
Because the chain store is a relatively medium sized business, it is not cash-flooded, it cannot
afford the best educated and most experienced managers. People of such high calibre are
expensive to hire and generally, only the conglomerates can afford them. Therefore, hiring
additional managers whose commitment to financial administration is high is not a viable
solution for Fields Cookies.
5. The System Requirements
The company seeks to install a computer system that supports all the functions that the business
faces in its operations to sustain itself. The company wants to have compliance measures for the
financial-administrative tasks of the stores, and support measures for the areas in which their
managers are strong.
You have been given the task or identi fying and suggesting the IlH1.l0r dctai led system
components required by Fields Cookies (Pty) Ltd, having familiarized yourself with thc issucs
organization f~lces.
6. The Fonnulatioll of the Task:
"~Yhat characteristics and components should the Fields Cookies (Pty) Ltd business ~yslem ha\'e
to support and enhance managers' commitment to customer service plus support and enforce
compliance to sound business practice in the administrative-financial aspects of running the
business? "
You are required to brainstorm around this question with the objective of defining the "must have
components" of the system under the circumstances.
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Note: Underneath is a Diagram Summarizing the Business Processes at Fields Cookies (Pty) Ltd.
Procurement / I Sales OrderPurchasing Function Entry Function









Quality and Marketing and
Inspection Sales
(b) Tealn Expert Choice Brainstonning Session 2: Task I-Iandout to Multiple-
Question Treatlnent
(As already stated thc handout for this treatment group was identical to the above, except for the
formulation of the task qucstion. This group was instructed to deal serially with the two questions
within allocated timc slices)
6. The Formulation of the Task
1. .. rVhat characteristics/components should the !Jyslem have 1o support and enhance
managers' commitment to customer service?"
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11. What characteristics/components should the system have to support and enforce
compliance to proper sound business practices in the administration - financial aspects of
running the business?
You are required to brainstorm around these questions with objective of defining the "must have
components JI of the system under the circumstances. Brainstorm each question separately, i.e.
once you have finished with the first question, only then can you tackle the second question.
Note: Underneath is a Diagram Summarizing the Business Processes at Fields Cookies (Pty) Ltd.
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APPENDIX 8: Post-Session Questionnaire to the Idea Generation Task
This appendix shows a specimen of the post-session questionnaire handed out to both groups,
which participants filled out upon completion of the task. Subjects were asked to complete the





Please answer the following questions to complete the session.
1. How satisfied were you with the effectiveness of the process (the TeamEC Environment)
used to generate ideas?
(1) Completely satisfied.
(2) Moderately satisfied.
(3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
(4) Moderately dissatisfied.
(5) Completely dissatisfied.
2. Would you rccommcnd this process to generate ideas?
(I) Yes.
(2) No.
]. Do you bel ievc you expressed all the ideas that occurred to you?
(I) Yes
(2) No




4. Did you express your ideas immediately after you thought of them or did you have to wait?
(I) Yes.
(2) No.
rf you had to wait, what was causing the wait?





5. Did you feel comfortable about expressing your ideas?
(1) Very Comfortable.
(2) Moderately comfortable.
(3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
(4) Moderately Uncomfortable.
(5) Very Uncomfortable.
6. Did you ever worry about other participants knowing that you are the owner of the ideas you
generated?
(l) Yes, all the time.
(2) Yes, sometimes.
(3) No, not at all.
7. After seeing the ideas of others, were you excited to think differently about some things?
(1) Yes.
(2) No.
8. After seeing the ideas of others, were you excited to think about more ideas which you had
not thought or previously.
( I) Ycs.
(2) No.
9. Did you feel there was sufficient time to tackle the prohlem?
(I) Yes.
(2) No
Below arc the tabulated results of the questionnaire for both treatment groups. No hypothesis had
been stated, the expectation was that the effect of the GSS would be equivalent.
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Table 8.1 Results From the post-session questionnaire for the single-question treatment group.
Questionnaire Results: All Encompassing Problem
Appendices
Issue Participants (Ratings)
Participants 1 2 3 4 5 6 Averasze
1 Satisfaction
3 4 3 4 5 4 3.83
2 Process Recommendable?
1 2 2 2 2 2 1.83
3 Production Blocking
2 2 1 2 2 2 1.83
4 Immediately
2 1 2 2 2 2 1.83
5 Evaluation Apprehension
3 4 2 3 4 4 3.33
6 Evaluation Apprehension-Anonymity
3 3 2 2 3 3 2.67
7 Think different
1 2 1 2 2 1 1.50
8 Think More
2 1 1 2 2 2 1.67
9 Time Enough
2 2 1 1 2 2 1.67
19 21 15 20 24 22 20.17
Tnhle B.2 Results From the post-session questionnnire for the multiple-question treatment group.
Questionnaire Results: The Decomposed Problem.
Issue Participants (Ratings)
Participants 1 2 3 4 5 6 Averasze
1 Satisfaction
4 4 4 5 5 2 4.00
2 Process Recommendable?
2 2 2 2 2 2 2.00
3 Production Blocking
2 2 1 1 2 2 1.67
4 Immediately
2 2 2 1 2 1 1.67
5 Evaluation Apprehension
4 1 3 3 4 4 3.17
6 Evaluation Apprehension-Anonymity
3 2 2 2 3 2 2.33
7 Think different
2 1 1 2 2 1 1.50
8 Think More
2 2 2 2 2 1 1.83
9 Time Enough
2 1 1 1 2 1 1.33




APPENDIX c: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEA GENERATION TASK
========================================
The tables below show the detail calculations for the t-statistic, for the hypothesis testing
discussed in chapter five. They also show the results of the test for the homogeneity of variances
of the two samples (Alder and Roessler, 1977:314; Pollard, 1977).
Table C.l. Illustrating the calculation of the t-statistic for hypothesis testing on the role of task structure over
the number of unique ideas (on the left hand side) and total quality (on the right hand side)
2IGG2I GG rOUD rOUD rOUD rOUD
~"m"Ar nf IInlnllA IAAAt Tnhl nlJAlttv
'le V x·x (X·X)2 v·v (V·V)2 'le V x·x (X·X)2 v·v (V·VI2
Member 1 5 9 ·0.333 0.111 0.333 0.1111 16 30 ·2.667 7.111 ·0.667 0.444
Member 2 7 7 1.667 2.778 -1.667 2.7778 26 22 5.333 28.444 -8.667 75.111
Member 3 11 7 5,667 32,111 -1.667 2.7778 47 25 26333 693.444 -5.667 32.111
Member 4 3 7 -2.333 5444 ·1667 2,7776 6 27 -12.667 160444 ·3.667 13444
Member 5 2 13 -3,333 11,111 4.333 187778 9 45 ·11.667 136.111 14.333 205.444
Member 6 4 9 -1 333 1 776 0.333 01111 16 35 ·4667 21776 4.333 18778
10 10
Group Total 32 5200 0000 53333 0000 27333 124 164 0000 1047.333 0.000 345333
Mean 5333 6667 20667 30667
Slandard dovlallo 3266 2336 14473 6311
. ·,4r!\M:"~III.. ;~r;-1":I"ili ....... '" .; ~ . . :.1Ill
Variance 10.667 5.487 209.467 69.087
For I
Numerator ·1054093 -1054093 -3162270 -31 62276




F (5,5) 5.05 5.05
(Pollard. 1977) , 951 < 50 Therefore difference In varlances IS not slgnlflcanl 3 033 " 5 0 Therefore difference ,n vaflances IS not Significant
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Table C. 2 Illustrating the calculation of the t-statistic for hypothesis testing on the role of task structure over
the mean quality of ideas (on the left hand side) and the number of good ideas (on the right hand side)
2GrOUD I GrouD 2 GrouD GrOUD
Mean Quality Nllmh",r nf r.nnrt nf IdfO"~
X V X-X (X-X)2 V-V (V-Y)2 X V X-X (X-X)2 V-V (Y-V)2
Member 1 3.6000 3.3333 -0.192 0.037 -0.209 0.044 4 7 -0.500 0.250 -0.500 0.250
Member 2 3.7143 3.1429 -0.078 0.006 -0.400 0.160 6 5 1.500 2.250 -2.500 6.250
Member 3 4.2727 3.5714 0.480 0.231 0.029 0.001 10 7 5.500 30.250 -0.500 0.250
Member 4 2.6667 3.8571 -1.126 1.267 0.315 0.099 2 7 -2.500 6.250 -0.500 0.250
Member 5 4.5000 3.4615 0.708 0.501 -0.081 0.007 2 11 -2.500 6.250 3.500 12.250
Member 6 4.0000 3.8889 0.208 0.043 0.346 0.120 3 8 -1.500 2.250 0.500 0.250
10.0000 10
Group Total 22.7537 21.2552 0.000 2.085 0.000 0.430 27 45 0.000 47.500 0.000 19.500
Mean 3.7923 3.5425 4.500 7.500
Standard deviation 0.6457 0.2932 3.082 1.975
~.•.'liim"l't~ •• t
Variance 0.4170 0.0860 9.600 3.900
For t
Numerator 0.78977 0.78977 -9.48683 -9.48683




F (6,6) 6.06 6.06
(Pollard, 1977) 4.850 < 5.0 Therefore difference in varlances Is not significant 2.436 < 5.0 Therefore difference In varlances Is not significant
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APPENDIX D: SOME DATA ON THE INDICATORS USED TO SUPPORT CONSENSUS
BUILDING
In the support for consensus many consensus data indicators, as defined by Ngwenyama et al.
(1996) were generated and analyzed The indicator values shown here relate to the original
criteria, which elicited intense discussion relative to the defined intensities. Below is a summary
of the process building up to consensus.
Table D.I Group Strong Agreement Quotient (GSAQ) identifying the percentage of pairs of group
members who have a reasonably strong level of agreement
SI\V(l), SIW(2), SIW(3), SIW(4), SIW(5), SIW(6), SIW(7), SI\V(8), GSAQ
W(GM)I W(GM)I W(GM)I W(GM)I W(GM») \V(GM» W(GM») W(GM»
('O:\S'I rn 'TI< >:\,\1. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.('-'
POLITICAL 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
RELIGIOUS n.oo 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25
CULTURAL 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
FACULTY 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50
ENTERTAINMENT 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
DEVELOPM 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
DVERSITY 1.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 n.oo 0.00 0.00 0.13
Memhership Size 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.11.\
\111C1\1I1( Hl'qlll"ll'd 0,00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1I.JX
\,llllllllll{\''':lrdl'd 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0,00 11.2:'
I \1)('lhl' \LlfI:IL:\'Il11'f11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 (l.SS
1'\'ITl'ptillll' 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 II ..'S
1111' 11111\' 11 i 'Ill',' 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 II.JS
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The Individual Strong Agreement Quotient (ISAQ) illustrated in Table D.2 used to identify those
members who, for the defined criteria, were prime candidates around which to build consensus.
Such members were encouraged to lead discussion.
Table D.2 The Individual Strong Agreement Quotient (ISAQ)
ISAQ constitution membership amount amount expenditure perceptions income
size requested rewarded management history
SRCOI 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.13
SRC02 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.13
SRC03 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.25
SRC04 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.13
SRC05 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.25 0.00
SRC06 0.13 0.13 0.50 0.13 0.50 0.25 0.13
SRC07 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.38 0.25
SRC08 0.50 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.63 0.25 0.25
Individual Strong Disagreement Quotient (ISDQ)
The usefulness of this indicator is in assisting highlight the individual of interest in building
consensus and promoting a compromise position. It is looked at in conjunction with data in Table
D.1.
Tnhlc n.3 The Intlividunl Stronl: Disn~rccmcntQuoticnt (ISDQ)
ISDQ constitution Illelll bersh ip amount amount expenditure perceptions II1come
SIZl.:. requcsted rcwarded management history
SRCOI -0.38 -0.38 -0.25 -0.38 -O.U -O.SS -0.75
SRC02 -0.38 -0.38 -0.75 -0.25 -0.38 -0.50 -0.75
SRC03 -0.38 -O.U -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 -0.50 -O.G3
SRC04 -0.25 -0.13 -0.25 -0.38 -0.38 -0.50 -0.75
SRC05 -0.G3 -0.50 -0.88 -0.75 -0.50 -0.63 -0.88
SRCOG -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 -0.50 -0.13 -0.63 -0.75
SRC07 -0.75 -0.25 -0.\3 -0.63 -0.75 -0.38 -0.50
SRC08 -0.38 -0.88 -0.50 -0.50 -0.25 -0.63 -0.63
A Summary Relating to the Important Criteria and the Intensities of the Criterion
ConstitutiolU11 Objective:
Expenditure managcnlcnt (GSAQ at 0.88) was almost unanimously rated as the most important
criterion with respect to the allocation of funds (the goal). Further, the node's sub-criteria
(intensities) were fairly straightforward and were agreed. The group was convinced and did not
engage in further discussion in this regard. With a GSAQ of 0.88, the usefulness of the consensus
relevant data was reassuring at this stage
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Constitutional Objective (GSAQ at 63%) was the criterion up next for discussion. In practice,
although there was not sufficient consensus, all the group had to do was convince one extra
person and consensus would be sufficient. More significantly, however is examining the power of
the members comprising the GSAQ at 63%, for in practice that is the reason why issue was
passed without "acrimonious discussion." Four of the five members i.e. members 1, 2, 3, 4, are
the President, his deputy, the only woman in the group and the Secretary General. All four
members command a lot of respect for their position, experience and/or independence of mind.
That member 8 showed high levels of agreement with these four members was a numbers-bonus.
All four members did not need encouragement to speak in this regard.
Nonetheless, The extent of agreement between these five members was more easily decipherable
from their similarity functions, seen in Table 10, below.
0.60.
= 0.78 shared the strongest level ofagreement, followed by
0.68 with the next strongest level (?f agreement, followed by
O. 66/0110 wed hy
SRC02 and SRC03 at S(w2, w3)
,5'RCO1 and SRC08 at S(w', wll)
SRC03 and SRCO-! at S(wJ, w")
.\'RC02 and SRC04 al S(l/, w4 ) =
a) Dcvclopnlcnt Promoting (GS!\Q at 50~»: Thc valuc of engaging in activities that are
dcsigned to the development or students was rated as the most important intensity (sec Figure 5.2
above). Following the discussion on the importance of entertainment members 3,5, and 6
volunteered to change their ratings in principle in order to arrivc at 1000/0 eonscnsus. The issuc
was closed without much discussion.
b) Diversity Pronloting (GSAQ at 130/0): This was discussed in the main body of this study.
d) Politics Promoting (GSAQ at 50%). Members were relatively satisfied with the rating of this
intensity, viewed against the other intensities. The facilitator individually polled Members 1,5, 6
and 7; their ratings were the obstacle to sufficient consensus. The President (Member I) indicated
he was happy in principle with the group rating, he had no "substantive objections" in light of the
fact that this rated higher than "cultural, religious and faculty considerations". The other three
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members were asked to change their ratings. They agreed to do this in principle provided the
ratings of "cultural, religious and faculty" were not subsequently adjusted upward.
e) Culture Promoting (OSAQ at 38%) At this stage members merely wanted to look at this
issue relative to the religious intensity only. Members were polled individually to indicate any
disagreement with the group preference rating and there were no objections. Consensus was
reached. Religion Promoting (OSAQ at 38%) rated second last, above faculty and was discussed
simultaneously with the intensity referencing the promotion of cultural issues. Thus the group
rating prevailed.
f) Faculty Councils (OSAQ at 500/0): The intensity referencing the importance faculty councils
was rated as the least important. The academic development officer was asked to lead the
discussion. she agreed with the group rating. She summarized the issue as follows. "The issue
with faculty councils as you all know is, we think these should be funded by the faculties they
serve. SRC/und\' are limited as it is. Faculty councils play a very !Jpec~fic role, the SRC concerns
ilse(f with Keneral student issues." The SRC had pondered this issue at length, it appeared. The
was no substantive disagreemcnt renectcd by the Individual Strong Disagreement Indicator
(ISDI) valucs and their individual preferencc vcctors: Members 1,2,6,7,and 8 rated it as the least





APPENDIX E. A POST SESSION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FIELD STUDY
Subjects were asked to rate the following in order to gauge for satisfaction with the process and
the effects of the technology, the decision approach (the Analytic Hierarchy Process )and the
facilitator on group ownership of the solution. These were assigned a judgment on a scale from 1
to 7. They were required to circle the relevant answer.









Ilow difficult was it understand the process?
( 1) Extremcly easy
(2) Very easy
(3) Easy





3. Did you ever feel the facilitator made issue decisions for the group?
(1) Never
(2) Almost never
(3) Less than sometimes
(4) Sometimes
(5) A good many times
(6) Almost all the time
(7) All of the Time
4. Did you ever feel the (AHP) method used made issue decisions for the group?
(I) .Never
(2) A Imost never
(3) Less than sometimes
(4) Sometimes
(5) A good many times
(6) Almost all the time
(7) All of the Time
S. Did you ever feel the TEAM EC software made issue decisions for the group?
( I ) Never
(2) AImost never
(3) Less than sometimes
(4) Sometimes
(5) A good many times
(6) Almost all the time




6. Would you recommend this process for future complex decisions your organization may have
to make?
(1) All of the Time
(2) Almost all the time
(3) A good many times
(4) Sometimes
(5) Less than sometimes
(6) Almost never
(7) Never
7. With what level of certainty can you say the solution generated by the group is the group's
own solution'?
( I) 7(} - 100 percent
(2) () I - 75 pcrccnt
(3) 40 - 60 perccnt
(4) 3 I - 45 percent
(5) 16 - 30 percent
(6) 1-15 percent
(7) opercent
8. !-Iow do you think the process has affected the capacity of your group to work together again?
( I) Extremely well
(2) Very well
(3) Well






TableE.1.Summary of the responses of the post-session questionnaire to the field study on supporting
consensus building.
Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6 Member 7 Member 8 AVERAGE
Question 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.00
Question 2 7 7 5 5 6 6 6 4 5.75
Question 3 7 7 7 7 5 6 5 5 6.13
Question 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.00
Question 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.00
Question 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.00
Question 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 7 6 6.50
Question 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7.00
1.00
0.82
0.88
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.93
1.00
234
